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1

P R O C E E D I N G S

2

-

3

-

MR. FROEB:

-

-

-

-

Welcome to the celebration of the

4

role of economics at the Federal Trade Commission.

My

5

name is Luke Froeb.

6

Bureau of Economics, but I've only been on the job three

7

weeks.

8

Paul Pautler, and especially Denis Breen for putting on

9

this crash course in management for me.

I'm the current Director of the

I want to thank Dave Scheffman, Chairman Muris,

I have hundreds

10

of questions about the role of economics and how to

11

manage the Bureau, and I'm sure I'll get a chance to ask

12

most of them today.

13

It's self evident to economists that cost

14

benefit analysis should be the foundation of consumer

15

protection and competition policy.

16

had is convincing others of that fact.

17

more sympathetic and influential in bringing cost benefit

18

analysis, economic analysis to the Federal Trade

19

Commission over the past three decades than our Chairman,

20

Timothy Muris.

21

(Applause.)

22

MR. MURIS:

The difficulty we've
No one has been

Please see Mr. Muris's written remarks at http://www.ftc.gov/
be/workshops/directorsconference/docs/openingremarks.pdf

Thank you very much for that kind

23

but not completely accurate remark.

There are a lot of

24

people in this room who are more responsible for getting

25

economics ingrained in the FTC than I've been.

For The Record, Inc.
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1

I want to welcome you to this celebration of

2

the 100th anniversary of the FTC's predecessor, the

3

Bureau of Corporations.

4

distinguished guests, including 13 former Directors or

5

Acting Directors of the Bureau of Economics.

6

critical role that the Bureau has played in the FTC's

7

history, including its economic investigation and report

8

writing and its involvement in law enforcement, it's

9

fitting to commemorate this 100th anniversary.

10

Today's roundtable is one of several

We're joined today by numerous

Given the

11

celebrations of the rich history of the FTC.

Let me just

12

give you a few examples of what we're doing.

A few years

13

ago, I created the Miles W. Kirpatrick Award.

14

honors the commitment, talent, and contributions of

15

individuals who throughout their public and private

16

careers have made lasting and significant contributions

17

to the FTC.

18

This award

Basil Mezines received the first award, and we

19

established a tradition by having someone present it to

20

him.

21

award and gave a very interesting talk which we have

22

recorded.

23

Caspar Weinberger actually presented the first

Just to show the persistence of the FTC

24

community, we had to schedule the award ceremony three

25

times.

26

2001, which for obvious reasons didn't work.

The first date was scheduled for September 12th,

For The Record, Inc.
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And right

7
1

before the second date, Basil's wife unfortunately died.

2

Caspar Weinberger called me and said don't you dare

3

cancel this thing.

4

was the charm.

5

So he came down, and the third time

Last year we gave the award to Bob Pitofsky.

6

Ira Millstein, who is a very prominent antitrust

7

attorney, presented the award.

8

there.

9
10

I see some grimaces out

(Laughter.)
MR. MURIS:

I know why Mike is grimacing,

11

because Ira led the attack on line of business.

But Ira

12

is probably best known for his forcing out GM management

13

ten years ago or so.

14

Ira's role was that he was the one who corralled Bob

15

Pitofsky and got Bob to be the executive director of the

16

first Kirpatrick report, which had such an impact.

17

I also see Marc Winerman here.

He's a very prominent lawyer.

Marc, Chris

18

White and Jim Hamill from our General Counsel's office

19

are working on oral histories of the FTC.

20

written an outstanding paper about to be published in the

21

Antitrust Law Journal on the 1914 origins of the FTC.

22

Marc has

We're also planning an event to celebrate the

23

FTC's 90th anniversary, which is tentatively scheduled

24

for next fall.

25

anniversary.

26

will be next fall, or when the agency opened, which I

The FTC has two ways to determine its
You can look at when the law passed, which

For The Record, Inc.
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1

think would be March of 2005.

2

Before I tell you about today's events, permit

3

me a few personal remembrances.

4

see so many longtime friends.

5

with people who remember the doghouse and Barney's sense

6

of humor in his FTC special.

7

was across the street.

8

turkey.

9

It's really wonderful to
It's especially nice to be

If you remember, Barney's

The FTC special was sliced

I have memories with so many of you, and I just

10

wanted to share two.

11

eyes get bigger and bigger until they almost exploded out

12

of his head as the late Mike Glassman explained the

13

cereals case.

14

(Laughter.)

15

MR. MURIS:

16

One was watching John Peterman's

As Mike said, quote, "It's a

spatial monopoly, John."

17

(Laughter.)

18

MR. MURIS:

The other was in Room 432, June

19

1975.

20

the late Jim Liebler and Mike Scherer do battle.

21

issue was whether General Foods was predating against

22

Procter & Gamble, and Mike's recommendation that General

23

Foods be forced to license its trademark Maxwell House to

24

new entrants.

25
26

Literally hundreds of people were packed in to see
The

As Mike reminded me last night, being the
excellent academic that he is, he recovered from the
For The Record, Inc.
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1

Commission's rejection of his remedy by publishing an

2

article about predation in the Harvard Law Review, no

3

less.

4

So I have many fond memories of what we're

5

going to talk about today, and I certainly look forward

6

to this discussion.

7

won't be able to be here for most of the discussion.

8

good news is we tape all these things, and it's my

9

entertainment while using my exercise bike.

Unfortunately, the bad news is I
The

I'm

10

currently watching a memorial service for Phil Elman, and

11

it is quite interesting.

12

We are also assembling a very large documentary

13

and oral history of the FTC.

This program will be an

14

important part of our oral history.

15

As you all know, the Bureau of Corporations was

16

created as an investigatory, not a law enforcement group.

17

It was created within the Department of Commerce and

18

Labor.

19

same day that the Department opened.

20

opened and replaced the Bureau of Corporations.

21

Commissioner of Corporations, Joseph E. Davies, became

22

the FTC's first Chairman.

23

The Bureau opened on February 14th, 1903, the
In 1915, the FTC
The

The FTC's first Chief Economist was Francis

24

Walker, the former Deputy Commissioner of Corporations,

25

who remained with the FTC for 26 years.

26

Commission inherited both staff and investigations from

The new

For The Record, Inc.
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1

the old Bureau.

2

began a tradition of economic report writing and research

3

that continues to this day.

4

Commission and its staff have played a crucial role in

5

policymaking by Congress, other federal agencies, and

6

state authorities and legislatures.

7

The Corporation's investigatory role

Economic reports by the

Of course, Congress included enforcement and

8

adjudication, as well as investigation, when it created

9

the FTC.

The Economic Division, which was the

10

predecessor to the Bureau of Economics, conducted the

11

report writing function through the '20s.

12

role expanded in 1936 with the passage of the Robinson-

13

Patman Act.

14

accountants, supported RP cases.

15

collection became another activity of the Division in the

16

late 1930s.

17

The Division's

The Division, primarily through its
Sad but true.

Data

The Bureau of Economics was created in 1954,

18

and its functions were further enlarged to include merger

19

review, antitrust analysis and case support.

20

Protection work became a regular BE activity in the mid

21

to late 1970s, and Competition and Consumer Protection

22

Advocacy began in the late 1970s and 1980s.

Consumer

23

Today we're going to consider the history of BE

24

and its contributions to research, economic knowledge and

25

policy, and antitrust and consumer protection law

26

enforcement.
For The Record, Inc.
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1

To some extent, there are discussions of BE's

2

history in published commentaries and other public

3

documents, including FTC annual reports.

4

several older publications on the earlier decades of the

5

Commission and the Bureau of Corporations.

6

There are

There's also some more recent FTC history

7

covering the Bureau of Economics in various books and

8

articles, including commentaries by our current General

9

Counsel, Bill Kovacic, and in a book that I wrote and

10

edited with Ken Clarkson, which criticized the role of

11

the FTC in the 1970s.

12

the reviews or memoirs of several former BE directors.

13

BE history also is discussed in

Today's discussion will provide a valuable

14

addition to this collection.

15

think we know about the history of BE and the evolving or

16

changing role of the economists at the Commission from

17

the mouths of those who know BE best, its former

18

Directors.

19

We will augment what we

We want to identify from their experiences

20

significant BE contributions to economic research and

21

knowledge and to antitrust and consumer protection

22

policy.

23

often less visible contributions to FTC law enforcement.

24

Likewise, we want to identify the important but

Finally, we hope to learn how internal and

25

external influences affected BE's work.

We will consider

26

the FTC's organization, resource levels, relationships
For The Record, Inc.
Waldorf, Maryland(301)870-8025

12
1

with other bureaus, lines of communication within the

2

Commission, and trends and developments in the fields of

3

economics, the economy, the political environment and

4

technology.

5

Our panel today -- and this is one of the great

6

parts about this day -- consists of former BE Directors

7

and Acting Directors from the past 50 years.

8

include Jesse Markham, who was Director in the mid 1950s,

9

and Fritz Mueller, Director for eight years in the 1960s.

They

10

I learned last night that Fritz also had a stint in the

11

White House monitoring prices.

12

Some of our guests served more than once as

13

Director or Acting Director, like Dave Scheffman and Mack

14

Folsom.

15

the Commission, and each has valuable knowledge to share

16

with us today about the Bureau of Economics and the role

17

of economic analysis at the Commission.

18

their biographies clearly indicate, they not only lived

19

for a long time, but each has had a distinguished career

20

beyond the FTC.

21

contributions to academia, other public service in

22

government, consulting and corporate America.

23

Each of our panelists left his or her mark on

Moreover, as

They are well recognized for their

We're also pleased to have as our luncheon

24

speaker -- and I'll have a lot more to say about that

25

when I introduce Jim at lunch -- another economist with a

26

distinguished career here and beyond, former FTC Chairman
For The Record, Inc.
Waldorf, Maryland(301)870-8025

13
1

James C. Miller III.

2

Dave Scheffman, our most recent former BE

3

Director, will moderate our beginning panels.

4

served with distinction for a total of 12 years, so far,

5

in the Bureau.

6

(Laughter.)

7

MR. MURIS:

Dave has

Luke Froeb, the current BE

8

Director, will moderate the fourth session this morning.

9

Luke comes to us from Vanderbilt University, where he

10

taught managerial economics, regulation, and antitrust

11

for MBAs.

12

Luke is new to the FTC, but he served as an

13

economist at the DOJ in the late 1980s and early 1990s.

14

We hired him despite that indiscretion.

15

BE Deputy Director Paul Pautler will moderate

16

the afternoon panels.

Paul has made valuable

17

contributions to antitrust, consumer protection,

18

advocacy, and research since his start in BE 25 years

19

ago.

20

Commission and of the Bureau.

He's also a dedicated student of the history of the

21

As most of you know, I consider good economics

22

to be crucial in guiding the FTC's judgments and policies

23

in promoting competition and consumer protection.

24

Commission's enforcement missions need a sound

25

theoretical framework supported by solid, empirical

26

evidence.

The

Our enforcement programs should be focused on
For The Record, Inc.
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1

practices that pose the greatest threats to consumers.

2

In addition, Congress gave us a broader role as

3

a deliberative body and independent expert on issues

4

affecting the market.

5

hearings, conduct studies and issue reports to Congress

6

and the public.

7

BE is an essential part of this policy research

8

and development.

9

our economists.

10

In this role, we hold public

I'm proud of the outstanding work of
Indeed, as I have often said, we have

one of the world’s great collections of IO economists.

11

In looking forward, we need to understand the

12

path we have followed.

13

of the steps taken by our panelists and others with whom

14

they work.

15

We've reached this point because

Each panelist can discuss positive acts during

16

his or her tenure.

17

frustrations and setbacks.

18

of evolution, adjustment and progress that provides a

19

valuable lesson for our future.

20

Each no doubt can also remember
Together, they tell a story

Finally, I want to thank the Bureau's staff for

21

organizing today's event.

22

Breen, Paul Pautler, Luke Froeb, and Dave Scheffman.

23

I especially thank Denis

Also, I thank again today's participants for

24

sharing your time with us.

25

to our first moderator, Dave Scheffman.

26

I now turn the program over

Thank you.
For The Record, Inc.
Waldorf, Maryland(301)870-8025

15
1

MR. SCHEFFMAN:

Thank you, Tim.

2

(Applause.)

3

MR. SCHEFFMAN: We have an extraordinary group

4

of people here in many dimensions in terms of

5

contributions to industrial organization economics,

6

publications, teaching, and textbooks.

7

group of people, and also obviously important to public

8

policy.

9

An extraordinary

One might expect that the main impact of BE

10

arises from actions of the Director, such as whispering

11

into the ear of the Chairman at Commission meetings.

12

Actually, the role of whispering in the ear of the

13

Chairman is an extremely minor part of the Bureau

14

Director’s job.

15

they tend not to listen much when we whisper into their

16

ears.

I have worked with lots of Chairmen, and

17

(Laughter.)

18

MR. SCHEFFMAN:

19

The way the Bureau of Economics

affects things is through the work of the staff.

20

The Directors were effective if they understood

21

that role and harnessed and improved that talent to make

22

economic analysis more relevant to the Commission.

23

A couple of people not here deserve special

24

mention.

One, Mike Mann, a Bureau Director in the 1970s,

25

besides being an outstanding industrial organization

26

economist, was truly one of the nicest people that any of
For The Record, Inc.
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1

us ever met.

We certainly miss Mike.

2

Another very important person who was not a

3

Bureau Director but undoubtedly would have been here,

4

larger than life, if he were still alive is Mike

5

Glassman, who made some of the biggest contributions to

6

the Bureau.

7

Two of our panelists, who started in the staff

8

and grew to management positions, were Mack Folsom and

9

John Peterman.

These men, and Mike Glassman, were

10

especially effective because they understood BE and the

11

Commission both from the staff and management

12

perspectives, and because they were effective in

13

integrating economic analysis with the needs of

14

Commission attorneys.

15

With those introductory remarks aside, we're

16

starting with the beginning of the modern Bureau of

17

Economics.

18

Mueller and Mack Folsom.

19

chronological order.

20

That's the panel with Jesse Markham, Fritz
We're going to go in

Jesse will go first.

MR. MARKHAM:

21

ever got me anywhere.

22

(Laughter.)

23

MR. MARKHAM:

This is the first time that age

I'm reminded that I must start

24

with a caveat.

It's exactly 50 years ago that Jack

25

Howrey sent a representative to visit me at Princeton

26

University to see if I would come down and entertain the
For The Record, Inc.
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1

notion of taking over the Bureau of Economics.

2

In looking back 50 years ago, to use good

3

computer language, I find that my memory coil works

4

pretty well, but my retrieval system may have some

5

defects.

6

(Laughter.)

7

MR. MARKHAM:

In fact, I think Denis was

8

somewhat surprised when he found my phone number, called

9

me, and found that a real live person answered the

10

telephone.

11

(Laughter.)

12

MR. MARKHAM:

Well, anyway, back to the

13

beginning and those two-and-a-half or three years that I

14

was around the Commission.

15

When Jack Howrey called me into his office,

16

after reviewing the enabling legislation that set up the

17

Federal Trade Commission, he thoroughly convinced me that

18

he was going to take quite seriously injecting a lot more

19

economic analysis into what was going on around the

20

Commission.

21

He started by reviewing the remand order in the

22

Pillsbury case, where Pillsbury acquired Ballad and Duff.

23

The hearing examiner had simply relied upon the

24

substantiality doctrine, that in some quantitative sense,

25

this had accounted for a substantial amount in a line of

26

commerce.
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It was Jack Howrey's illustration of what he

2

wanted the Bureau to do.

He said that the hearing

3

examiner did not make the connection between a

4

substantial amount of output in a particular line of

5

commerce and the possibility of substantial injury to

6

competition.

7

My mentor, Ed Mason, had written two very

8

persuasive articles claiming that economists prefer

9

models, but lawyers like rules.

10

So I pointed this out to

Chairman Jack Howrey.

11

I told him that injecting more economics into

12

the whole system of litigation may be a pretty rough road

13

to travel.

14

economics is in some sense relevant to what they're

15

doing?

16

How are we going to convince lawyers that

He said, well, we'll take care of that.
He did hold several staff meetings between the

17

lawyers and the economists after I got there and

18

emphasized the point that he was making.

19

Well, to jump along, when I got my feet under

20

the desk in that lovely office over on Pennsylvania

21

Avenue, I found that I was not over staffed with

22

economists.

23

mergers and concentration.

24

committed to a study of the thousand largest

25

corporations.

26

called the litigation component of the Bureau of

John Blair was already busy with a study of
Frank Kottke was thoroughly

Erston Barnes was head of what we then
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Economics.

2

Roy Prewitt, as near as I could understand, was engaged

3

in damage control on a previous study of the petroleum

4

industry.

5

Betty Bock was busy with the Loria case, and

I learned fairly early in my tenure that we did

6

not have room to hire and beef up the economics

7

department very much.

8

called a RIF, a reduction in force, in Washington at that

9

time.

10

We were going through what was

In any case, that's what we had to live with.
Let me describe what the procedures were and

11

how Jack Howrey's mandate became put into practice.

12

those days before Hart-Scott-Rodino, we spent an awful

13

lot of time scanning the financial press to find and

14

catalogue all the mergers and situations that looked like

15

they might be predatory pricing.

16

In

The economists would work on a draft making the

17

economic argument that a situation potentially looked

18

like a case and should be investigated.

19

recommendation would come to my desk.

20

approved the recommendation and sent it to Harry Babcock,

21

who was then head of the Bureau of Investigation.

22

The draft
I almost always

From that point on, historically investigations

23

had just been in the lawyers' hands.

The change we

24

implemented was to send the economist along with the memo

25

to the Bureau of Investigation, to make it clear that

26

this is my case as well as it is your case.
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had very little opposition from Harry Babcock.

2

I was reminded when I called on Joe Sheehy, who

3

was the head of the litigation bureau in the Commission,

4

he stated that he could get along with economists.

5

didn't really hold very much against economists.

6

my departing his office, he was the one who reminded me

7

of that old Federal Trade Commission statement, "But you

8

have to remember, Professor, one incriminating letter in

9

the files is worth the testimony of ten economists."

10

(Laughter.)

11

MR. MARKHAM:

He
But on

Well, so much then for BE

12

functions, which are all spelled out in the Annual

13

Report.

14

The functions really were the screening, developing the

15

initial economic analysis, but going with it to the

16

Bureau of Investigation and having something to do with

17

the content of the letter of inquiry to go to the target

18

of the investigation.

19

There's no point in my reviewing all of this.

I want to dwell a little bit on the economic

20

study program.

We had scarcely gotten started on what I

21

perceived to be something of a new program when we got

22

hit with the coffee study.

23

popular study than this?

24

to its cup of coffee, and coffee prices were going up.

25

That was the end of the ten-cent cup of coffee in the

26

country.

How could you get a more
America woke up every morning
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Again, the role of the economist and Jack

2

Howrey.

The Bureau of Investigation literally ran with

3

that.

4

investigate and do something about the price of coffee.

5

You can understand, constituents were very upset about

6

all of this.

7

Congress was putting pressure on the Commission to

So the Bureau of Investigation sent its lawyers

8

to New York, and Howrey called me, and he said “I want

9

you to get to New York, take whatever staff you've got,

10

and I want you to be supervising the investigation.”

11

The lawyers were investigating the New York

12

Coffee and Sugar Exchange activities and looking into the

13

purchasing policies of Maxwell House Division of General

14

Foods, and of all the large coffee producers.

15

and I then moved from Washington to New York.

16

John Blair

In my first conference with members of the New

17

York Coffee and Sugar Exchange, it became clear that we

18

needed an expert on futures trading.

19

found one in the Department of Agriculture.

20

to recall his name.

21

a whiz.

22

member came over from the Bureau of Commerce who had a

23

degree in economics, but his specialty was marketing.

24

And fortunately, we

I think it was Robinson.

I'm trying
Absolutely

So we had him added to the staff, and a staff

Well, anyway, that study, produced during my

25

term in that office, was reviewed very favorably.

26

press I think hailed it as probably the best industry
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study that had ever come out of a government office.

2

it was nominated for a prize from the American Marketing

3

Association.

4

And

If I have a few minutes left, Denis wanted me

5

to do some reconciliation here between what seemed to be

6

the very prominent role that economists played in 1953 to

7

1956 or thereabouts, and an article that I wrote,

8

celebrating by the way the 50th Anniversary of the

9

Federal Trade Commission, dating it from 1914 at that

10

time, in which I downplayed the role of economists

11

generally.

12

given what's happened since the late 1950s, I would write

13

it a little differently.

14

I think if I had to write that article again,

The three decisions that the Federal Trade

15

Commission passed down in 1962 seemed to me again to be a

16

triumph of rules over analysis.

17

Commission enunciated the slogan of the deep pocket

18

theory.

19

therefore would put at a disadvantage the unintegrated

20

smaller firms.

21

possibility of business reciprocity.

22

reverted again to the doctrine of substantiality.

23

In one case, the

The acquiring company would have more money and

In the food case, it opened up the
In a third, it

In none of those cases was there any empirical

24

evidence of any anticompetitive effects.

Those rules may

25

have been perfectly supportable, but they were not

26

supported in these decisions.

The lack of evidence led
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me to conclude that rules again triumphed over economic

2

analysis in the decisionmaking and in the processes of

3

the Federal Trade Commission.

4

I end by observing that had I been writing any

5

time after around 1980, I would have given a somewhat

6

different story.

7

started were rooted clearly in the theory of oligopoly

8

and in the notion of conjectural interdependence.

9

was no evidence of an overt conspiracy, but that was I

The shared monopoly cases that were

10

think an excellent example of the application of an

11

economic model to an industrial situation.

There

12

Whether the FTC won or lost, it was very

13

appropriate, and in my judgment, it was a signal triumph

14

of analysis over rules.

15

That about finishes my little presentation.

16

MR. SCHEFFMAN:

17

MR. MUELLER:

Thank you, Jesse.

Fritz?

As with Jesse, I appreciate this

18

opportunity to visit with many old friends and to meet

19

others whom I've read about and some I am hearing about

20

for the first time.

21

young student, young relative to him. (Laughter.)

22

Jesse was one of my mentors as a

MR. MUELLER:

I have an article elaborating on

23

my presentation forthcoming as “The Revival of Economics

24

at the FTC in the 1960s” in the Review of Industrial

25

Organization, Vol. 24, No. 1 (2004). In many ways, the

26

1960s were the
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best of times and the worst of times.

A young President

2

had made a call to public service.

3

young academicians anxious to answer the President’s

4

call.

5

nature and business of the antitrust agencies.

6

Professor, George W. Stocking, often spoke of his

7

experiences as one of the several “chief economists” of

8

Thurman Arnold, and of working with the FTC’s long-time

9

chief economist Dr. Francis Walker.

I was among the many

Early in my training, I had learned much about the
My major

Another of my

10

professors, Jesse Markham, was appointed chief economist

11

of the FTC in 1953 while I was in graduate school.

12

I thought the best Washington job for an IO

13

economist must be that of Chief Economist of the FTC.

14

colleague, Professor John Stedman of the Wisconsin Law

15

School, provided an introduction to Paul Rand Dixon after

16

President Kennedy announced that Dixon would become the

17

FTC’s new Chairman.

18

while he was still serving as Chief Counsel to Senator

19

Kefauver’s Antitrust Subcommittee.

20

me on the list of candidates, but he suggested that I

21

also talk to the Subcommittee’s Chief Economist, Dr. John

22

Blair, a former Acting Chief Economist of the FTC.

23

Blair, who also was a candidate for the position,

24

discouraged me from going there by saying that the Bureau

25

of Economics was in such bad shape that perhaps even he

26

couldn’t fix it.

My

In February 1961, I visited Dixon

Dixon promised to put

Discouraged by my prospects at the FTC,
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in 1961 I accepted an offer as Chief Economist to

2

Congressman Wright Patman, the 1961 Chairman of the Joint

3

Economic Committee of the Congress, where I remained

4

until July.

5

During May and June, I had several interviews

6

with President Kennedy’s first two appointees to the FTC,

7

Chairman Paul Rand Dixon, a Democrat, and Commissioner

8

Philip Elman, a political independent.

9

interview in June in which Dixon said that he and Elman

Following an

10

had decided that I was one of the two finalists, Elman

11

asked me which position I was applying for, Chief

12

Economist to the Commission or Director of the Bureau of

13

Economics.

14

first inkling that they were considering creating

15

separate positions.

16

would choose the position of Economic Advisor to the

17

Commission.

18

I was nonplused by the question.

This was my

I said that, if forced to choose, I

At the time I had not known that a 1960 Budget

19

Bureau report had made a devastating criticism of the

20

Commission’s treatment of economists.

21

BE functioned out of the mainstream of the FTC’s mission

22

and played no role in advising Commissioners.

23

other things, the Budget Bureau recommended that a

24

special position of Economic Advisor to the Commission be

25

created, apart from the position of Bureau Director, as

26

Chief Economist Corwin Edwards had recommended in 1953

It stated that the

For The Record, Inc.
Waldorf, Maryland(301)870-8025

Among

26
1

and the Heller Report had recommended in 1955.

2

The reason various parties had proposed

3

separating the positions of Bureau Director and Economic

4

Advisor to the Commission was their interpretation of the

5

Administrative Procedures Act of 1946, which mandated the

6

separation of functions within administrative agencies.

7

Commissioner Philip Elman, who had served for years in

8

the office of the Solicitor General and was an expert on

9

administrative law, persuaded Chairman Dixon that the

10

same person could hold both positions if the Commission

11

isolated the Bureau Director from the litigating

12

functions within the BE by delegating administrative

13

responsibility of the Division of Economic Evidence to

14

the Deputy Bureau Director.

15

A few months after I arrived at the FTC in July

16

1963, the Commission accepted Elman’s proposal and

17

permitted the Bureau Director to serve as an economic

18

advisor to the Commission on any matter in which he had

19

not participated at the staff level.

20

Committee of the Administrative Conference, which was

21

reviewing the procedures of the FTC and other

22

administrative agencies, endorsed this approach (See

23

Auerbach, “The Federal Trade Commission: Internal

24

Organization and Procedure,” Minnesota Law Review, 48,

25

383-522.)

A 1962 report of a
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This decision decisively enhanced the role of

2

economists at the Commission in the 1960s.

The Chairman

3

always suggested that new Commissioners invite the

4

Commission’s Chief Economist to meet with them and have

5

him explain how he might be helpful to them and their

6

staffs.

7

to permit me to initiate meetings with them or their

8

staffs on economic matters.

9

Commissioner Philip Elman, generally conceded to be the

10

most brilliant legal mind to serve on the Commission to

11

that time.

12

decisions with economic content.

13

legal assistant was Richard Posner, who had served as

14

legal clerk to Justice William Brennen.

15

Posner said that I was the first economist he had worked

16

with and that his experience at the Commission began his

17

romance with economics.

18

had essentially embraced the industrial organization

19

paradigm of Professor Joe Bain, whose ideas had gained

20

prominence in antitrust enforcement circles in the 1960s.

21

Not surprisingly, Elman’s Consolidated Foods decision

22

included more than 40 citations to economic authorities,

23

with the largest number citing Professor Bain.

24

successfully articulated his views and played an

25

important role in developing antitrust policy in the

26

1960s, first at the Commission and later in the Office of

Most Commissioners adopted an “open door” policy

I worked most closely with

He wrote most of the important Commission
His most brilliant

In later years,

In those times, Posner, like me,
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the Solicitor General, where he successfully argued the

2

important Von’s Shopping Bag and Schwinn cases before the

3

Supreme Court in 1966 and 1967.

4

My first priority upon arriving at BE was

5

rebuilding the staff, which had been decimated in 1955

6

when the FTC asked the Heller consulting group to propose

7

organizational changes at the FTC.

8

recommended moving most BE economists to the staffs of

9

the Bureaus of Investigation and Litigation; moving the

The Heller Report

10

BE Division of Accounting to the Bureau of Investigation;

11

and moving the BE Division of Financial Statistics to the

12

Office of the Controller.

13

only a Bureau Director and a Division of Economic Reports

14

with 12 economists.

These changes left BE with

15

I think the reason the economists were moved

16

out of the Bureau of Economics into the legal division

17

was an outgrowth of a controversy between economists and

18

attorneys before Jesse came in.

19

Blair and the Chief Economist, Corwin Edwards, disagreed

20

vehemently with the economic approach being taken by the

21

legal division, and the lawyers wanted greater control

22

over the economists.

23

The economists, namely,

I think it was a terrible idea myself.

24

one of those things like your first marriage.

25

like a good idea at the time.
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Prior to my appointment, Chairman Dixon had

2

promised to return all economists to BE.

3

Bureau Director seriously committed to rebuilding BE,

4

Chairman Dixon insisted on a minimum commitment of four

5

years.

6

the other leading finalist for the BE job was unable to

7

obtain a four year leave of absence.

8

but I was willing to take my chances.

9

To find a new

This requirement proved fortunate for me, because

I couldn’t either,

Former BE Director Simon Whitney told me that

10

he had only two personnel recommendations.

11

Katherine Abbott, his competent personal secretary; the

12

other was Roy Prewitt, an excellent and loyal economist.

13

I accepted Whitney’s recommendations and retained Mrs.

14

Abbott as the BE Secretary and appointed Roy Prewitt

15

Deputy Director of BE.

16

One was

I quickly discovered that all economists on

17

BE’s Economic Reports staff were older than me and that

18

only one had a Ph.D.

19

thereafter.

20

bureaus included some very fine economists, especially

21

Roy Prewitt, Dr. Frank Kottke, and Dr. Betty Bock, all of

22

whom had been candidates for the BE Director’s job.

23

He was 65 and retired shortly

The 14 economists returning from the legal

We immediately began a serious recruitment

24

effort, which was difficult because universities were

25

hiring economists at record levels in the early 1960s.

26

Among the first I hired was Dr. Irene Till, who had been
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on Senator Kefauver’s staff.

She agreed to serve as

2

Chief of the Division of Economic Reports until I could

3

obtain a qualified replacement.

4

Stanley “Gene” Boyle, perhaps the top economist at the

5

Antitrust Division.

6

life, I appointed Dr. Arthur Anderson of Boston College,

7

one of Carl Kaysen’s students at Harvard.

8

the Division of Economic Evidence, I appointed Harrison

9

Houghton, who had worked many big cases at the Justice

In 1962, I hired Dr.

When Boyle returned to academic

As Chief of

10

Department in the 1950s and had assisted Senator Kefauver

11

in enacting the Celler-Kefauver Act.

12

knowledgeable in the ways of Washington.

13

recruit was Dr. Russell Parker, a University of Wisconsin

14

Ph.D., who subsequently served as Assistant Director of

15

BE with me and for all successive BE Directors until

16

1987, when he obtained a leave of absence to come to

17

Wisconsin for several years.

18

FTC until his retirement in the early 1990s.

19

key role in pushing through and implementing the line of

20

business program.

21

Houghton was very
Another early

He later returned to the
He played a

Happily, Russ is here today.

During the first few years, BE’s publication

22

output was modest.

But as the staff grew and the quality

23

improved, the output of economic studies increased from

24

14 during 1961-1965 to 48 during 1966-1970.

25

the professional prestige of BE economists, I persuaded

26

the Commission to permit identifying the authors of BE
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1

studies.

2

previously permitted crediting authors of reports.

3

the end of 1963, BE had 39 economists; thereafter the

4

number increased steadily, if modestly.

5

achieved recognition as one of the best microeconomics

6

groups in Washington.

7

To my knowledge, the Commission had never
By

By 1969, BE

My role as Chief Economist to the Commission

8

created many important and unique opportunities.

I

9

worked more closely with Commissioner Philip Elman than

10

with other Commissioners.

11

such important FTC decisions as Consolidated Foods and

12

Procter & Gamble, which the Supreme Court sustained in

13

important decisions.

14

initiatives.

15

I assisted him in preparing

Elman virtually always supported BE

I worked closely with Chairman Dixon on many

16

matters, though his legal aids were less inclined to

17

request economic input than were those of other

18

Commissioners.

19

testified before Congressional Committees, and he had me

20

accompany him to Congressional hearings, meetings with

21

officials of executive agencies, and sometimes to

22

meetings with White House staff.

23

most of his speeches.

24

Friday afternoons open for frequent meetings to review

25

the past, plan the future, and occasionally to relax with

26

a bourbon and water.

Dixon often asked for my input when he

He also had me review

Finally, he asked me to hold late

Assisting me in advising
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Commissioners were my Assistant Director and Chief of the

2

Division of Economic Reports.

3

My secretary, Mrs. Abbott, handled personal

4

matters involving the typing pool.

Shortly after I

5

arrived at the Commission, Mrs. Abbott asked me to select

6

the new supervisor.

7

for the position of supervisor of the BE typing pool.

8

When I asked why she brought the matter to me, she

9

explained that two of the most qualified typists were

Three qualified typists had applied

10

white and one was a Negro, as African Americans were

11

labeled in those times.

12

received the highest Civil Service score.

13

Negro typist had, that no Negro had ever served in a

14

supervisory position at the Commission, and that most of

15

the typists were Negroes.

16

break the racial barrier, and she should appoint the most

17

qualified person.

18

among typing supervisors of other bureaus, and they

19

brought the appointment to the attention of Chairman

20

Dixon.

21

first Bureau Director to implement President Kennedy’s

22

directive to give appropriate recognition to Negroes.

23

created another stir when I appointed another highly

24

qualified Negro, Mrs. Doris Rocket, as the Assistant to

25

my secretary, Mrs. Catharine Abbot.

I asked which typist had
She said the

I said fine, it’s time to

The appointment created quite a stir

He called me and congratulated me for being the
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An historic racial barrier was broken in 1963

2

when President Kennedy appointed H. Leon Higginbotham to

3

the Commission, the first African American Commissioner

4

of any Administrative Agency, to become a Commissioner.

5

Higginbotham was about my age, and we became good

6

friends.

7

Federal bench and later to the Third Circuit Court of

8

Appeals, where he served with great distinction until his

9

death in 1999.

10

Higginbotham was subsequently appointed to the

I am proud of the accomplishments of the BE

11

staff of the 1960s.

In addition to its many reports, it

12

was responsible for several especially important

13

initiatives.

14

BE effort from 1962 to 1969 to establish a line of

15

business reporting program; leadership in achieving the

16

Commission’s first premerger notification programs in

17

1967 and 1969; success in persuading the Commission to

18

require the affirmative disclosure of the octane ratings

19

of gasoline, which some consumer groups view as one of

20

the Commission’s most important consumer protection

21

programs; and contributions to President Johnson’s

22

National Commission on Food Marketing.

23

prevent me from elaborating on these initiatives, but

24

perhaps they will come up in other segments of the

25

program.

Among the most important were a persistent

Time constraints
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My greatest disappointment occurred when Ralph

2

Nader unleashed a vitriolic attack on the Commission in

3

1968 while I was serving on the White House staff.

4

Commissioner Philip Elman, the brilliant and sometimes

5

maverick Commissioner, who had written 121 decisions,

6

dissents and concurring opinions, initially welcomed

7

Nader’s investigation, perhaps viewing it as an

8

opportunity to gain publicity for his own proposals to

9

improve the Commission’s performance.

Nader’s staff, or

10

“Nader’s Raiders” as the press dubbed them, wrote a

11

devastating report on the Commission.

12

upset because it omitted any reference to BE, which Nader

13

had previously singled out as the Commission’s “crown

14

jewel.”

15

visit me at the White House, they never did.

16

told me it was a mere oversight and that my reputation

17

would survive the unintended slight.

18

I was personally

Although Elman had encouraged Nader’s Raiders to
Nader later

At the end of his career, Elman became

19

increasingly haunted with what he viewed as the

20

unwarranted legacy of the Nader and ABA reports’

21

characterizations of the FTC’s performance in the 1960s.

22

In his memoirs, Elman said, in part:

23
24
25
26
27
28
29

The FTC of the 1960s on which I served has
gotten a bum rap, and I contributed to it. I
was its severest critic, and I fed the
material, negative material, to the people on
the outside. I was the source of the things
that the Nader's Raiders reported, and I worked
with the ABA Commission. There were some very
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3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

solid accomplishments. We did a lot in the
merger field. We did a lot in the deceptive
practices area. The cases that were decided by
the Supreme Court were all upheld. I think
this is a solid record of accomplishment which
has been ignored. And in all fairness to
history, the accomplishments of that period
also ought to be noted. I think now I probably
held the Commission to too high a standard.

11

After leaving the Commission, I had continuing

12

contact with Commissioner Elman when he was of counsel to

13

the Wald firm in Washington, and I consulted with him

14

over about a five-year period.

15

from Elman a year before he died, he again asked, “Do you

16

think we could have avoided many of those acrimonious

17

situations for which I was responsible?

18

probably held them to too high a standard.”

19
20
21

In the last letter I got

I think I

There were many battles, and you'll be hearing
about them later.
MR. SCHEFFMAN:

Thanks a lot, Fritz for a very

22

interesting history.

23

part of this time, so can you tell us what it was like?

24

MR. FOLSOM:

Mack, you were here in the trenches

Okay.

I joined the FTC in

25

September 1964 in the Division of Economic Evidence,

26

because George Stocking, my professor, said I should get

27

some experience working on individual cases.

28

By the time I arrived, all those, quote, "good

29

people" who had been over in the legal bureau and

30

transferred back had been moved out of evidence into
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1

other jobs in the Bureau.

2

such that I once said to a person who asked me what I

3

did, “Call me a pseudo-economist, because I'd like to be

4

different from those other people in the Bureau who are

5

classified as economists.”

6

(Laughter.)

7

MR. FOLSOM:

The group that was left was

Very quickly, I was visited by a

8

GS-15 who informed me that she had seen a memorandum I

9

had given to my boss, that it was handwritten, and that I

10

had made a recommendation.

She bet that I didn't keep a

11

copy of it.

12

should never do that, because one of these days, you're

13

going to be wrong and you'll be fired.”

I said “You're right.”

She said “Well, you

14

I said that if they expected me not to make any

15

mistakes when they hired me, then they were wrong, and if

16

the alternative is to back up to receive my check, I'll

17

continue to do as I'm doing.

18

working environment at the time.

19

But it was not a good

My primary involvement and that of all of the

20

people in evidence was with the attorneys in the Division

21

of Mergers.

22

that time.

23

gather data that would help them support the market

24

definitions they had used in the complaint.

25
26

You didn't have a Bureau of Competition at
What they really wanted us to do was to

Now fairly quickly after I got there and
started working with them, they started to say, well,
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1

give us a little more input to the market definition

2

question.

3

survey, to put it into evidence on the market definition

4

they had used.

5

Subsequently, they'd ask the division to do a

We had two economists who attempted to put it

6

in.

I was called in on a Friday evening and told they

7

had not accomplished their goal.

8

over it to see what I can do and told that I would be

9

testifying on Tuesday.

10

(Laughter.)

11

MR. FOLSOM:

I was directed to go

Well, I went over it.

They had

12

them making up two tables that were 180 degrees opposite,

13

so I threw out one of the tables and went home and

14

studied the material.

15

telephone calls to clarify answers.

16

Administrative Law Judge accepted the material.

17

at the end of my direct and cross, the Administrative Law

18

Judge said that he had some questions for this witness.

19

“Have you analyzed the competitive impact of this

20

acquisition?”

21

you think it is?”

22

he said, “So what would you do?”

23

what an economist would study.

24

entry barriers, et cetera.

25
26

I spent all day Monday making

I said no.

On Tuesday, the

He said, “What is it?

However,

What do

I said, “I haven't analyzed it.”

Then

I started telling him
That I would look at

The lawyer quickly settled with the defendant,
and Commission lawyers began to consider entry barriers
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1

in their merger cases.

2

did have some input.

3

(Laughter.)

4

MR. FOLSOM:

So in that sense, I think that I

Subsequently, the personnel began

5

to be upgraded.

Fritz hired Frank Coulton, Arnie

6

Danielson, and Steve Nelson.

7

and Fritz assigned them to the Division of Economic

8

Evidence.

9

Harry Houghton as his assistant while Fritz was over at

They moved me out of the Division to work with

10

the White House.

11

involvement in the 1960s.

12

All were good economists,

That's about the extent of my

By the end of the decade, the economists were

13

becoming much more involved in making recommendations,

14

and the lawyers were listening to us.

15

which we were not involved was R-P.

16

The one area in

I was asked to work on one R-P case in the

17

whole time of the sixties.

18

that the respondent was bringing in to testify.

19

search on the man.

20

Druggists Association of America.

21

The case involved an expert
I did a

He was an adviser to the Retail

He was going to be testifying in favor of a

22

manufacturer of drugs who was accused of price

23

discrimination.

24

going to testify.

25

went over to court or the hearing on the day he was to

26

testify.

I said to the FTC lawyer, “He's not
If he does, he'll lose his job.”

We all sat there.

He didn't show up.
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1

(Laughter.)

2

MR. FOLSOM:

Somehow, it got back to Professor

3

Mueller that someone charged me with contacting the man

4

and convincing him not to come.

5

man, and I still haven't spoken to him.

6

down to his office to tell me about the charge.

7

informed him I had never spoken to the man, and that was

8

the end of it.

9

(Laughter.)

10

MR. FOLSOM:

11

I had not spoken to the
Fritz called me
I

So thus ends my activity in the

sixties.

12

(Laughter.)

13

(Applause.)

14

MR. SCHEFFMAN:

15

interesting first panel.

16

(Applause.)

17

MR. SCHEFFMAN:

Thank all of you for an

What we've heard, very briefly,

18

was that two people were very important in creating the

19

Bureau of Economics as it exists now as an independent

20

entity.

21

you heard from Mack about how it was to work as an

22

economist during those days.

23

It doesn't work directly for the lawyers.

And

We now turn to the seventies, the decade when

24

by far, economics was most important in driving the

25

agenda.

26

and DOJ brought during the seventies really were economic

The various monopolization cases that the FTC
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1

cases.

2

believed that economics showed at that time.

3

They were founded by what a lot of economists

That period was very important for the law and

4

for economics.

5

by trying out economic analysis in a forum that could be

6

much more thoroughly vetted even than in the journals,

7

that is, through in depth litigation with serious

8

economists and lawyers on both sides.

9

Both lawyers and economists learned a lot

Mike Scherer was very important to the

10

Commission's agenda during that time, and he's going to

11

start by reviewing what he and the Commission were doing

12

during that time.

13

MR. SCHERER:

Thank you.

One of my economic

14

advisers was John Litner.

15

“if you want to be a good economist, you've got to have a

16

direct telephone pipeline to God.”

17

(Laughter.)

18

MR. SCHERER:

19

And Litner used to say to us,

Last week, we used that pipeline,

and Mike Mann gave me permission to speak for him.

20

(Laughter.)

21

MR. SCHERER:

I'm going to talk about the big

22

cases that we brought during the 1970s.

23

originated under Mike Mann's watch, so he's responsible.

24

All three

The three biggest cases were Xerox, breakfast

25

cereals, and Exxon et al.

Now I'm going to lateral Exxon

26

et al. over to Darius, because I don't have time to talk
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1

about all three.

Exxon was really a turkey, but it

2

looked like a football.

3

(Laughter.)

4

MR. SCHERER:

I'm going to talk about Xerox and

5

cereal.

6

machines.

7

discriminatory and other practices, and this was a great

8

and important new technology.

9

Xerox had a commanding position in copying
It engaged in a whole bunch of bundling,

When we finally settled the case, Xerox had had

10

an exclusive position in the market for 16 years because

11

of its patent portfolio.

12

you're supposed to get a monopoly for 17 years, period.

13

We thought it was time to do something about it, so in

14

1972 we brought a case.

15

According to the patent law,

See Mr. Scherer's slides at http://www.ftc.gov/
be/workshops/directorsconference/docs/scherer.pdf

Let me turn this projector on to focus things.

16

Xerox dominated the industry in terms of patents.

17

is something I drew the other day from a database I have.

18

They had 81 percent of all the patents in the industry,

19

and it was really difficult to enter without the leave of

20

Xerox, and they weren't licensing, at least not plain

21

paper patents.

22

This

We negotiated this case, and in 1975 reached a

23

consent settlement under which Xerox agreed to end some

24

of its discriminatory practices, and most importantly, to

25

license with minimal royalties.

26

fifth patent, you paid zero royalty, and the maximum

Actually, after the
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1

royalty you paid was 1.5 percent.

2

license its entire patent portfolio to any comers.

3

Xerox also agreed to

When we reached the decision that this was

4

going to be an efficacious remedy, we had our eye on whom

5

it would affect.

6

And so, of course, did Xerox.

We thought that the principal emerging

7

competitors to Xerox in plain paper copiers would be

8

Eastman Kodak and IBM, both of which had recently entered

9

the plain paper copying industry.

10

The chief executive officer of Xerox, David

11

Kearns, agreed with our perception.

He wrote, among

12

other things, about IBM and Kodak, that with two of the

13

behemoths of industry angling for a piece of its market,

14

“Xerox was plenty worried.

15

nibbling away, making far more headway, as it turned out,

16

that we realized at the time.

17

blinded by IBM and Kodak.

18

to me over and over again, IBM, IBM, IBM.

19

way we perceived the situation.”

The Japanese were also

But we were totally

In fact, Ray Hay used to say
And that's the

20

We were wrong.

True, Kodak has remained in the

21

industry and done important things.

22

who had at that time been making coated paper copiers,

23

now moved into the plain paper aspect of the industry and

24

presented a tremendous challenge using the compulsory

25

licensing decree to get access to the necessary

26

technology.

But the Japanese,
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1

This really had an enormous impact on the

2

industry in the long run.

3

quotations from David Kearns' book, Prophets in the Dark:

4

How Xerox Reinvented Itself and Beat Back the Japanese:

5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16

Let me just draw three

“I don't like to dwell too much on the
ramifications of the FTC case and the private
suits it fomented, because I don't like to make
excuses. The real problems that afflicted us,
though we were just beginning to realize it,
were that we had lost touch with our customers,
had the wrong cost base, and had inadequate
products. The barrage of suits took something
out of us, but the true challenges to the
company lay outside the courtroom.”
And then skipping a few pages:

17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40

“The new competitive environment after the
decree said this meant a new way of viewing the
world. The monopoly environment that Xerox
thrived in encouraged internal competition, but
not external. We would measure the quality of
a new Xerox machine according to the
specifications of older Xerox copiers. Those
specifications didn't mean very much if other
companies were producing something altogether
better.”
And then one more quote:

41

reinvented itself under this new force of competition,

42

and at least for a long time, until very recently, became

“While Xerox products were not bad, and we had
some promising new machines in development, our
cost structure was not competitive, and we had
not figured out how to design for low cost and
high reliability. In fact, the initial
Japanese products were not more reliable, and
generally, their copy quality was worse, but we
were charging our customers appreciably more to
cover our inefficiencies.”
And he goes on in this book to tell how Xerox
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1

a provider of high quality, low cost plain paper copying

2

machines.

3

case for the American consumer.

4

So I think this was a very, very effective

Now let me go on to breakfast cereals, a second

5

of our big cases.

The cereal case arose out of several

6

challenges.

7

legal challenge.

8

book, which said, hey, forget about this Cournot

9

business.

One was an economic challenge.

One was a

The economic challenge was Chamberlin's

Real oligopolies engage in joint profit

10

maximization.

And the evidence that we could assemble

11

suggested that that's what the cereal companies were

12

doing.

See Mr. Scherer's slides at http://www.ftc.gov/be/
workshops/directorsconference/docs/scherer.pdf

13

Let me just put up one more slide.

14

have these data at the time, but in terms of the 234 to

15

238 lines of business covered by the Line of Business

16

Report, cereal in every year was right among the top in

17

terms of operating income as a percentage of assets, and

18

it was among the highest industries in terms of its media

19

advertising as a percentage of sales.

20

We also had census data.

We didn't

Cereal had one of the

21

highest price/cost margins, about 54 percent, of any

22

manufacturing industry on which data were available.

23

So that was one problem.

24

Chamberlinian oligopoly here.

25
26

It looked like we had a

The second thing was that antitrust had proven
ineffective in dealing with Chamberlinian oligopolies.
For The Record, Inc.
Waldorf, Maryland(301)870-8025

45
1

Basically, if you didn't have evidence of outright

2

collusion, you couldn't get them on the conscious

3

parallelism doctrine.

4

I only have five minutes, so I'm going to cut

5

out the legal discussion.

6

this was really Mike Mann's case.

7

way with his article with Tom Wilson showing that

8

advertising and high profitability were correlated.

9

Now Mike Mann came in, and
Bill Comanor led the

And then Mike Mann came along and advanced that

10

work further.

11

relationships among

12

profitability was made in the 1974 book, Industrial

13

Concentration:

14

amount of muddle there.

15

Mike's definitive statement of the
advertising, concentration and

The New Learning.

There's a certain

The basic problem we had in this case was,

16

okay, the cereal companies were never cutting prices.

17

They charged very high prices.

18

margins, and by the Dorfman-Steiner theorem, they were

19

advertising very heavily.

20

profits, why wasn't there entry into the industry?

21

They made very high

But with these continued high

Well, there was an argument that advertising

22

solidified brand loyalty and constituted a barrier to

23

entry.

24

skeptical about it, and we needed a better theory.

25
26

We didn't believe that.

We were at least

And then lightning struck.
us?

Mack, were you with

Mike Glassman, Dave Malone, Tony Joseph and I went
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1

to San Diego, and we met Dick Schmalensee.

2

with a new theory of why entry didn't swarm into this

3

high price, high profit industry.

4

theory of entry barriers was really very satisfying

5

intellectually.

6

economics.

7

There's the missing link.

8

so we made it a significant part of the case.

9
10

Dick came up

His space packing

I had just written a book on spatial

His theory rang the bell, and I said, aha!
There's our barrier to entry,

This was a brilliant move intellectually and an
absolute disaster in terms of public relations.

11

(Laughter.)

12

MR. SCHERER:

The bad press we got was just

13

unbelievable.

My home town newspaper, population 16,000,

14

I worked for that paper for four years during high

15

school.

16

Trade Commission, which too often of late has seemed to

17

be completely out to lunch, has now apparently decided to

18

be out to breakfast too.”

Here's the lead in their op ed: “The Federal

19

(Laughter.)

20

MR. SCHERER: “How else can one explain the zany

21

action of the FTC in launching legal battle against the

22

leading U.S. cereal manufacturers on the ground that -- I

23

swear I'm not making this up -- the manufacturer is

24

giving the American housewife too wide a choice.”

25

(Laughter.)
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1

MR. SCHERER:

Everybody became obsessed with

2

Schmalensee's entry limitation part and completely forgot

3

about the high prices, the high profits, the high and

4

wasteful advertising and all that.

5

Then a bunch of other things happened.

The

6

case-in-chief was concluded, if my memory is correct,

7

with my testimony in January of 1977, at which point a

8

number of things started happening.

9

First, Kellogg fired its counsel and brought in

10

a new counsel, Fred Furth, a noted treble damages lawyer,

11

and a very aggressive guy, who sized up the situation and

12

said, in effect, “We're not going to win this battle in

13

the courtroom.

14

Capitol Hill.”

15

We're going to win it in the press and on

If you look at all the bad press we got, it

16

started with Fred Furth.

17

newspapers with articles critical of the case.

18

good press we got were from two media, Consumer Reports

19

and the Los Angeles Times.

20

He was out there seeding the
The only

Second, Fred Furth commissioned a phony

21

consulting study which said that the remedy we wanted

22

would increase union unemployment.

23

no opportunity to rebut it.

24

problem.

25

the team after I had left the Commission formally, and

26

Dave Malone announced that Mike Pertschuk was going

Not true.

But we had

KidVid aggravated our

I remember sitting in the conference room with
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1

public next week on KidVid and that it would kill the

2

cereal case.

3

We talked about it, and we said, God, what'll

4

we do?

5

that knows Mike best.

6

the rules, it would be wrong.

7

our teeth and took the consequences.

8

A whole lot else happened.

9

We went around, and I said, well, I'm the one
I could go talk to him, but under
We didn't do it.

We grit

We had problems

with the Administrative Law Judge, who got fired after

10

presiding over nine-tenths of the record, and there was a

11

long break.

12

The 1978 election eliminated some of our most important

13

supporters.

14

Furth was very effective on Capitol Hill.

Both Reagan and Carter announced during their

15

campaign that they would stop the case if they were

16

elected.

17

Subsequently, from 1983 after the case stopped until '91,

18

cereal prices rose by 71 percent.

19

themselves free of constraint, and they started raising

20

their prices like mad.

21

and a price war broke out.

22

Indeed, the case ended in a very unhappy way.

The companies felt

Eventually, they went too far,

So the best I can say about this case was, it

23

was a nice try.

It probably protected the American

24

public for about five years from price increases that

25

cereal makers might otherwise have initiated, but it

26

thereby jeopardized their positions.

In the end, it was
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1

certainly a loss both in terms of competition law and

2

competition economics.

3

Thanks very much.

4

MR. SCHEFFMAN:

Thanks a lot, Mike.

5

always hard to follow Mike.

6

if I know my history right, there was actually another

7

speaker on the day that Lincoln gave the Gettysburg

8

Address, but we don't remember who he was.

9

I think

(Laughter.)

10
11

I'll remind Bill.

It's

MR. SCHERER:

It was in my home town.

No, no.

That was the Lincoln-Douglas debate.

12

See Mr. Comanor's
slides at http://www.ftc.
13gov/be/workshops/ September
directorsconference/
14docs/comanorslides.pdfBE peaked

MR. COMANOR:
1st, 1978.
in size.

I arrived at the Commission on

And it may have been the time when
When I arrived, there were 225 people

15

in the Bureau, which I gather is much more than it is

16

today.

17

to 90 economists.

18

shop than had existed before, or I think since.

19

Indeed, there were something on the order of 80
So it was a big shop, a much bigger

Let's talk about the small cases of the

20

seventies, the verticals.

The decade of 1970s was really

21

a period of change in the realm of vertical restraints,

22

as I'm sure many of you remember, and I think the first

23

two bullet points in this slide really set the high water

24

mark for policies against vertical restraints.

25

Although resale price maintenance was declared

26

per se illegal back in 1912 or thereabouts, that finding
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had been essentially overturned by state fair trade laws,

2

which were permitted under the Miller-Tydings-McGuire

3

Act, which authorized state action.

4

So the federal decision was essentially a dead

5

letter, and the state laws were only repealed in 1975.

6

During that period, both RPM and non-price vertical

7

restraints were per se illegal as long as title had

8

shifted.

9

restraints per se illegal.

10

The Schwinn decision made non-price vertical

That period lasted for all of two years,

11

because within two years, we had Sylvania, which

12

represented the first retreat in the policy against

13

vertical restraints.

14

repeal of the Miller-Tydings and McGuire Acts, set the

15

high water mark, whether for good or for bad, in policies

16

against vertical restraints.

17

These two actions, Schwinn and the

The retreat on vertical restraints enforcement

18

rests on two books by Bork and Posner, which created a

19

whole new view about what policy should be in this realm.

20

Bork and Posner created a new conventional wisdom toward

21

vertical restraints.

22

total confluence of interests between manufacturers and

23

consumers, and it questioned whether circumstances could

24

ever exist where vertical restraints had any

25

anticompetitive effects.

This view argues that there is a
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1

The Bork and Posner view suggested a policy

2

contradiction because price restraints were considered

3

per se illegal and non-price restraints were under the

4

rule of reason.

5

as it is now.

6

concurring opinion in Sylvania, he specifically raised

7

that question.

That was as untenable a situation then
Indeed, if you look at Justice White's

8

In the Bureau at that time, to the extent that

9

we worried about vertical rather than the big horizontal

10

cases, we worried about this difference.

11

really know what to do.

We didn't

It was a policy in flux.

12

There was really considerable uncertainty as to

13

how to proceed, and there was great debate and dispute in

14

the Commission.

15

embraced this new conventional wisdom.

16

them.

17

should get on board with the new conventional wisdom.

18

course, the lawyers took an opposite view.

Some, including some economists,

But the debate went on.

19

I wasn’t one of

Many said, look, we

The question was what to do.

Chairman

20

Pertschuk was under considerable political pressure

21

regarding KidVid.

22

didn’t need another fight.

23

we punted in the area of vertical restraints in the

24

seventies.

25
26

Of

What he said in this realm was that he
Let's punt.

So essentially,

This is not to say that we didn't have any
vertical restraints cases.

Paul Pautler provided me with
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1

some very interesting data.

2

vertical restraint cases for all complaints that were

3

initiated in this period of time.

4

and almost all were settled by consent.

5

relatively small cases.

6

We'll go along.

7

over.

8

on these cases.

9

data says.

10

These data summarize the

Most dealt with RPM,

The defendant said, all right.

We'll stop doing RPM.

And they were

They didn't make the headlines.

There's no press

But that's essentially what the current

That's through '78.

recent data.

They were

And I have some more

See Mr. Comanor's slides at http://www.ftc.gov/be/
workshops/directorsconference/docs/comanorslides.pdf

11

Well, what do we conclude from this?

12

percent of the cases brought dealt with RPM allegations,

13

and 96 percent were settled by consent.

14

them went to trial.

15

almost in half from the first three years of my data set

16

to the second half.

17

About 62

Almost none of

The number of complaints declined

We were really on the edge of a revolution, as

18

almost everybody in this room knows.

Antitrust policy

19

standards shifted sharply in the eighties.

20

few, if any, vertical restraints cases brought in the

21

1980s, and with the advantage of hindsight, we can see

22

that the new inhospitality toward these cases really

23

followed the new conventional wisdom of Bork and Posner,

24

which had just taken over.
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It culminated, of course, in the Vertical

2

Restraints Guidelines proposed by the Justice Department,

3

which have since been withdrawn.

4

BE went along with the new conventional wisdom.

5

BE was not the instigator, but the follower here.

6

reports that the Commission started in the late seventies

7

were published in the eighties.

8

that I can find that dealt generally with vertical

9

restraints both concluded that we should get out of the

10

business.

11

Two

The two staff reports

In fact we did get out of the business.
A conflicting consideration that worried us is

12

reported in Scherer's text on industrial organization:

13

prices typically rose with RPM.

14

literature.

15

conclusions.

16

factor?

17

He reviewed the

I don't have any reason to doubt Scherer's
The question was, is this a relevant

Of course consumer welfare can possibly be

18

enhanced when prices increase.

I don't dispute that.

19

But the question is, is it a likely result?

20

about the higher prices.

We worried

21

The question I would raise for you all is

22

whether the enforcement pendulum has shifted again.

23

Three decisions, all quite recent, have important

24

vertical components.

25

posture than existed in the 1980s, but not one that went

26

all the way back to the way things stood in the sixties

All suggest a much different policy
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and early seventies.

2

post-Chicago economic literature played a role?

3

it has done so in setting a tone, but not much more.

4

I leave you this question: has the

I have just a few conclusions.

I think

Policies toward

5

vertical restraints since the 1960s have shown

6

considerable fluctuations, perhaps more so than in other

7

areas of antitrust policy.

8

The extent to which vertical restraints have

9

been accepted or tolerated has varied considerably, as

10

has the tone of the economic literature.

11

restraints is the only area where Guidelines have been

12

both announced and withdrawn.

13

Vertical

While many of the recent studies have been

14

limited in scope, collectively they point in a very

15

different direction than those of the seventies or

16

eighties, and the case law has followed along.

17

We're all tempted to believe that the policy

18

standard we enforced during our terms in office were the

19

right ones, and that they would persist forever.

20

would remain in effect even when we left.

21

of us, that was not to be, and it's especially true in

22

the area of vertical restraints.

23

teach us all a great deal of humility, if nothing more.

24

MR. SCHEFFMAN:

25

(Applause.)

They

But for most

This lesson should

Thank you, Bill.
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MR. SCHEFFMAN:

Darius, Mike handed you the

2

football, and you can of course deal with that or

3

whatever else you'd like to add.

4

MR. GASKINS:

I have two things I want to

5

discuss, and I'll start with the Exxon case.

6

a comment.

7

was my thesis adviser, and Bill Comanor, and I left to go

8

work for Fred Kahn at the CAB in 1977.

9

for about a year.

10

Let me make

I was the Director between Mike Scherer, who

So I was there

I'm on a little different page.

I consider

11

myself the accidental Bureau Director, because I was made

12

the Bureau Director at a time when we had a President who

13

was not elected, Gerald Ford.

14

the position.

15

sorts of political pressures didn’t seem to operate, and

16

I got this job.

17

He was never elected to

We had an administration where the normal

I thought I was a well trained price theorist.

18

I thought I knew what the problem was.

19

make sure that we could drive prices down to marginal

20

cost.

21

always what the problem is, or the perceived problem.

22

Sometimes you have to keep people from pricing too low.

23

We were there to

I found out much to my chagrin that that's not

And if you think that's preposterous, notice

24

the Treasury secretary, who is a friend of mine, John

25

Snow, is in China right now trying to persuade the
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Chinese to raise their prices.

2

economist from the University of Virginia.

3

And he's a well trained

So you've got to be careful with what it is

4

you're trying to achieve here.

5

that the problem was that prices were too high.

6

the General Foods case, and I'll get to it in a minute.

7

I thought I knew going in
That's

I was quite naive by Washington standards at

8

that point.

9

what I thought, and to manage this bureau of remarkably

10

I assumed that I was there to tell people

well trained and hard-working individuals.

11

I started looking around at what we were doing,

12

and there was this big mound over there called the Exxon

13

case.

14

and it occurred to me very quickly that it was a mess.

15

Even though the case may have started out well before

16

OPEC and all the rest, it had been overtaken by events.

17

There had been some major changes in the world, and there

18

might be something wrong with this case.

I started asking some questions about the case,

19

I didn't know enough about the oil industry

20

myself to persuade the lawyers or the Commission that

21

there was a problem.

22

convene a panel.

23

on the energy industry.

24

this panel.

25

Mead, Morrie Adelman, Mike Scherer, a whole bunch of

26

people were on the panel.

So I said, I've got an idea.

Let's

Let's get the best experts in the world
We went out and put together

I think there was about ten of them.

Walter

We said, would you look at
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this case and give us your advice about where we're

2

going?

3

Do we have a theory?

Is it a decent case?

They came back within a remarkably short period

4

of time, about two months, and they gave me a report.

5

can't remember everything it said, because I had to put

6

it in a safe somewhere.

7

this case is not going anywhere.

8

You'll never win this case.

9

I

But the report seemed to say
This is ridiculous.

There might be a problem having to do with

10

pipelines and access and stuff like that.

11

is not going after that factual situation.

12

heaven's sakes, you should dump this case and replace it

13

with a case that might have some merit.

14

But this case
So for

Being a naive person, I dutifully said, well,

15

here's what we do.

We'll talk to the lawyers.

We went

16

over and talked to the lawyers.

17

into the safe goes the report, and that's the end of the

18

story.

The next thing I knew,

19

(Laughter.)

20

MR. GASKINS: It bothered me for a long time.

21

used to worry about what we had done.

22

Here we are part of the so-called prosecution, and we

23

discovered that maybe we don't have such a great case

24

here.

25

other side?

I

Was this justice?

Don’t we have an obligation to share this with the
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I agonized a little bit.

But, you know,

2

eventually, sleep overcame, and I got on with my life.

3

But as I look back on it, with history, the thing that's

4

amazing is that maybe it was the right thing to do,

5

because it was not unlike the coffee problem.

6

People were very worried about the run up in

7

oil prices.

8

to blame somebody.

9

case took the pressure off in that particular industry.

10

They were angry about it.

They were trying

The fact that the FTC had an ongoing

With the passage of time, the case got dropped.

11

Now I was naive because I was frustrated that

12

we were using resources, economists in the Bureau, to

13

staff an investigation that wasn't going to go anywhere.

14

Maybe in the bigger picture from 40,000 feet, it was the

15

proper course.

16

questions about how we handled that particular matter.

17

But I will go to my grave with some

Now let me talk about the coffee case.

Talk

18

about naive, this is my introduction.

We heard Professor

19

Markham talk before about General Foods as potentially

20

gouging people with high coffee prices.

21

changed.

22

into the Chicago market, predatory pricing was the

23

charge.

24

about the FTC.

25

There are always a lot of politics there, and I learned

26

it only over time.

Well, they

They changed because when Folger tried to come

It was my first week on the job.

Two things

One is, it's always affected by politics.

Second, it's driven by external

For The Record, Inc.
Waldorf, Maryland(301)870-8025

59
1

affairs.

That is, the changes in the market really

2

affect whether a case is good or bad or whether it makes

3

any sense.

4

The General Foods case was fairly well along.

5

Folger had attempted to go into this market.

6

House dropped its prices aggressively.

7

in Chicago than in the markets where Folger's hadn't

8

tried to enter.

9

Maxwell

Prices were lower

And the die was cast.

The Bureau of Economics in the person of Mike

10

Glassman said, this is a great case.

11

who was my boss, came in.

12

little pushback from all the cases that were being

13

brought, and he had a real problem with why we were going

14

after somebody for lowering prices.

15

visceral kind of a thing.

16

(Laughter.)

17

MR. GASKINS:

Then Cal Collier,

He was already getting a

He'd say it was a

Here I'm in the middle between

18

Mike Glassman on the one hand and the Chairman on the

19

other, and I was getting phone calls at night screaming

20

about what I should do and what I shouldn't do.

21

I said to Mike, ”It does look like it could be

22

predation, but, you know, we've got to worry about a

23

remedy.

24

consumers?

25

low prices today, and some other guys in some other

26

market were paying too much.

Also, how do you even decide it's bad for
Some consumers were getting the benefit of
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Then Collier would say to me “Gaskins, there's

2

no such thing as predation.

3

“Wait a minute.

4

possibility.”

5

about strategic response and stuff like that.

6

bloody awful.

7

It can't exist.”

It could exist.

I said

It's a theoretical

This was well before people had thought
But it was

I thought, here I am, trying to figure out what

8

to do.

9

at the time I'll be glad when I get out of there because

10

We had a hell of a mess on our hands.

I thought

I won't have to grapple with predatory pricing anymore.

11

Next chapter in my life, I ran into it again

12

about three or four years ago with Jon Baker.

13

commission studying predatory pricing in the airlines.

14

There it is.

15

the market, and American and Northwest drop the prices.

16

Sure looks like predation to me.

17

You know the story.

I was on a

The little guys enter

But then again, you know, it's also rational

18

behavior.

What's the remedy going to be?

And again,

19

it’s overtaken by events.

20

pricing is a problem in the airlines anymore.

21

even think it's a problem in the coffee industry, if it

22

ever was.

23

challenging, I'll tell you that.

24

stories about my duration as the Chairman of the Bureau

25

of Economics.

I don't think predatory
I don't

But they're both very intellectually
So, those are my two
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2

MR. SCHERER:

Darius, could I just inject one

point on the Exxon report?

3

MR. GASKINS:

Absolutely.

4

MR. SCHERER:

As you say, it was put into a

5

safe.

And all of us consultants were told, you shall not

6

show this to anyone.

7

oath.

8
9

You've signed a confidentiality

I had a friend on the Federal Affairs staff at
Exxon, and she told me she had a copy of the report.

10

(Laughter.)

11

MR. SCHERER:

Not from me.

But she had

12

obtained it through such surreptitious methods that there

13

was no way they could use it.

14

(Laughter.)

15

MR. SCHEFFMAN:

Okay.

Thanks, Darius.

Mack?

16

It appears that there was a big change from the sixties

17

to the seventies in the role of economists.

18

MR. FOLSOM:

As we moved into the seventies and

19

the shared monopoly type cases began to spring up, I had

20

a real problem as the head of the Evidence Division.

21

in the devil do I staff these?

22

at trying to fire one of the Evidence people a year, and

23

some of the worst ones were retiring, I still did not

24

have the level of economic skills that I felt the

25

Division needed to deal with the more complicated

26

problems.

How

While I had been working

I went over to the Division of Industry
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Analysis and approached Jim Dalton, who was a student of

2

Mike Mann, and tried to convince him to come over and

3

head up the cereal investigation.

4

(Laughter.)

5

MR. FOLSOM:

He said, no way.

I went to Detroit to try to

6

recruit some people, and I ran into a young man named

7

Mike Glassman, convinced him to come work for me in

8

Evidence, and turned the cereal matter over to him.

9

At the same time, there was a young man in

10

Evidence who was working on the matter.

11

he could not support a complaint.

12

staff members that they could write an objection to any

13

recommendation made by their bosses, what have you, and

14

it would be sent forward to the Commission along with the

15

document.

16

He decided that

I had told all of my

He came to me three weeks before the thing was

17

to go forward and said, “I want to write a dissent.”

18

said, fine.

19

tomorrow or something, some specific date.

20

memorandum ready, and it will go forward with the

21

package.

22

I

We'll be going forward three weeks from
You have your

He came in the day it was to go forward and

23

said that he had not had time to finish it.

He asked me

24

to delay sending forward the recommendation for a week to

25

allow him to finish his memorandum.

I said, I'm sorry.
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There will be no delay.

2

memorandum.

3

So there was no dissenting

I guess the matter I should feel most guilty

4

about is Exxon.

5

and in a meeting shortly before the complaint was

6

prepared, I was called some rather unflattering words.

7

Let's say horse's rear end would be the polite way of

8

saying what I was called.

9

finally decided to support the complaint.

10

I had serious reservations about Exxon,

After much soul searching, I
I even helped

write the memorandum recommending the complaint.

11

I said at the time, unless we can prove entry

12

barriers into refining, we should close the

13

investigation.

14

said, Mike, don't sign the recommendation memo.

15

stay out of it.

16

course, you know the rest of it.

17

I went into Mike Mann's office, and I
Just

He decided he would sign it, and, of

Subsequently, after the report by the experts,

18

Owen Johnson called me up.

19

thought Darius was over at CAB when they delivered those

20

reports.

21

MR. GASKINS:

22

MR. FOLSOM:

Darius had left.

No, no.

In fact, I

I was still there.

Shortly after.

Okay.

I know they

23

sent you one.

I called up Owen and said, Owen, you've

24

announced you're leaving.

25

Let's you and I go tell the Commissioners that this

We're spending money like mad.
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investigation is not going any place and suggest to them

2

that they dismiss the complaint.

3

Owen, ever the pragmatist, said, “Mack, if we

4

do that, we'll spend the rest of our lives explaining to

5

some congressional committee where we've hidden the money

6

we were paid to make this recommendation.”

7

the end of that.

8

afterwards.

9

So that was

I left the Commission not long

One other point that I wanted to talk about

10

briefly is the Robinson-Patman Act involvement.

11

not been involved in Robinson-Patman in the sixties.

12

Then a young man named Alan Ward was brought in to head

13

the Bureau of Competition.

14

but he felt it was something that he had to do, and he

15

wanted an excuse to get out of it.

16

the complaint recommendations through my office for

17

concurrence.

18

(Laughter.)

19

MR. FOLSOM:

BE had

Alan didn't like the R-P Act,

So he started to send

He was picking little bitty

20

companies and recommending complaints because they were

21

charging some customers a lower price than some other

22

customer.

23

and sending them to the Commission.

24

I was writing dissents to the recommendations

The third one involved a manufacturer of men's

25

neckties with a market share of about 4 percent of the

26

neckties made in the United States.

I wrote a memorandum
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explaining that really to be bad as a price

2

discriminator, a firm had to have market power and that

3

there was no way that a firm with a 4 percent market

4

share could have much market power.

5

The Commission decided not to issue the

6

complaint.

7

me and said, “Mack, I've been giving you fish in a barrel

8

to shoot at.

9

any more R-P cases to the Commission.”

10

We walked out into the hall.

You finally hit one.

Alan looked at

I'm not going to send
Well, he didn't.

Then one of the staff attorneys who was very

11

much an advocate of the R-P Act visited a congressional

12

committee.

13

the Hill -- Mike Scherer, myself, and several of the

14

attorneys -- to testify about why we were not enforcing

15

the R-P Act.

16

someone go through the complaints, look at the size of

17

the companies, and essentially prove to them that the R-P

18

Act was used against small companies, not against large

19

companies where we might have market power problems.

20

The next thing you know, we were called up to

Mike did a little study where he had

I still remember the congressman when I was

21

talking looking down at me and saying, “If I had anything

22

to do with it, we would impeach you.”

23

(Laughter.)

24

MR. FOLSOM:

I didn't know how to tell him that

25

they only had to fire me.

26

me.

They didn't have to impeach
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(Laughter.)

2

MR. FOLSOM:

I kept my mouth shut and kept my

3

job.

4

get involved in the Commission.

5

investigation of the automobile industry as a shared

6

monopoly.

7

to the Commissioners, and the Chairman of the Commission

8

was very much in favor of the investigation.

9

Then one final thing to show how much politics can
We started an

Mike Glassman and I were going around talking

It turned out, God rest his soul, Engman wanted

10

to run for Senator in Michigan.

He thought that this

11

attack on the automobile industry would be his entre into

12

running for Senator.

13

(Laughter.)

14

MR. FOLSOM:

15

home of the automobile industry.

16

never got off the ground, and I'm thankful, because facts

17

such as the Japanese growth in the automobile industry

18

and successful entry of the Koreans have proven that we

19

really did not have a competitive problem with the

20

American manufacturers of automobiles.

21

He forgot that Michigan is the
At any rate, the thing

One of the alleged monopolies that the

22

Commission investigated while I was the head of Evidence

23

was the hearing aid industry.

24

had been very big in the hearing aid industry at the

25

time.

There was one company that
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The staff came to me with the data, and I saw

2

that the company's share had dropped from about 90

3

percent of the industry to about 55 percent of the

4

industry.

5

want to bring a complaint against this company?

6

what's happening in the market.”

7

we have to hurry up and sue them before the industry

8

becomes competitive.”

9

(Laughter.)

10

MR. FOLSOM:

11

MR. SCHEFFMAN:

I asked my staff member, “My God, why do you

His response was, “Yes,

So that's the end of my comments.
Thanks, Mack.

Let me have the

12

moderator's prerogative, a little kibitzing.

13

touched Exxon.

14

like John Peterman and Mike Scherer.

15

Look

A lot of us

I see a lot of people in the front row

I was actually the last economics staffer on

16

Exxon.

17

actually became my part of it, which became my

18

contribution to raising rivals' costs, and it was a great

19

lesson for me.

20

said.

21

I was assigned to come up with a theory which

I think it's consistent with what Mack

It was a case stupid on its face, because it

22

required some sort of tacit collusion among the eight

23

largest major oil companies, which only had 50 percent of

24

the market at that time.

25

(Laughter.)

For The Record, Inc.
Waldorf, Maryland(301)870-8025

68
1

MR. SCHEFFMAN:

So there were a lot of heroic

2

things which I didn't deal with in my theory, of course.

3

But it was a good lesson for me because I said

4

this is how the theory would work.

5

they were squeezing the independents.

6

theory would work.

7

Mark Schildkraut and John Woodstock, came with the facts,

8

and the facts were absolutely the opposite.

9

great lesson for me, because I was more of a theoretical

10

The theory was that
I said, yes, this

Now bring me the facts.

The lawyers,

It was a

economist at that time, of how important facts were.

11

And that segues into a semi response to Mike

12

Scherer and a question.

13

the cereals case.

14

wonder if you think differently, is that the cases the

15

Commission brought show the strength of the Commission.

16

Mike and I probably disagree on

But I think what you overlooked, and I

The legal opinions coming out at administrative

17

trials in cereals, in titanium dioxide, in coffee, in

18

ethyl and probably others, are really extraordinary

19

documents.

20

law.

21

anymore.

22

aggressive a competitor, something that used to be garden

23

variety.

24

They clearly had a profound effect on the

No one brings a case based on profitability
Hardly anyone now brings a case on being too

Those cases, along with IBM, killed off a whole

25

line of attack, properly so.

But those are extraordinary

26

documents, because, independent of political and the PR
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stuff, those were seriously litigated cases with very

2

good lawyers and very good economists on both sides, and

3

the decisions are really important documents that have

4

clearly profoundly affected the law.

5

My concern is, I don't think that economists

6

read administration decisions.

7

organization economist should read these opinions.

8

They're so full of facts and the issues you have to deal

9

with actually applying economics, and they certainly had

10

Any industrial

a profound effect on the law.

11

You were pretty negative about a lot of the

12

circumstances in cereals.

13

whether you agree with the opinion or not, documenting

14

the arguments on both sides and what the evidence was is

15

really an extraordinary document in that case and many of

16

the other cases?

17

MR. SCHERER:

But don't you think actually,

I disagree on cereal.

The

18

Administrative Law Judge's opinion was in my view mostly

19

non-facts.

We had brought forward direct evidence of

20

collusion.

He totally ignored that direct evidence.

21

totally ignored much of the other evidence and having

22

heard only one-tenth of the trial, emphasized that one-

23

tenth that he did hear, and caused a big furor.

24

Unprecedented things happened.

The staff

25

appealed over the heads of their bosses to the

26

Commission, leading Pat Bailey to write the following
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opinion dismissing the case.

She referred first to

2

congressional stormwaters of imposing magnitude, and then

3

said, I quote: “The paradox we are left with is that

4

while there may be a legitimate concern about the

5

anticompetitive effects of the exercise of oligopoly

6

power, it is rarely true that these concerns will mandate

7

an administrative agency to restructure an industry,

8

short of a legislative warrant to that effect” --

9

Congress was saying don't do it.

“Therefore, I will vote

10

that this appeal be terminated, not for the reasons

11

relied upon by the Administrative Law Judge, but because

12

the promulgation of relief by this agency will not in any

13

eventuality -- because of congressional pressures --

14

conceivably lead to a restructuring of the cereal firms.”

15

She recognized the claim that the

16

Administrative Law Judge's decision was, quote, "riddled

17

with major procedural errors and does not fairly give

18

weight to certain of the evidence," end quote.

19

therefore ordered that the case be vacated, quote, "with

20

no precedential or even persuasive authority for any

21

proposition whatsoever."

22

(Laughter.)

23

MR. SCHERER:

Just a plug.

She

If you want to read

24

the facts in the case, read my write-up in Walter Adams,

25

The Structure of American Industry, 7th Edition.

26

(Laughter.)
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1

MR. SCHEFFMAN:

2

people to ask questions.

3

You have a microphone there for
Go ahead.

Question?

MR. BAKER: My question is for you, Mike.

To

4

what extent did you feel that you had to engage with the

5

argument that even when there are only a few firms and

6

entry barriers are high, that the firms would not be able

7

to maximize joint profits?

8

consensus or deter cheating?

9

those kinds of questions?

10

MR. SCHERER:

Could the firms reach a
Were you grappling with

My whole testimony went to that

11

set of questions.

I analyzed in great detail the

12

mechanisms by which they set prices and the circumstances

13

under which coordination, tacit and explicit, worked.

14

thought we had compellingly documented both the tacit

15

agreements and explicit argument that the cereal

16

manufacturers had reached.

17

whole testimony.

18

Congress was up there with a 16-inch gun ready to shoot

19

the Commission if it did anything bad.

I

The ALJ just ignored the

He had a good reason for ignoring it.

20

MR. SCHEFFMAN:

21

QUESTION:

Other questions?

On a lighter note, I have a memory

22

of Xeroxing the complaint that was going to the

23

Commission -- and this is for Mack, too, who may

24

remember.

25

MR. SCHERER:

26

(Laughter.)

You should have thermo faxed it.
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1

QUESTION:

Well, the story as I remember is

2

that the machine broke down and we had to call a Xerox

3

repairman.

4

(Laughter.)

5

MR. SCHERER:

6

copy.

7

(Laughter.)

8

QUESTION:

9

Who asked if he could have a

As I remember the story, somebody

said, gee, it's been a long time, you know, since the

10

repairman has been there.

11

done.

12
13

So they go to the Xerox room, and there is the
repairman reading the Commission memos.

14

(Laughter.)

15

QUESTION:

16

interesting.

And he says, gee, this is

It's about the company I work for.

17

(Laughter.)

18

QUESTION:

19

MR. FOLSOM:

20

We've got to get this thing

Can I have a copy?
I think the answer was no, and it

was put in the safe.

21

(Laughter.)

22

MR. SCHEFFMAN:

23

MR. MUELLER:

Other questions?
My last recommendation to the

24

Commission, in September 1969, requested approval for

25

opening an investigation into a potential monopolization

26

case in the cereal industry.
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1

MR. SCHERER:

Didn't know that.

Good for you.

2

MR. MUELLER:

Mack, you implied that the Bureau

3

of Economics didn't do much in the R-P area, and that's

4

true.

5

When I came to the Commission, the Chairman had

6

agreed to return to BE all units that had been taken away

7

in 1955.

8

without exception, the most competent ones were very

9

pleased to be separate but equal.

The one group that was

10

not returned was the accountants.

The lawyers objected

11

strenuously, and the accountants stayed in BC.

12

When the economists came back to the Bureau,

About that time, my friend Corwin Edwards, the

13

Bureau Director during 1948-1952, visited me.

14

about losing the accountants, and he said to let them go.

15

He said that with a little judicious assistance, I could

16

participate in the demise of the price discrimination

17

cases that those guys were helping the lawyers bring.

18

I told him

Within the first year I had an opportunity to

19

get involved in a Robinson-Patman case.

20

was meeting, and the General Counsel and I were attending

21

as advisors.

22

200 cases that the prior Commission had brought against

23

clothing manufacturers for discriminating in their sales

24

to buyers.

25
26

The Commission

The Commissioners were arguing about some

There was a heated argument.

Commissioner

MacIntyre, after all, had been with Patman at the time the
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1

R-P Act was written, and then he wrote a book over

2

Patman's name telling people what Patman had meant.

3

thought he was the ultimate authority.

4

So he

Commissioner Elman had different views on it.

5

The Chairman was ambivalent.

New Commissioner

6

Higginbotham was undecided, and they used me as their

7

foil.

8

Professor Mueller, how can you be such a hawk on Section 7

9

and so reluctant on the R-P Act?

MacIntyre could not understand my position.

As far as he could see,

10

the language was the same.

11

said, maybe so, maybe so, and got over it.

12

I tried to explain, and he

It boiled down to who was responsible for the

13

discrimination.

14

the buyers.

15

competition.

16

If there are any culprits, I said, it's

They're inducing discounts and encouraging

Elman then said, where do we end up?

Is the

17

solution here, if there is one, to dismiss all these cases

18

and possibly go after the buyers?

19

the logical extension of what's involved.

20

tentatively voted three to two to get rid of all the

21

cases.

22

ones that were involved originally.

23

if they ever did proceed in going after the buyers who

24

were inducing discrimination.

25
26

I said perhaps that's
They

I don't know if they dropped the cases against the

MR. FOLSOM:

I also don't recall

I thought they later changed their

minds and accepted those settlement offers, to the relief
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1

of the plaintiffs in the matter, because it gave them an

2

excuse to say to the buyers who approached them about a

3

price discount, no, I'm under order by the federal

4

government not to give you a price discount.

That's my

5

recollection of what subsequently happened.

Chris White

6

has indicated that's his recollection also.

7

MR. MUELLER:

Mack, you said one thing that

8

reminded me of one of the great moments in FTC oversight.

9

That hearing that you got summoned to, you were getting

10

your hide torn off one side up and the other side down,

11

but you were holding your own.

12

member of Congress.

13

I forget if it was a

But he essentially said, “You're just saying

14

that to keep your job.”

15

actually a quite accomplished shade tree auto mechanic.

16

could go do that.”

17

(Laughter.)

18

MR. FOLSOM:

You said, “That's not true.

remembered the wrong person.

20

Minutes and not a member of Congress.
(Laughter.)

22

MR. MUELLER:

23

That was Mike Wallace of 60

I stand corrected.

But it was a

wonderful line.

24

MR. SCHEFFMAN:

25

MR. MARKHAM:

26

I

The only problem with that is you

19

21

I'm

Jesse?
I'd like to comment on a question

that was raised by someone whose memorandum I received
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before I came down.

2

economists out among the lawyers.

3

having greater economic influence over the casework, or

4

was it a way of getting rid of the economists and having

5

them under the aegis more or less of the lawyers?

6

And that was the order to spread the
Was that by way of

The report was going to assign the accountants

7

to the Bureau of Investigation and the statistical outfit

8

somewhere else.

9

one of the proposals, I was reminded of Winston

When I first became aware that that was

10

Churchill's statement about the British empire, that I

11

must have been brought down to preside over the

12

dissolution of the Bureau of Economics.

13

But it does make a lot of difference whether you

14

keep economists within the Bureau and acting as equal

15

partners with the law group or have them assigned more or

16

less under the authority of the legal group.

17

I found it very successful, at least in the

18

three cases that were cited in the Federal Trade

19

Commission Annual Report in 1955, to have the economists

20

take the recommendation from the Bureau directly over to

21

the Bureau of Investigation, just plunk himself down, and

22

say I am here to work on this case.

23

He was not under the authority of the lawyer,

24

but he was there as an equal partner.

And that was one of

25

the reasons I think it was a mistake to break up the

26

Bureau and to assign economists willy-nilly almost
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1

anywhere.

2

always could come back to their Bureau chief and say “You

3

need to go over and talk to those people.

4

they really understand what I'm supposed to be doing in

5

this case.”

6

If they went with the case, the economists

I don't think

But there is a distinction between still being

7

in the Bureau and being assigned out of the Bureau and

8

under the authority of a management somewhere else.

9

MR. SCHEFFMAN:

Thanks, Jesse.

All right.

10

Well, we're about on time, so while we don't have a lot of

11

time for a break, but we will be back starting again at

12

11:15.

Thanks.

13

(A brief recess was taken.)

14

MR. SCHEFFMAN:

Well, we've done the foundations

15

of the modern Bureau, and Jesse's remarks at the end were

16

very important.

17

that problem, that the economists reported to the same

18

people as the lawyers.

19

The Europeans in our view had exactly

And in part perhaps because of our lobbying,

20

they've created an Office of Chief Economist and they have

21

ten Ph.D. economists that report to the Chief Economist.

22

We think that's a good idea.

23

We'll see how it works.

So we had the seventies, in my view, the high

24

point of economic theory in antitrust.

But it was the

25

beginning in terms of actually influencing anything.

26

was also the beginning of economists being able to make
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1

lots of money in antitrust, a good thing for those of us

2

who do that.

3

(Laughter.)

4

MR. SCHEFFMAN:

The influence of economists

5

really took off during the eighties.

6

eighties Bureau Directors.

7

Bob Tollison, but we have Wendy Gramm, John Peterman and

8

Mike Lynch.

9

So we have the

Unfortunately, we don't have

Wendy?

MS. GRAMM:

When I came to the FTC, my first job

10

in government, about six months into the Miller

11

administration, was in the Division of Consumer

12

Protection.

13

antitrust side, but I did read what I think Tim had

14

written in the transition report about what the Miller

15

program was, and also later on became Bureau Director.

16

I was not paying that much attention to the

The Miller Commission’s objective was to promote

17

competition and to have more open and more competitive

18

markets.

19

also with regard to international restraints to trade, and

20

in some of the other policy areas besides strictly what

21

was in the antitrust area.

22

And that goes across the board domestically, but

In antitrust, the emphasis was on the bread and

23

butter horizontal type cases versus the vertical, and away

24

from some of the more innovative theories of antitrust.

25

Of course, someone mentioned earlier that both Reagan and
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Carter had campaigned on moving the FTC more toward the

2

mainstream.

3

I do believe that in that period, even the

4

Washington Post, in criticizing the consumer protection

5

side, probably KidVid, called the Federal Trade Commission

6

the National Nanny.

7

the antitrust area, very frankly, the role of economists

8

was pretty much ingrained.

9

But at any rate, I would say that in

That's not to say that it was ingrained at the

10

Commission per se.

That's not to say that the lawyers

11

always liked to get the economists involved in very early

12

stages, and John can tell you about some of those issues.

13

But in terms of the economics, economic analysis was part

14

of antitrust, especially when you compare it to the

15

consumer protection side.

16

A lot of the academic literature looked at

17

efficiencies and raised questions about the consumer

18

welfare aspects or the efficiency aspects of vertical

19

restraints, for example.

20

ingrained in the analysis, and the challenge was to get

21

economists even more involved in the cases both on the

22

consumer protection side and on the antitrust side.

So economics was already

23

Having a Chairman who was an economist made a

24

real difference, because if there was reluctance on the

25

side of attorneys to listen to economists early on, they

26

not only had Jim Miller to contend with, but they also had
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Chief of Staff Carol Crawford.

2

complaint about some lawyers not being willing to meet

3

with us or listen to the economists, and that they had

4

held some meetings without economists, et cetera.

5

the complaint to the head of the Consumer Protection

6

Bureau and to Carol Crawford as the Chief of staff.

7

the lawyers didn't want to talk to the economists, they

8

had to answer to her, if not to Jim Miller.

9

want to face her, because she was pretty tough on

10

enforcing the process.

11

don't care.

12

mad at me.”
(Laughter.)

14

MS. GRAMM:

I took

If

People didn't

I remember Tim Muris saying “I

Do anything.

13

I remember once I had some

Just don't get Carol Crawford

I think that was helpful not only on

15

the consumer protection side, but also on the antitrust

16

side.

17

the time, you had a movement away from the vertical and

18

Robinson-Patman cases, and Jim Miller and others had to

19

testify why they weren't bringing more of these cases.

20

If you stop and think about what was going on at

The economists were examining whether price

21

discrimination had an efficiency rationale and whether

22

there was evidence to demonstrate whether an efficiency

23

motivation actually explained the observed behavior.

24

Commission had not investigated these questions in

25

previous R-P cases.
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1

Bob Tollison felt that economists were pretty

2

well ingrained into the Hart-Scott-Rodino process.

3

However, it was difficult to refocus efforts to bread-and-

4

butter horizontal cases and away from some of the more

5

innovative theories and some of the vertical theories,

6

because it was a change in focus rather than simply a more

7

careful analysis.

8

Bringing careful analysis in at earlier stages,

9

which is what Hart-Scott-Rodino was about, got economists

10

in there up to their elbows right from the get-go, even

11

helping draft or modify the questions on the Second

12

Request.

13

information about everything and the kitchen sink so they

14

could have more time to prepare a case.

15

At the time, the attorneys tended to request

If you think about that period, we analyzed some

16

very large mergers in the oil industry.

17

involved at the very early stages, and he helped define

18

how to look at mergers of large companies, and in the oil

19

industry in particular.

20

withstands the test of time.

21

practitioners explain more.

22

Scott Harvey was

His methodology probably
I'll let the guys who are

Scheffman is raising his eyebrows.

I don't

23

know.

I don't consult in this area, but there were some

24

major oil mergers, and I think they were good examples of

25

successful collaboration with the lawyers.
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1

You still had the same issues, and it was

2

difficult for lawyers to understand why the economists

3

asked questions that seemed to undermine their cases.

4

was also difficult for economists to understand that when

5

you're negotiating a case and you're in meetings,

6

sometimes you have to use a little judgment about what you

7

can say and when.

8
9

It

So the tensions that existed back in the early
days of economists and lawyers working together also

10

existed during our time there.

11

When I was back at the FTC during the 2000 transition and

12

talking to folks, a lot of the same issues were still

13

being raised, sometimes by the Commissioners, about the

14

role of economists.

15

analysis was really solidified, but it was a process that

16

was well established in the prior decade.

17

matter of deepening the analysis and expanding it.

18

And it was interesting.

Nonetheless, the role of economic

It was just a

I think the watershed case was the GM-Toyota

19

joint venture.

It was a watershed in the sense of the

20

economists being involved from the very earliest stages in

21

that analysis and the economists carrying the day in terms

22

of the decision when it got to the Commission.

23

that's about the only antitrust case I remember as Bureau

24

Director.

25

a 1,200 page memo, and I didn't know if I added another

26

zero on it or not.

It loomed that large in my mind.
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John Peterman has confirmed with me that in fact

2

it was about a 1,200 page memo that went from the Bureau

3

to the Commission.

4

agree with the economists on what was a difficult case for

5

the Commission.

6

in retrospect, and even for me at the time.

7

glad that we had the 1,200 pages of support.

8
9

At any rate, the Commission really did

It seems to me like it was a no-brainer
But I was

I want to mention a couple of things that are,
again, a little outside antitrust per se, but that showed

10

what we were doing on the policy front.

11

going to talk about intervention later on.

12

want to point out that there was a lot of testimony, and

13

the Commission or Jim Miller were asked for their opinions

14

on things like industrial policy and international trade.

15

I know that we're
But I also

For example, the steel industry was trying to

16

get not only protection, so it wasn't just an ITC kind of

17

issue, but all sorts of other protections.

18

I believe the rest of the Commission were asked their

19

opinions.

20

good stand against industrial policies, against picking

21

winners and losers, and in favor of keeping markets open

22

and competitive.

23

Jim Miller and

The Commission took a very strong stand and a

I want to end by mentioning the use of

24

experimental economics in my time at the Federal Trade

25

Commission.

26

protection area, but also the FTC funded some research in

It was used not only in the consumer
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1

the antitrust area.

2

Vernon Smith and Bart Wilson at George Mason with whom I

3

work to conduct an experimental study on zone pricing in

4

gasoline markets.

5

Indeed, the FTC recently commissioned

See Ms. Gramm's documents at http://www.ftc.gov/be/
workshops/directorsconference/docs/grammdocs.pdf

So I have included an executive summary of the

6

report that's just been finished that you all probably

7

know about, but also a memo from Charlie Plott to me, and

8

a whole bunch of papers that list the research that they

9

did for the economists using experimental economics.

10

Charlie’s perspective is that FTC support fostered a whole

11

bunch of academic research.

12

research helped in the antitrust area and in the ethyl

13

case in particular.

14

MR. SCHEFFMAN:

In Plott’s view, this

Thanks, Wendy.

I screwed up

15

here because obviously I should have begun with Mike Lynch

16

since he was the first of the Bureau Directors of the

17

eighties, so I apologize, Mike.

18

MR. LYNCH:

No problem.

I'm going to steal a

19

line from Darius.

If he was the accidental Bureau

20

Director, I was the accidental Acting Bureau Director.

21

(Laughter.)

22

MR. LYNCH:

There were more accidents than I had

23

conceived.

This was at the end of Mike Pertschuk's

24

chairmanship.

25

Everybody knew that Jim Miller was going to be appointed

26

Chairman of the Commission.

Ronald Reagan had already won the election.
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1

The Bureau Director left, so Mike Pertschuk was

2

looking for a Bureau Director, and I think he went through

3

people wiser than me who said no.

4

(Laughter.)

5

MR. LYNCH:

Mike and I had gotten to know each

6

other pretty well on the life insurance cost disclosure

7

investigation.

8

happened during the committee hearings, that I was

9

politically very astute.

I think Mike thought, because of what

This was a sheer accident, never

10

to be repeated.

But in any case, when Mike asked me to be

11

the BE Director on an acting basis, I said I don't think I

12

agree with any of your views.

13

(Laughter.)

14

MR. LYNCH:

And Mike said, what about life

15

insurance?

I said, yeah, life insurance is the one thing

16

that we probably agree on.

17

more thing than any other economist.

18

(Laughter.)

19

MR. LYNCH:

And he said, well, that's one

I confess that I had several other

20

motives.

21

accepted that position, it would be a matter of a few

22

months at most, and Jim Miller would be in place.

23

would appoint a new Bureau Director, and I would be

24

leaving the Commission.

25
26

Planning is so wonderful.

I thought that if I

He

I thought, well, it's time to do something else,
and this would look good on my resume.

Instead, there was
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a hold up in Congress and it dragged on and on and on, so

2

I became a fairly long-term unintended and basically

3

unwilling Bureau Director.

4

That said, the seventies were certainly

5

tumultuous.

6

eighties, but at the beginning of the eighties, we were

7

suffering a bit of a hangover after the tumultuous

8

seventies.

9

direction.

10

We're supposed to be talking about the

And of course we were planning for a new

In any case, one of my tasks was to go to the

11

International Trade Commission to testify against

12

automobile quotas.

13

a staff report that I thought was good which stated that

14

the competition from the imports was better for the

15

American public than any injury done to the automobile

16

industry.

17

I was happy to testify because we had

I had no problem whatsoever with our position.
But in the past, I don't know if any Bureau of

18

Economics Director had ever made this presentation to the

19

International Trade Commission.

20

head of the Bureau of Competition.

21

who would make these arguments.

22

sort of argument.

23

It had typically been the
It had been a lawyer

I was very unused to this

In any case, all of the very bright lawyers

24

declined this honor.

So the Chairman and his closest

25

advisors went down the totem pole starting with the BC

26

Director.

All asked found reasons why they couldn’t and
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shouldn’t testify.

2

fell to me.

3

Commission.

4

I was lowest on the pole so the honor

So I went to the International Trade

One of my memories sitting there was seeing one

5

of the Commissioners at the International Trade

6

Commission, looking and just glaring at me.

7

thought I told you never to come back here.

8

(Laughter.)

9

MR. LYNCH:

10

He said, I

I replied, uh, Commissioner, this is

the first time I've ever been here, honest.

11

MS. GRAMM:

12

(Laughter.)

13

MR. LYNCH:

It was the right thing to do.

It was the right thing to do.

14

actually, the International Trade Commission made the

15

right choice.

16

but it probably helped.

17

And

I don't know how important our report was,
So that was a good thing.

On the other hand, the ITC decision pretty much

18

all but got undone with quota agreements that were

19

independent of the ITC.
20

I'm not sure how beneficial it

was, but it probably helped. It probably would have been

21

worse if the ITC had found the other way.

That was one

22

memorable experience during my tenure, and it’s pretty

23

much all I have to say.

24

kind of an unreal period.

The beginning of the eighties was
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1

MR. SCHEFFMAN:

John's next, but Mike's interim

2

tenure was important as were those of Mack, who did it

3

various times, and John.

4

When you have a change in administration, the

5

Bureau of Economics is a little bit of a white elephant,

6

and you never know how you're going to fit in with the new

7

guys.

8

morale up within the Bureau, talking to whoever comes in,

9

and trying to make sure that the Bureau has its rightful

10

Interim management is very important in keeping

place.

11

John?

12

MR. PETERMAN:

I intend to make a few broad

13

comments, in that context link a few things that I and

14

other economists attempted to do while at the Bureau, and

15

evaluate how successful these efforts might have been.

16

I came to the Commission in the late seventies,

17

having been an academic involved in antitrust economics.

18

At that time, numerous economists were devoting serious

19

attention to antitrust, to Commission decisions, to court

20

decisions, finding serious weaknesses in many of them,

21

finding approaches wrong, finding weaknesses in case

22

selection, and making strong suggestions that antitrust

23

policy needed a strong base in economic analysis to help

24

direct it.

25
26

It was an exciting time for economists who were
working in antitrust.

When I came to the Commission, that
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same spirit was evident.

2

be at the Federal Trade Commission.

3

It was a very exciting time to

Courts were demanding economic analysis in

4

arguments before them.

5

economic analysis and evidence before making decisions.

6

The Bureau was able to attract very, very capable

7

economists to come and provide an exciting environment to

8

provide the type of analysis that the Commission was

9

demanding.

10

The Commission was demanding

When I first arrived, there was enthusiasm not

11

only in BE but also in BC.

There was a very strong

12

functioning Merger Screening Committee which had become

13

reinvigorated.

14

jointly on what types of mergers were going to be

15

investigated and which specific ones to investigate.

Both lawyers and economists made decisions

16

There was a very serous effort for a jointly run

17

Evaluation Committee where both staff economists and their

18

managers evaluated proposed cases, presented arguments,

19

and discussed the types of evidence that we needed to show

20

possible anticompetitive effects.

21

One reflection of the importance of developing

22

economic analysis for possible cases involved a very

23

strong effort by BE and BC management to develop what were

24

called investigative protocols, which are largely

25

forgotten now.
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But there was an effort to try to take, for

2

example, a horizontal merger, and set out what analytical

3

steps we would take during an investigation, what

4

arguments we would try to advance, and what types of

5

evidence we would seek to support a possible case.

6

We completed protocols for horizontal mergers,

7

horizontal restraints, vertical mergers and vertical

8

restraints.

9

very hard on them.

It was a major effort.

I remember working

They did not really become policy or

10

really see the light of day, but they did show a

11

willingness and desire to integrate economic analysis into

12

the antitrust mission, and a serous effort by BC at that

13

time to accommodate that goal.

14

It was also a time when the big monopoly cases

15

were dying out.

16

perspective, they proved too difficult to do.

17

the Commission didn't have the capability to handle such

18

cases.

19

line.

20

They either bore no fruit, or from my
In my view,

There was no enthusiasm to continue along that

There was some effort by attorneys to continue

21

“industry wide” cases by proposing “no-fault” monopoly

22

investigations where the aim was to challenge brands that

23

had large market shares and to require the licensing of

24

the brand names at essentially zero license fees.

25
26

BE was very much opposed to no-fault monopoly
cases, and those particular investigations did not go far.
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There were also efforts to develop conglomerate merger

2

cases, but none bore fruit (if I remember correctly,

3

because they didn't have a strong economic base to them).

4

Many of the economists and attorneys at the time

5

de-emphasized vertical cases, largely on the ground that

6

the arguments to support proposed cases were the very ones

7

that academics had strongly criticized, and the proposed

8

cases demonstrated the weaknesses of past arguments.

9

we tended not to promote vertical cases, or tended to be

10

So

very, very choosy in what we supported.

11

One effort to continue support for past vertical

12

policy was an evaluation of about five or six past FTC

13

cases by outside economists, which we published in a book.

14

The volume argued that the past cases bore consumer

15

benefit.

16

didn't carry the day, partly because few of the studies in

17

it were really first rate.

18

superior, I think the retrospective volume would have had

19

more influence.

20

That effort, although it was interesting, really

Had more of the analysis been

An example from the retrospective is a study of

21

the FTC challenge of resale price maintenance by Levi

22

Strauss on its Levis jeans.

23

basically supported the Commission's challenge in that

24

case, largely by concluding that it was a “good” case

25

because Levi’s use of RPM was a mistake, and the

26

Commission helped it overcome its error.

An economist from Yale
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(Laughter.)

2

MR. PETERMAN:

So what did BE focus on?

We

3

focused primarily on horizontal restraints.

4

economists developed great skill and expertise in

5

analyzing horizontal restraints and horizontal mergers, in

6

developing relevant evidence and arguments, and in

7

presenting them to the Commission.

8

very influential.

9

The

Here I think BE was

The Merger Guidelines were coming into existence

10

in '82, and we began to follow them as investigative

11

guides.

12

Guidelines are relatively very low.

13

structure/performance paradigm was coming into disfavor.

14

Weaknesses were being shown.

15

concentration in the Guidelines seemed very low in

16

relation to new economics research, and also in relation

17

to how competitive firms seemed to be when their

18

Herfendahls in their industries were much higher than

19

those in many cases that we were investigating.

20

The Herfendahl thresholds numbers in the
The

The threshold levels of

Malcolm Coate has demonstrated that the

21

Commission really has based its decisions on much higher

22

Herfendahls than the thresholds in the Merger Guidelines.

23

I remember one time calling as an experiment maybe 35

24

eminent industrial organization economists and asking them

25

what post-merger Herfendahl would he or she be concerned

26

about?

What should be our cutoff?

The average was 2,500
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to 3,000, if I remember correctly.

2

that, they (generally) said not to be too concerned about.

3

Anything lower than

The economists who favored the much higher

4

levels, 3,000 or even higher, were those who felt the FTC

5

would too frequently challenge procompetitive mergers.

6

They felt that errors blocking procompetitive mergers

7

would be less likely if the Herfendahl thresholds were

8

very high.

9

So the Commission gradually did move well above

10

the Guideline thresholds.

Efforts were made in the '92

11

Merger Guidelines to change the levels, but this proposal

12

was not successful.

13

In management, we always tended to require the

14

economists to analyze the behavior of buyers and sellers

15

and explain how the market actually worked.

16

the staff to develop either a theoretical framework or a

17

compelling story that would allow us to discern how a

18

particular merger would affect competition and why, and to

19

provide any supporting and contrary evidence.

20

My years covered a great time to be an economist

21

at the Commission, and I hope it still is.

22

is.

23

We expected

MS. GRAMM:

I'm sure it

I want to mention one thing, Dave,

24

just to follow on to these comments.

If you look at the

25

cases that were brought on the antitrust side, you really

26

see the influence of Tim Muris when he moved from BCP
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Director to became BC Director, especially with a lot more

2

cases brought where monopolies were basically government-

3

sponsored monopolies.

4

Some of them weren't successful, but Muris

5

targeted government-imposed restraints and, for example,

6

cases where standard setters tried to raise rivals' costs

7

by excluding others.

8

in the eighties are worth noting.

9

These kinds of cases from later on

MR. SCHEFFMAN:

Let me give a little

10

perspective, having been a Bureau Director at that time.

11

I came to the Commission in 1979.

12

how much things changed for the economists.

13

altogether good, but it was productive.

14

You can't overemphasize
It wasn't

I remember in the late seventies, most of BE’s

15

resources were in the big monopolization cases.

16

there were certainly strong differences of opinion within

17

the Bureau of Economics on the merits of individual cases,

18

the Bureau has always provided total support whenever the

19

Commission has gone to court.

20

Although

I worked on a number of cases I didn't agree

21

with.

22

supporting the litigation in what were all economics

23

cases.

24

lawyers.

25
26

That was my job.

The Bureau was very important in

So we were actually quite popular with the

The situation changed when big monopolization
cases went away.

The other part of the BC agenda, like
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the merger program at that time, few economists supported,

2

because of the sort of merger cases that were brought at

3

that time.

4

many merger cases, but there wasn't much of an avenue for

5

the economists to have much role in that.

6

There was tension because of BE opposition to

Overall, however, in the 1970s BE was quite

7

popular within the Commission.

During the eighties, the

8

monopolization cases stopped, a merger wave picked up, and

9

the cases and the caseload began to be mergers.

At the

10

same time, we had Bill Baxter's brilliant Merger

11

Guidelines in which the methodology laid out was

12

essentially an economic analysis.

13

reform of the Merger Guidelines, as Mack mentioned, merger

14

cases were generally decided by abstruse arguments about

15

market definition.

16

nothing to do with economics.

17

Prior to Baxter’s

Prior to Baxter, merger cases had

The brilliance of the Guidelines is that they

18

gave a sound analytical approach that we learned over time

19

was implementable.

20

into a ball game for economists.

21

The new approach also turned mergers

The typical merger we were doing in the early

22

days were 7 to 6 and 6 to 5 mergers.

Tim gets blamed for

23

supposedly not enforcing the antitrust laws.

24

most conservative policy, however, with respect to

25

concentration thresholds was under Muris.

26

of Justice and the Commission at the same time were both

By far the

The Department
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pretty much holding to the Guidelines’ Herfindahl

2

standards.

3

With the numerical standards, however, a lot of

4

the merger cases weren't ones that economists would get

5

very excited about.

6

specific 6 to 5 merger would make a lot of difference?

7

see a lot of industries that are much more highly

8

concentrated than 5 significant firms and look pretty

9

competitive.

10

Why would you think that this
We

With very conservative numerical standards and a

11

new methodology, there was a lot of tension between the

12

economists and the lawyers.

13

footing with the lawyers, because the Guidelines used a

14

economic methodology, because Chairman Jim Miller was an

15

economist, and because BC Director Tim Muris was an

16

economist-oriented lawyer.

17

We were on a much more equal

But we sort of became the lightning rod for the

18

change.

19

The legal bureaus weren't dying for the change in

20

methodology or in policy direction, and these changes were

21

very unpopular at the time.

22

were saying no, no, this case doesn't make any sense.

23

It was obviously a tremendous change in policy.

BE was the nay sayers who

So the Bureau of Economics went from being

24

“loved” by the lawyers and supporting litigation to being

25

the unpopular quality control enforcers who would say in a

26

very vigorous way, wait a minute, here are the reasons why
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this may not make sense.

2

background.

3

Jim was not a shy guy.

4

Jim Ferguson is in the

He was one of the Assistant Directors, and

We had some very vocal people, including me, who

5

fought vigorously with the lawyers.

6

time.

7

worked out modern merger analysis.

8

web site about this period.

It was a very testy

It was the time in which the Commission and DOJ

9

We have a paper on the

But it was a time in which the Bureau of

10

Economics, with so much to say, went from being friends to

11

becoming to some extent the “enemy” from the staff

12

lawyers’ perspectives.

13

What eventually happened was that the lawyers,

14

who are very smart, figured out the Guidelines and learned

15

to play that game, too.

16

to build cases using the methodology of the Guidelines.

17

They learned to marshal evidence

Over time, then, the economists prevailed less

18

frequently when the economists were saying, well, we think

19

there's not enough evidence to support a merger case.

20

Having just come back to the Bureau, I think

21

that's where we are still today.

The economists are very

22

important.

23

with our friends, even though we sometimes disagree with

24

them.

25

the analysis.

The lawyers listen to us.

We're not at war

The lawyers are very smart, and they figured out
If it's an argument about evidence, lawyers
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are going to win against the economists, unless you can

2

come up with some really convincing evidence.

3

To summarize, the economists' role is important

4

and appreciated.

We had that “high point” for a while in

5

the eighties, but it also was a time of great contention

6

and put a lot of pressure on the Bureau.

7

Directors have fortunately defused the contentious nature

8

of the interactions that we had during the late 1980s and

9

early 1990s.

Later Bureau

We have some time for questions or comments.

10

MS. GRAMM:

Ferguson.

11

MR. FERGUSON:

12

BE management during that period.

13

(Laughter.)

14

MR. SCHEFFMAN:

Let's talk about the surrender by

Let's do that.

Now remember,

15

Jim, general counsel is here, so be careful what you say,

16

but we'll get the gist of it.

17

MR. FERGUSON:

The idea that we had some

18

influence during the early period of the eighties while

19

Jim Miller was Chairman was in part because obviously he

20

supported the program, and Tim Muris supported the

21

program.

22

supporting an increased role for BE, that makes it a

23

little easier.

24

When you have the Chairman and the BC Director

However, the structural change that accompanied

25

more influence for BE was placing emphasis on the Merger

26

Screening and Evaluation Committee meetings at which some
For The Record, Inc.
Waldorf, Maryland(301)870-8025

99
1

evidence had to be presented before cases were allowed to

2

go forward.

3

retreat from the requirement of evidence before a case

4

could proceed.

5

Screening and Evaluation Committee no longer mean

6

anything.

7

of BE declined, because if you can't get in there early

8

and present evidence of the lack of a case, once they get

9

going, they have a momentum of their own, as we've all

My impression is that there's been a major

In fact, in the last ten years, Merger

They're a rubber stamp.

That's where the role

10

observed.

11

didn't do more to maintain the importance of the Merger

12

Screening and Evaluation Committee meetings.

13

Therefore, the question is why management

MR. SCHEFFMAN:

I don't agree.

I don't think

14

it's quite that important.

15

difference in the early eighties, when we were looking at

16

7 to 6 mergers, when it wasn't obvious that the market

17

definition made any sense, when we didn't really

18

understand the Guidelines, and when we were not using the

19

Guidelines’ methodology.

20

These meetings made a lot of

Now in the typical matter, there's normally a

21

solid basis in the case.

For example, you usually have a

22

plausible 4 to 3 or 5 to 4.

23

about the merits at the time of the case.

24

that's much less of a problem.

25

screening actually works very well.

The economists might disagree
But I think

I think that merger
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What the people did in the nineties during the

2

merger boom, I can't imagine how they were able to do what

3

they did.

4

I guarantee, because a lot of stuff was left by the

5

wayside, and we don't see very many complaints about

6

anticompetitive mergers that got through.

7

demonstrated that the Merger Guidelines made the

8

enforcement process enormously more efficient.

9

There was some serious screening that went on,

The merger boom

We used to be really busy when we had two big

10

mergers going on at the same time.

11

time.

12

was amazed when I came back in 2001 when it was still

13

really busy.

14

mergers, and a number of other mergers going on at the

15

same time.

16

have been under water.

17

us to do so many cases simultaneously in the eighties.

18

People got much better at what they did, both the

19

economists and the lawyers.

20

Now that's a slow

That was like a vacation during the nineties.

I

We had two big oil mergers, two big food

I had never seen anything like that.

MS. GRAMM:

We would

It would have been impossible for

But then the point that you made,

21

though, is that it's not only that the lawyers figured out

22

our game and can spit out cost benefit analysis as if they

23

are using a template and punching in the numbers.

24

point is, they also got better in terms of learning not to

25

bring such awful cases to evaluation.

They had to.

The
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MR. SCHEFFMAN:

I think they're applying the

2

same analysis we do.

3

weight to hot documents.

4

to the typical lawyer than to economists.

5

don't give much weight to opinions in memos.

6

I think as lawyers, they give more
Documents are worth a lot more
Economists

Lawyers emphasize relatively more statements in

7

documents, and the economists emphasize more of the

8

quantitative part.

9

is, on average, correct decisions.

I believe that the product of the two

10

Typically they're correct decisions.

11

Other questions?

12

MR. SCHERER:

More than on average.

Yeah.

I think there's something

13

missing from the equation.

14

the idea.

15

been Don Turner.

16

begins from the premise established in many empirical

17

studies that the average merger yields zero at best

18

efficiency increase, and therefore, in efficiency terms,

19

mergers are on average a blah.

20

to err in antitrust enforcement, very little is to be lost

21

in the absence of compelling evidence of efficiencies,

22

which can be brought forward in some cases.

23

myself in merger cases.

24

I'm not sure who originated

It may have been Fritz Mueller.

It may have

A quite different approach to mergers

Therefore, if you've got

I've done it

But in the absence of such evidence, very little

25

is to be lost if you take too tough a line, by standard

26

Cournot theory, towards the merger.

And somehow we have
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lost sight of that weighing of relative benefits versus

2

relative costs of enforcing a tough merger policy.

3

I know the people who did these things in the

4

1990s had a very difficult job.

I worked for the

5

Department of Justice on the proposed merger between

6

Lockheed Martin and Northrop Grumman.

7

worked on that concluded that there would be serious

8

losses of competition if this merger took place.

9

really let the horse out of the barn with two prior

The team that

But we

10

mergers that were not challenged by the antitrust

11

authorities, the merger of McDonnell Douglas with Boeing

12

and the merger of Raytheon with Hughes Electronics.

13

Those mergers got through and have had a

14

significantly negative impact on our defense posture.

15

Also, I did the efficiencies analysis in the Lockheed

16

Martin Northrop Grumman proposal.

17

sorts of efficiencies.

18

close down 90 production lines, close 115 laboratories.
19

They were proposing all

I remember they were going to

I did an item-by-item analysis of what these

20

closures entailed.

In something like 85 percent of the

21

cases, the firm in which the laboratory to be closed was

22

located had an exactly parallel laboratory somewhere else

23

within that firm, so that they could have maintained the

24

same R&D work substantively while closing that laboratory

25

without the impetus of merger.
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2

MR. SCHEFFMAN:
thank you.

Thanks, Mike.

All right.

Well,

Thank you very much, panelists.

3

(Applause.)

4

[Break for lunch]

5
6
7
8

[Resuming]:

9
10

MR. FROEB:

This is the 1990s.

We have Jon

Baker and Jeremy Bulow.

11

MR. BAKER:

I'm really delighted to be back and

12

to see all my former colleagues and old friends who have

13

shown up, and to see this lovely new building.

14

The three challenges I'd like to talk about that

15

were important for the Bureau of Economics during my

16

tenure involved the need to deepen the litigation support

17

capability, the challenge to resources posed by the merger

18

wave, and the challenge of integrating new theories and

19

empirical tools into antitrust practice.

20

Let me start with litigation support.

When Bob

21

Pitofsky, Bill Baer and I arrived in April 1995 and were

22

talking about our management goals, we realized we wanted

23

to expand the Commission's litigation capacity, because we

24

planned to litigate cases and we knew the importance of

25

integrating economic analysis with the legal analysis in

26

doing so.
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The lessons that John Peterman had taught the

2

Commission were not lost on us.

3

a more cooperative relationship between the Bureau of

4

Competition and Bureau of Economics staffs where both

5

would value the contributions of each other more than we

6

thought might have been going on in the recent past.

7

recognized this was not just a Bureau of Economics

8

problem, but of course my focus was on the Bureau of

9

Economics aspects of it.

10

We saw a need to develop

We

With respect to the Bureau of Economics, there

11

was no issue of undoing what had been going on in the

12

earlier decades.

13

of Economics staff's independent voice to the Commission

14

or its intellectual integrity.

15

ask the staff to undertake a second, complementary job,

16

helping the attorneys make their case more effectively,

17

sharpen their arguments, improve theories, buttress their

18

evidence, and identify the best answers to the problems

19

with the case that the Bureau of Economics might identify

20

in the event that our training led them to see problems

21

that the lawyers didn't.

22

We didn't seek to challenge the Bureau

The goal instead was to

We spread this message through joint retreats of

23

the managements of the two bureaus, the Bureau of

24

Competition and Bureau of Economics.

25

litigation support for the Bureau of Economics staff,

We had seminars on
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including one where we brought in senior academics and

2

consultants to talk about their experiences as experts.

3

In my view, the staffs of both the Bureau of

4

Economics and Bureau of Competition rose to the challenge.

5

One example, and the biggest one from the point of view of

6

the Bureau of Economics, was Staples’ proposed acquisition

7

of Office Depot.

8
9

Bruce Wasserstein, an investment banker, talked
about it as, he said in his book, “a particularly dramatic

10

show stopper” from the point of view of the investment

11

community in understanding the government's merger policy.

12

I believe that case would not have been brought by the

13

Commission or won in court without the extensive

14

contribution that the Bureau of Economics staff made in

15

analyzing the pricing evidence and in analyzing what we

16

concluded were the parties' overstated efficiency claims.

17

The Bureau of Economics staff played a similar

18

role in litigating the drug wholesaling mergers, another

19

one that went to District Court.

20

Cardinal, McKesson, AmeriSource and one other.

21

four firms.

22

Bergen.

This case involved
There were

Thank you, Harold [Saltzman].

There was theoretical modeling from BE staff

23

that supported the Commission's economic expert, and there

24

was extensive support also for the Commission's

25

efficiencies expert in that case.
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When the Pitofsky era at the Commission began,

2

few BE attorneys and BE economists had significant

3

antitrust litigation experience.

4

learned on the job and became more capable and effective

5

in going to court.

Both bureaus essentially

6

In fact, during Jeremy's tenure, the Commission

7

was litigating three cases simultaneously in the District

8

Court.

9

beginning of our tenure in 1995.

10

That’s something we could not have done at the

The effort to develop a more cooperative

11

relationship with the legal staff was made on the consumer

12

protection side as well, where the Bureau of Economics

13

staff played an important role in working on the Joe Camel

14

litigation, particularly in data analysis.

15

The improved cooperation with the Bureau of

16

Competition gave the Bureau of Economics credibility with

17

the Commissioners and paid off with influence.

18

Bill Baer and I basically agreed on most cases

19

when we made recommendations to the Commission.

20

we disagreed, and when the Bureau of Competition didn't

21

have a signed consent in hand, the views of the Bureau of

22

Economics were highly influential.

23

reflected our overall cooperation in serving the aims of

24

the Commission as a whole.

25
26

But when

I think this influence

The second challenge that we faced was the
merger wave, which strained the resources of the
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Commission unbelievably.

2

overwhelming during my tenure, and I think they got worse

3

for Jeremy.

4

The resource demands were just

Antitrust investigations also at the same time

5

became more complex, particularly because we were more

6

often conducting econometric analyses, for example

7

regarding market definition or unilateral competitive

8

effects.

9

Those are probably the most common examples.
On more than one occasion, I remember Bob Brogan

10

coming into my office and telling me that the Bureau of

11

Economics' ability to staff all the antitrust cases was in

12

question.

13

analysis of the oppressive number of significant mergers

14

that were coming in one after another.

15

There was an overwhelming demand for economic

Despite the heavy merger case load, BE supported

16

many other Commission projects.

17

to investigate and challenge nonmerger practices in

18

antitrust.

19

investigations, for example.

20

coming, and the Hart-Scott Rodino deadlines meant we

21

couldn't put them on the slow track.

22

them.

23

The Commission found time

The Toys “R” Us case, Intel, those were big
But the mergers just kept

We had to address

The constant pressure from the merger wave made

24

what we did in the Bureau of Economics in staffing Staples

25

all the more impressive.

26

Staples involved something like eight economists in a

I don't recall exactly, but
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full-time equivalent sense, including staff and managers

2

and a visiting scholar, all working full time or nearly so

3

for several months.

4

making significant contributions.

A number of others were also involved

5

Half of our staff were doing full-time

6

econometrics as were both of our outside experts and their

7

staffs.

8

either Justice or FTC, before or since, has involved as

9

extensive a commitment of resources to econometrics, both

10

I believe that no government antitrust case,

in investigation and litigation, as BE made in Staples.

11

We also put some resources into research and

12

advocacy, but it was basically just enough to keep the

13

functions from disappearing.

14

for us even to do that throughout my tenure.

15

It was a constant challenge

We also found time for an interesting effort to

16

generate antitrust cases that I don't think people outside

17

the agency know about.

18

Bureau of Labor Statistics Producer Price Indices in as

19

disaggregated a level as the data permitted.

20

to 7 and even sometime 9-digit SIC industries.

21

essentially looked at price changes, starting several

22

months before the most recent business cycle trough in the

23

most closely related industrial production index.

24

linking price and output changes separately for each

25

industry, we timed the trough individually for each

26

industry.

The idea was to screen the monthly

The data go
We

By

We compared prices before and after the trough,
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once output had returned to its original level in that

2

industry.

3

The idea was to identify instances when prices

4

rose during a period where output probably wasn't rising,

5

and when most industries were in recession.

6

instances, one could probably rule out the hypothesis that

7

the higher prices came from input cost increases or from

8

industries hitting capacity constraints.

9

price increases during those down times would likely on

10
11

In such

Industries with

average reflect the exercise of market power.
This sample gave us a group of industries to

12

study further.

13

become less elastic as the economy began to pick up on the

14

way out of the recession, and firms able to exercise

15

market power might take advantage of the opportunity to

16

raise price.

17

One hypothesis was that demand could

Our screen generated more than 600 industries

18

that were worth looking at.

19

600 industries, so Denis Breen, Ron Bond and I picked 25

20

industries, largely arbitrarily, to look at further, and

21

assigned each one to an economist on the staff to study.

22

We couldn't possibly touch

In most of those cases, there was a plausible

23

explanation for the price increase in terms of cost or

24

some other industry-specific factors.

25

economists talked to the appropriate BLS economist about

26

how they did the survey, and sometimes the data were

Some of our
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misleading.

For example, the BLS data sometimes didn't

2

fully pick up a quality increase that affected price.

3

However, in three of the 25 industries, the

4

report came back that there wasn't really any good

5

explanation for the price increase other than market

6

power.

7

further investigation wouldn't be appropriate.

8

them it turned out was the subject of several Justice

9

Department grand juries at the time, so they were on to

10
11

In two of those industries, we decided that
One of

this one already.
But for the one that was left, the Bureau of

12

Competition investigated.

13

the prices go up and what can we learn from documents

14

associated with that price increase.

15

confirmed that the price increases probably reflected the

16

exercise of market power, but there wasn't any agreement,

17

and there wasn't any facilitating practice that the

18

Commission could challenge. The Bureau of Competition

19

therefore decided that it couldn't go forward, so it

20

closed the investigation.

21

They asked essentially why did

The investigation

Ultimately, we didn't come up with any cases.

22

However, I thought that we had proven the technique.

23

didn't have the resources to try again on another 25

24

industries, much less 600 industries.

25

(Laughter.)
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MR. BAKER:

But now, Luke, you can make another

2

effort.

The merger wave has slacked off and there's a

3

whole new set of industries with unexplained price

4

increases to investigate.

5

The third area I wanted to mention was

6

integrating new theories and empirical tools in antitrust

7

practice.

8

with strong backgrounds in theory and econometrics.

9

also invited some top academics to do continuing education

10

We recruited new Ph.D.s and visiting scholars
We

seminars.

11

We worked on auction theory and unilateral

12

effects in several cases, not just in the drug wholesaling

13

mergers that I mentioned before, but also in Rite-

14

Aid/Revco and Time-Warner/AOL.

15

worked out involving all-or-nothing offers and bundling.

16

We also worked on how to implement the minimum viable

17

scale analysis of the Merger Guidelines.

18

raising rivals' cost cases.

19

utilize Dave and Steve Salop's ideas in actual cases.

20

We had models that we

We worked on

We thought about how to

We thought hard about efficiencies in

21

conjunction with the 1997 efficiency guideline revisions

22

and in working out ways to estimate pass through rates.

23

In Staples, we worked out how to take advantage of a

24

natural experiment to see how prices varied with market

25

structure.

26

econometrics in lots of cases.

We investigated demand elasticities using
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One of the most important jobs was to share how

2

we in the Bureau were applying these new econometric

3

techniques and theoretical approaches with the economists

4

and lawyers who advised outside firms.

5

speeches on a wide range of topics trying to explain what

6

we were doing.

7

I gave a number of

I did very little of this work by myself.

It

8

really was the staff and the talented economists and

9

managers in the Bureau, and all my Associate Directors and

10

Deputy Directors, who made all this possible.

11

am not surprised that under my successor, Jeremy, the

12

Bureau remained as highly successful as we were.

13

Thank you.

14

MR. FROEB:

15

I therefore

I'm tempted to call on Jim Ferguson

to rebut.

16

(Laughter.)

17

MR. FROEB:

But we're going to go to Jeremy.

18

MR. BULOW:

Thank you.

Of course, at the time I

19

became bureau director, Bob Pitofsky was the chairman.

20

And as you all know, Bob is a real intellectual, and part

21

of what that implied was that he was perfectly happy for

22

me to say what I really thought and entertained debate

23

about any case so long as I didn't persuade Mozelle or

24

Sheila to change their vote.

25

(Laughter.)
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MR. BULOW:

So fundamentally, the way we could

2

have influence was either by persuading Bob, which

3

sometimes happened.

4

sometimes we could persuade BC.

5

deleted].

6

[Nonpublic material deleted]

Or

[Nonpublic material

And the third thing that we do [nonpublic

7

material deleted].

BC's proposal would have more

8

credibility with him if BE was saying that we were going

9

way too far. [Nonpublic material deleted].

10

MR. FROEB:

11

(Whereupon, at 12:35 p.m., a luncheon recess was

12

Well, thank you both.

Let's eat.

taken.)

13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24

A F T E R N O O N

S E S S I O N

25

(1:10 p.m.)
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MR. MURIS:

Let me introduce Jim Miller, but let

2

me also mention that we have several other current and

3

former members of the Federal Trade Commission here

4

besides Jim and me.

5

Commissioner, Pamela Jones Harbour.

6

Commissioners Mary Azcuenaga, Mary Gardiner Jones, and

7

Margot Machol.

8

quite a morning.

9

Tom Leary is here, as is our newest
We also have former

So we have quite a gallery, and it's been

I have the distinct honor and privilege of

10

introducing Jim Miller.

11

service last fall for Jim Liebler, I've been lucky to have

12

had three mentors in my life, each named Jim.

13

As I mentioned in a memorial

Today I have the honor of introducing the second

14

Jim, Jim Miller.

15

who want to know.

Jim Rill is the third, for those of you

16

I first heard of Jim without meeting him when

17

doing work for Chairman Lew Engman in the fall of 1974.

18

Lew made a major speech attacking transportation

19

regulation.

20

York Times, which is a pretty big deal.

21

on Jim Miller and George Douglas's book about the Civil

22

Aeronautics Board, which I read in galleys.

23

It actually got on the front page of the New
He relied heavily

I met Jim, shortly thereafter became friends,

24

and even took a class from him.

Within 36 hours of Ronald

25

Reagan's victory in 1980, we had breakfast.
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that he wanted to be Chairman of the FTC.

2

mess the place was in, I asked why.

3

Knowing the

(Laughter.)

4

MR. MURIS:

Jim, who has almost always got the

5

big issues right, was way ahead of me in seeing the FTC's

6

potential.

7

on the Regulatory Relief Taskforce in the White House,

8

where I worked for Jim and Boyden Gray, and next for four

9

crucial years in the FTC's history, and what years they

10

I worked for Jim in the FTC transition, then

were!

11

The FTC abandoned the discredited policies of

12

the 1970s.

13

attacking fraud, and becoming competition's advocate

14

before other government agencies.

15

strengthened its roles involving health care and the

16

professions.

17

was a personal triumph that I believe only Jim could have

18

accomplished, and against odds that even today make me

19

shudder to remember how long they were, Jim preserved the

20

FTC's jurisdiction against the onslaught of the American

21

Medical Association and its allies.

22

It went in major new directions, for example,

The FTC also

Here Jim's presence was essential.

That victory reverberates today.

In what

We at the FTC

23

have become the major government institution in the world

24

advocating for competition in health care.

25

triumph, this work would be impossible.
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Jim's tenure was analyzed in a major book by two

2

political scientists, who considered themselves neo-

3

liberals, whatever that means.

4

Change is the story of why Jim Miller succeeded at the FTC

5

and Ann Buford failed at the EPA.

6

book rather extensively:

7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44

The Politics of Regulatory

Let me quote from the

Miller ... brought to the FTC a well-considered
intellectual framework. On arriving at the FTC,
he put together a more concrete deregulatory
agenda based on this framework. Buford, on the
other hand, came to the EPA with an agenda to
get the agency off the back of business. This
agenda was grounded in an intellectual
commitment rather than an intellectual
framework. This difference accounts, in great
part, for Buford's problems and Miller's
successes. As one former EPA official noted,
you can't fight something (environmentalism)
with nothing (Buford's strategy of ratcheting
down). In this sense, Miller had something and
Buford had nothing. His intellectual framework
provided a basis for both attacking past FTC
policy and defending his administrative and
budgetary measures. . . . Miller ... [left his]
own distinct stamp on the [agency he] led. When
[Janet] Steiger arrived at the agency, she found
a legacy on which she could build. Indeed, she
defined her mission essentially as consolidating
the changes in the legal standards that Miller
brought to the agency. As the Associate
Director of Advertising Practices under Steiger,
Lee Peeler, observed, policy statements
formulated during Miler's tenure required
“greater attention to economic analysis -- this
affects the view the Commission has of
advertising: the cases we bring, the way we
carry out enforcement, the general orientation
of the Commission.” . . . Miller's success in
modifying the FTC demonstrated dramatically how,
with the expansion of executive capacities in
American politics, energetic and carefully
conceived administrative action, can bring about
substantial alterations in regulatory policy.
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I give you Chairman Miller.

2

(Applause.)

3

MR. MILLER:

Please see the written text of Mr. Miller's speech at
http://www.ftc.gov/be/workshops/directorsconference/docs/
FTC_Address_Miller.pdf

Chairman Muris, Commissioners,

4

Directors, and everyone else: it’s a pleasure to be with

5

you today.

6

the awful shock I received at opening up today's

7

Washington Times and being confronted with a photograph of

8

Howard Beales.

9

madman!

10

Please bear with me:

I'm just recovering from

The photo makes him look like some sort of

Chairman Muris was kind to mention that once he

11

was my student.

Well, Wendy Gramm, with whom I served on

12

the faculty of Texas A&M, will probably vouch for the fact

13

that I've taught many classes which included students who

14

knew more about the subject than I did.

15

have such an experience where the student knew as much

16

more about the subject as when Tim Muris was in my class.

17

I'm honored to be here today -- in part because

18

I'm not officially an alumnus of the Bureau of Economics.

19

I’m reminded that soon after arriving at the Commission I

20

participated in my first Part III matter -- you know, a

21

judicial-type hearing.

22

room on the fifth floor, someone from the staff came up to

23

me and said, “Mr. Chairman, how long have you been a

24

lawyer?”

25

from being an economist directly to being a judge.”

But never did I

As I walked out of the hearing

I responded, “Oh, I'm not a lawyer.

For The Record, Inc.
Waldorf, Maryland(301)870-8025

I jumped
And

118
1

so, when I came to the Commission, I jumped directly from

2

being an economist right over BE to become a Commissioner.

3

I'm glad to see Paul Pautler here -- and glad to

4

see that he's found a comparative advantage.

5

first jobs in Washington was helping me unload a U-Haul

6

truck and trailer containing everything my family brought

7

with us from Texas A&M.

8

unloading trucks, working for BE would be just a charm.

9

You know, when I left government and set up office at

10

Citizens for a Sound Economy, I had a series of young

11

women work as my assistant.

12

eight, ten months or a year, and then they’d get married.

13

Then another one would come aboard and work six, eight

14

months or whatever, and she'd get married.

15

to comment on the phenomenon.

16

explanation for it:

17

six months, any man looks good!”

18

One of his

Paul surmised that after

They'd be with me seven,

People began

My wife had an easy

“After working with Jim Miller for

I was interested in Paul's rather expansive

19

history of BE.

As I began reading it, I was drawn to the

20

fact that for many years Francis Walker was Chief

21

Economist of the Bureau of Corporations and then Chief

22

Economist of the FTC.

23

living in a man's world and performing so well.

24

rather than finishing the piece, I called Paul, to find

25

out more.

26

woman, and that his father was the first President of the

Here was this Francis Walker:
So,

Paul told me that Walker was a man, not a
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American Economic Association and prior to that was

2

President of the American Statistical Association.

3

then I remembered that while Paul and I were at Texas A&M,

4

playing a lot of basketball during the lunch hour, Bob

5

Tollison and I wrote a piece about rates of publication

6

per faculty member.

7

a piece that had been co-authored by Leonard Weiss

8

describing a “Hall of Fame” for women economists, based on

9

the number of publications in major journals.

But

In doing the research, we came across

Included in

10

that hall of fame was Sally Herbert Frankel.

Writing

11

Weiss a note, I said, “I know Sally Herbert Frankel; he's

12

a man.”

13

easy mistake to make these days; sometimes you can't tell

14

one from the other.”

15

Weiss wrote back and said, “Yes; well, that's an

Mr. Chairman, I notice that the title of the

16

“intervention program” has been changed to “advocacy

17

program.”

18

"intervention" has more pizzazz than "advocacy."

19

know, you go running into Tim's office and say, "Tim,

20

something's up.

21

catchier than, “Tim, something's up.

22

It reminds me of how that great Georgia Bulldog, Lewis

23

Grizzard, distinguished between the words "naked" and

24

"nekked."

25

don't have any clothes on, and "nekked" is when you don't

26

have any clothes on and you're up to something!

I really think that's a shame, because the word

Let's go intervene!"

You

That's much
Let's go advocate!”

According to Grizzard, "naked" is when you
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About the intervention program:

2

remember when we sent Bill MacLeod to Minneapolis to

3

deliver papers to the City Council, suing them over

4

monopolizing the taxicab market?

5

conference at which a bunch of taxi drivers showed up.

6

Former Minnesota Vikings, according to Bill.

7

send Mack McCarty down to New Orleans to do the same

8

thing?

9

recollect.

10

Tim, do you

Bill held a press

Didn't we

Mack left the Commission soon after that, as I
Those were the days.

They were a lot of fun.

In his piece on BE history, Paul addresses what

11

I call the Arthur Burns question.

12

resolution, but at least he tries.

13

I was at the American Enterprise Institute during the late

14

1970s, I sponsored a monthly series where we'd invite the

15

head of a regulatory agency to come over and meet with the

16

scholars and then discuss their issues.

17

came one time; we also had the heads of OSHA, FMC --

18

organizations such as that.

19

the Regulators.”

20

doing and then take questions.

21

Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board and then an AEI

22

distinguished scholar, always asked the same question:

23

“Would the world be different if your agency didn’t

24

exist?”

25
26

He does so without firm
Let me explain.

When

Mike Pertschuk

I called the program “Meet

The guest would talk about what he was
Arthur Burns, former

I want you to know that I've taken a very
careful look at the FTC and have tasked myself to answer
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the Arthur Burns question.

2

the results of that inquiry.

3

into decades.

4

the decade of the thirties; then the forties, the fifties

5

and sixties together; then the seventies; then the

6

eighties; and then the nineties.

7

probably yes, no, marginally yes, yes, damn right, and

8

yes.

9

I want to share with you now
We can divide the century

Consider the first two decades together;

Now the answers are:

Now in the remainder of this conference, in

10

ruminations about what transpires today, and in your

11

writings, I hope you will keep several things in mind.

12

One is that, as an independent agency, the FTC is very

13

vulnerable, because it has few friends and lots of

14

enemies.

15

that can keep the allegiance of the public and have a

16

reputation for professionalism and credibility -- such as

17

you have today -- you’re accomplishing a lot!

18

Parenthetically, when an organization such as

Part of the problem is that you don't have the

19

cover of the Executive.

You really don’t, because you are

20

"an independent agency."

21

Tim, but in 1980, right after the election, as a member of

22

the Reagan-Bush transition team, Tim went up and down the

23

halls at FTC Headquarters saying to no one in particular

24

but to anyone who would listen, “We're going to retry

25

Humphrey’s Executor.”

26

William E. Humphrey was Chairman of the FTC when President

Not everyone would be so bold as

As you will no doubt recall,
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Franklin Delano Roosevelt took office, and when Roosevelt

2

tried to fire all the FTC commissioners, Humphrey took him

3

to court.

4

executor won in the U.S. Supreme Court -- a landmark

5

decision that establishes the independence-from-the-

6

Executive of independent agencies.

7

just poking fun, though not everybody knew it at the time.

8
9

After Humphrey’s unfortunate passing, his

Of course, Tim was

As you will recall, the environment for the FTC
was very tense in the early 1980s.

The agency had been

10

shut down for a while, and the medical doctors and other

11

professionals were close to obtaining an explicit

12

exemption from FTC authority.

13

that door, there will be lots of others.

14

very hard, and ultimately successfully, to prevent that.

15

I thought, once you open
So we fought

Also, in a strategy of trying to consolidate our

16

strength, we peeled off some controversial things.

The

17

cigarette lab:

18

cigarette companies hated it because they had no

19

confidence in its results.

20

Financial Report to the Department of Commerce.

21

QFR program we were sampling with replacement; sometimes

22

people got hit two times in a row, and they'd go complain

23

to their Congressman or Senator.

24

of business program, another source of controversy and a

25

program that had pretty much run its course.

26

little like being in a sleigh out in the woods on a cold

we got rid of it; it was just a drag.

The

We spun off the Quarterly
With the

We closed down the line
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night and being pursued by a pack of wolves.

You throw

2

off a few cats and dogs, so the wolves will leave you

3

alone.

4

A second thing to bear in mind is that the

5

Commission’s work has been enhanced by economists in

6

addition to those in BE.

7

of economists George Douglas, Tom Campbell, Tim Muris,

8

Howard Beales, Walter Vandaele, and Bruce Yandle, plus

9

those who think like economists, such as Andy Strenio and

10

Don’t forget the contributions

Orson Swindle.

11

A third thing you need to keep in mind is that

12

often economists are easily misunderstood.

13

some examples.

14

for about a year, he gave an interview to the Bureau of

15

National Affairs, BNA.

16

mergers and how one would analyze their prospective

17

effects.

18

He said,

19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32

I'll give you

After Bob Tollison had been Director of BE

The reporter asked him about

Bob came up with a classic thought experiment.

You would allow a lot of mergers to go through.
would allow a lot of people to put their money
on the line and see what happens to prices,
profits, sales, R&D. We get a natural
experiment in the economy going. Let firms
merge and see what happens.
The next day, the BNA story read:
The chief economist of the Federal Trade
Commission would like to conduct, “a natural
experiment in the economy. According to Robert
D. Tollison, Director of the FTC’s Bureau of
Economics, the experiment would involve approval
of virtually all mergers and acquisitions to the
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3
4
5

point where there are three or four firms per
market; then, if there are competitive problems,
the enforcement agencies can step in and
‘unscramble the eggs.’”

6

Or take, for example, my first press conference.

7

Soon after I went over to the FTC, and against the advice

8

of Tim, Carol Crawford, and others, I decided to hold a

9

press conference.

Carol kept saying, “Why?”

10

people to know we're here,” I said.

11

do something and then hold a press conference?”

12

know; I just want to hold a press conference,” was the

13

best I could come up with.

14

“Why?

“Oh, I want
Why don't you
“I don’t

So I held a press conference and talked about a

15

number of things.

16

thought I was pretty good at responding until somebody

17

asked me about defective products.

18

of a hammer:

19

wall for hanging pictures, but you wouldn’t want to use

20

one to build a house.

21

ad substantiation.

22

recalled something Tim had taught me, but obviously I had

23

not gotten the whole story.

24

follows:

25
26
27
28
29
30
31

I was asked a bunch of questions and

I offered the example

a cheap hammer is okay to pound nails in a

Following that was a question about

You can catch the drift here -- I

In any event, I answered as

Consumers are not as gullible as many regulators
think they are. They make intelligent choices.
The thing that concerns me is that if we are so
tight with our regulations that only the top-ofthe-line kind of products [get produced], then
people who would like to purchase a much lowerpriced and perhaps not as high quality product
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2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21

will be deprived of that opportunity. And I
want to make sure that doesn't happen. . . .
On the question of substantiation, yes, I
personally have strong reservations about the
whole issue.
Now what I was thinking about, of course, is prior
substantiation, not ex post. I went on:
I want to study this more. I count myself as an
academic. I think an academic is a person who
wants to know what the evidence is and wants to
draw their own conclusions. On some of these
issues, I will say I do not know as much about
them as I should. I am not going to make a
precipitous judgment, but I have substantial
problems with the whole idea of substantiation
and will be looking at that very critically and
may well recommend to my fellow Commissioners
that we move away from that standard.

22

The next day the New York Times led off with the following

23

story:

24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42

James C. Miller, 3d, the new Chairman of the
Federal Trade Commission, said today the
Commission should no longer protect consumers
from defective products and unsubstantiated
advertising claims.
There was also an Associated Press story:
Several leading consumer activists said
yesterday there would be a flood of false
advertising and shoddy products if the
Government adopted proposals by the head of the
Federal Trade Commission for less regulation of
industry.
It's horrifying," said Karen Burstein, Chairman
of the New York State Consumer Protection Board.
And Rhoda Karpatkin, Executive Director of
Consumers Union, the product-testing
organization, said, policies advocated by James
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4

C. Miller, the Trade Commission Chairman, would
move the country “back to the age of ‘Let buyer
beware’ or maybe ‘Let the buyer be milked’."

5

Obviously, what I had hoped to communicate and

6
7

what I actually communicated were two different things.
Economists especially have this kind of problem.

8

Lawyers talk about things like this and it sounds

9

esoteric, reporters don't understand what they are saying,

10

and few people respond.

11

think they understand what’s being said.

12

they don't get it.

13

When economists talk, reporters
And sometimes

You may remember another case that involved

14

being misunderstood.

One of our economists was writing a

15

paper explaining FTC enforcement behavior, and one of the

16

variables in his or her model was the philosophical views

17

of members of relevant congressional committees.

18

statistical test, the economist was using the well-known

19

ratings of Americans for Democratic Action and the

20

American Conservative Union.

21

called up the organizations to get their most current

22

ratings and made the mistake of telling them something --

23

but apparently not everything -- about the use to which

24

the data would be put.

25

I got a call from, among others, Congressman John Dingell,

26

Chairman of our authorizing committee in the House.

27

told him forthrightly, “As long as I am Chairman of the
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Federal Trade Commission, we will never allocate our

2

resources or decide cases based on the philosophy or party

3

affiliation of a member of Congress.”

4

enough credibility with Chairman Dingell that he accepted

5

my assurances.

6

was doing with the data, but it shows how easy it is for

7

an economist to be misunderstood.

8
9

Fortunately, I had

Of course, that's not what the economist

And then there was the famous Black Death study
that was included in BE’s series of working papers.

What

10

most people didn’t know is that the study was put there

11

because of a commitment by the previous administration --

12

as an inducement for an especially well-qualified

13

candidate to join BE.

14

believed in keeping commitments.

15

Bob Tollison, quite appropriately,

Well, I couldn’t pass up an opportunity such as

16

this without presenting a few recommendations for you --

17

the Commission as a whole as well as BE.

18

One!

In investigations, I hope that you will

19

maintain transparency as much as you possibly can.

Part

20

of my thinking on this goes back to my favorite movie, "My

21

Cousin Vinny."

22

recall that when the defense attorney, Vinny, played by

23

Joe Pesci, asks the prosecuting attorney, played by Lane

24

Smith, for some information the latter has on his clients,

25

the prosecutor says he would be glad to give it to him,

For those of you who have seen it, you’ll
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and got on the phone and asked his staff to send over a

2

whole box of stuff.

3

law in such criminal matters, as I understood it.

4

That’s transparency.

And that’s the

On point, yesterday I read in the BNA Daily

5

Report that Assistant Attorney General Pate has a

6

coordinated effects manual that the Antitrust Division

7

follows to make determinations of liability.

8

ought to share that with the public.

9

course, it would take Jim Ferguson at least a week to

Well, they

I realize, of

10

reply to that report!

11

on the outside some notion of how the Department of

12

Justice staff goes about its evaluations, and so those in

13

the antitrust bar could better counsel their clients.

14

sure that if Tim had anything like that he’d put it on the

15

FTC website.

16

Two!

But releasing it would give people

I’m

Increase the predictability of which --

17

FTC or DOJ -- gets what, when, and where.

Now, I know you

18

tried to do this.

19

and you guys were absolutely right.

20

overcome that setback and get together with DOJ so there

21

is more predictability about the process of reviewing

22

mergers and acquisitions.

23

Three!

(I learned this one!, two!, three! stuff

24

from Dr. Laura.)

This is something hard to do, but to the

25

extent that you can forecast the workload, do it not only

Senator Hollings was absolutely wrong,
I hope that you can
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for BE and the Commission, but also for lawyers who engage

2

in this kind of practice.

3

of the first things people asked me was, “When are mergers

4

going to pick up?”

5

question and came up with a little model.

6

variables would be very important in explaining merger

7

activity -- growth of the economy and cash balances of

8

firms.

9

the FTC -- Paul Pautler -- he knows all this stuff.”

When I went over to Howrey, one

So I started thinking about the
Probably two

Then somebody said to me, “This guy over there at
So I

10

called Paul.

11

complicated and more difficult to model than I thought.

12

Nevertheless, it’s a useful thing to pursue.

13

It turns out that the problem is a lot more

Four!

Try to measure productivity.

I don't

14

know to what extent you do that, but as George Mason

15

University President Alan Merten says, “What gets measured

16

gets better.”

17

Once Executive Director Bruce Yandel came to my office and

18

said, “Jim, you will not believe what I just heard.”

19

said, “What was that?”

20

someone at the Bureau of Labor Statistics requesting our

21

productivity numbers.

22

talking about, please tell me.”

23

measured the productivity of the FTC as the number of

24

lawsuits per employee!

25

and it gets “better,” you may be getting worse.

26

careful.

But you've got to measure the right things.

I

He said, “I got a call from

I said, “I don't know what you're
It turns out the BLS

Now if you measure the wrong thing
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Five!

Find ways to minimize interference with

2

the market for corporate control.

This is a dicey thing.

3

If you think about it, the default is, “the market works.”

4

But there are times when the government should say, “Wait

5

a minute, we want to look at this to see if there's a

6

problem.”

7

complicated, with multiple suitors, you can have an effect

8

on who gets what just by saying, “Wait a minute.”

9

partner and former FTC official, Mark Schildkraut,

But since many acquisitions are very

My

10

reminded me the other day that at one point during my

11

tenure at the FTC, I actually triggered a second request

12

just to hold somebody back until we had concluded the

13

review of a proposed acquisition so that we wouldn't be

14

standing in the way of the market’s making its choice.

15

Six!

Study and help remedy abuses of the legal

16

process for rent seeking purposes.

This is something of

17

particular interest to me.

18

in which Tim is already interested, because he's got Mr.

19

Delacourt and Mr. Zywicki hard at work on the Commission’s

20

Noerr-Pennington Task Force.

And it’s obviously something

21

I happen to know from personal observation that

22

there’s a case where a firm is representing that it has a

23

valid patent, and while the claim is baseless, it is going

24

around to customers of its competitors and holding them up

25

for settlement.

26

has gone out and sued a competitor and then has gone on
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radio and television to tell people about the lawsuit and

2

to claim that as a result of the lawsuit its stock is

3

going up and its competitor’s stock is going down.

4

“sell them; buy us.”

5

judicial process, and if the business models are allowed

6

to continue, their extent -- and the efficiency costs they

7

impose -- could escalate significantly.

8
9

Seven!

So,

Both constitute an abuse of the

One of the best things I think the

Bureau of Economics can do is to be ready to address

10

controversial issues in a very rational, analytical way.

11

The oil merger report we did in the early eighties is a

12

good example.

13

basically frozen in place during the late 1970s.

14

1981, the caps were taken off, and there was a lot of

15

reorganization in that industry.

16

spurious proposals were made on Capitol Hill.

17

Commission was able to work through all the issues and

18

make a substantial contribution to that debate, perhaps

19

heading off some very wrong-headed legislation.

20

recent example is SPAM.

21

Call list, and it appears to make good sense.

22

Commission has noted, SPAM is very different in many ways.

23

Making those kinds of reports is a very useful thing for

24

you to do.

25
26

You remember the petroleum industry was
Then, in

As a result, some really
The

A more

You've promulgated the Do-Not-

Eight! (I just have twelve!).

But as the

In your report

writing, realize that the major audience is not your
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fellow colleagues but others.

2

Lawyers are not the only ones who should be writing

3

briefly, and you have even less incentive to be long-

4

winded.

5

payment, the attorneys and clerks have contrived to

6

multiply words beyond all necessity.”

7

So, write more briefly.

As Adam Smith observed, “to increase their

When recruiting economists, shop at some

Nine!

8

of the smaller, less well-known schools.

9

you're going to miss a Bruce Yandel and some other really

10

If you don't,

good people.
Ten!

11

Be particularly wary of expanding Section

12

5, unfair methods of competition or unfair or deceptive

13

acts or practices.

14

here.

I know I'm preaching to the choir

But Section 5 is very open-ended.

15

Eleven!

Stand your ground.

Stand your ground.

16

The doctors fight that Chairman Muris mentioned was very

17

important.

18

have heard about -- Indiana Federation of Dentists.

19

was a case where the Commission found liability, and the

20

defendants went to the federal Court of Appeals and got

21

the case overturned.

22

partly because we hadn't lost any cases which I had

23

authored or in which I had concurred, and on the merits we

24

thought finding liability was exactly the right thing to

25

do.

But there was another case that you may not
This

I was mightily troubled about that,

So I got the Commission together, and the
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Commissioners voted to ask the DOJ to represent us and

2

seek certiorari.

3

even more troubled, I recommended to my colleagues that we

4

ask DOJ to reconsider.

5

especially those in the General Counsel's office, said

6

that was a bad idea.

7

phone to Ed Meese and my current Howrey partner, Brad

8

Reynolds, and others at DOJ, and tried to talk them into

9

it.

But, DOJ turned us down.

And so, now

Some of the people at the FTC,

But we did it anyway.

I got on the

They told me the probability of the Supreme Court

10

granting cert. was remote; and the basis on which we could

11

make an appeal was very narrow and not very substantive.

12

DOJ turned us down again.

13

I was really distraught at that point.

But one

14

day as I headed into my office, one of the staff members -

15

- could be someone sitting in this room -- said, “Mr.

16

Chairman, did you know that the FTC law only gives DOJ the

17

right of first refusal?

18

appeal a case on its own initiative.”

19

didn't know that.”

20

Commission, and it was very divisive.

21

voted three-to-two -- against the wishes of our General

22

Counsel, Jack Carley, by the way -- to seek cert. on our

23

own.

24

And guess what?

25

court.

26

something was right and standing our ground.

The Commission can actually
I said, “No, I

So I called another meeting of the

And guess what?

The Commissioners

The Supreme Court granted cert.

The Supreme Court overturned the lower

So that's the way we prevailed, just by knowing
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Twelve!

(Finally!)

Take your work very

2

seriously.

I'm talking to the people in BE right now.

3

When I arrived at the Commission, there was a general

4

feeling that the structure-conduct-performance paradigm

5

was sort of old hat.

6

School approach and so forth.

7

are criticisms from the Austrians, who say those in the

8

Chicago School are not pure; they've compromised.

9

industrial-planner-types who say, well, what we really

It should make way for the Chicago
And now, of course, there

And the

10

ought to do is abolish the antitrust laws and let people

11

get together within the context of some sort of industrial

12

planning.

13

Let me respond to this and close my remarks by

14

reading the last paragraph of my book, The Economist as

15

Reformer:

16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32

How industry is organized and how businesses and
consumers are regulated -- whether through
cooperative centralized strategies, a free
market protected by antitrust, a policy of
restrained regulation, or a totally unregulated
market -- affects not only our economic well
being, but our basic liberties. No orthodoxy
prevails forever. We must always be prepared to
change our approach when faced with superior
reasoning or contrary evidence. But we must
also be prepared to oppose unfounded changes
that would deprive us of the unsurpassed freedom
and prosperity that this country has achieved
and that the FTC was established to protect.
Thank you very much!
(Applause.)
(A brief recess was taken.)
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MR. PAUTLER:

In this session we're going to

2

shift gears from this morning's antitrust matters and take

3

a look at the role of economists and economics on the

4

consumer protection side of the agency.

5

Economics came to consumer protection at the FTC

6

a lot later than it came to antitrust.

In this session,

7

we'll try to describe some of the history of how economics

8

came to be in consumer protection.

9

that the economists did on the consumer protection side

We'll discuss the work

10

and indicate the kinds of effects that some of that work

11

has had.

12

All the Bureau Directors that are here will be

13

able to participate in the session if they'd like to,

14

certainly by grabbing the mike.

15

on three ex-Bureau Directors.

16

But we are going to focus

Ron Bond, who was the Acting Director from '93

17

to '95 and worked on the consumer protection side, is

18

going to give us a general overview of the work of

19

economists in consumer protection.

20

Wendy Gramm, who was Director from '83 to '85,

21

is the ex-Director who was most involved in the day-to-day

22

work in consumer protection, because she actually ran the

23

Division for a while.

24

Mike Lynch, who was the Acting Director in 1980,

25

was very involved in the early work in consumer protection
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through his position in the Division of Industry Analysis,

2

from which a lot of the staff came when consumer

3

protection began in the Bureau of Economics.

4
5

Let’s get going and let Ron Bond give us an
overview of economists in consumer protection.

6

MR. BOND:

Thanks, Paul.

I came to the Bureau

7

of Economics in 1968.

I was a young economist fresh out

8

of graduate school, and I came to the research division,

9

Industry Analysis.

For the first five or six years I was

10

here, I don't think I ever heard the term "consumer

11

protection."

12

industrial organization, and all of the projects that I

13

remember were industry studies, structure/performance

14

studies, or projects related to antitrust.

15

All of my colleagues had backgrounds in

Since I was new to the FTC at the time, I

16

certainly wouldn't have known everything that was going on

17

in BE.

18

list of studies that Denis Breen so very kindly provided

19

us with, and I found several studies from the 1960s that

20

sound as if they're consumer protection related.

21

certainly enjoy hearing from some of the Bureau Directors

22

who were here back then as to what those were.

23
24

In preparing for today, I looked back over the

I'll

But what I'd like to do for the next few minutes
is to give you my perspective on the evolution of BE's
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involvement in consumer protection issues beginning in the

2

1970s.

3

To put this discussion into perspective, in the

4

1970s, the FTC was busy trying to reform itself.

It had

5

been the subject of critical reviews by both the American

6

Bar Association and Ralph Nader and his Raiders, as we

7

heard this morning.

8

Commissioners were therefore all thinking about ways that

9

they could make the FTC's law enforcement activity both

The Bureau Directors and

10

more relevant and more streamlined.

11

meant on the Consumer Protection side was a newly

12

invigorated enforcement program against deceptive

13

advertising by large national advertisers.

14

opening a large number of industry wide investigations as

15

a substitute for a case-by-case approach to enforcement.

16

What I think that

It also meant

Given the magnitude and the novelty of the

17

agency's newly invigorated consumer protection

18

enforcement, at least some of the Commissioners and

19

managers in the Bureau of Consumer Protection not

20

surprisingly began to look to the Bureau of Economics for

21

a little assistance.

22

attorneys for many, many years on the antitrust side.

23

After all, BE had been assisting

Thus, during Mike Scherer's tenure, BE became

24

involved for the first time in the day-to-day activities

25

of the Consumer Protection mission.

Mike asked his former
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student, Dennis Murphy, to join him at the Bureau of

2

Economics.

3

for coordinating BE's Consumer Protection input.

4

Dennis served as Mike's assistant responsible

I remember meeting Dennis when he arrived.

I

5

didn't think too much about it at the time, but in

6

retrospect, I think that Dennis had to be one very brave

7

young economist.

8

Dennis had only the part-time help of a small handful of

9

economists in the Industry Analysis Division.

10

Either that or very foolish.

Poor

He and they, all with backgrounds in industrial

11

organization, no background in consumer protection, and no

12

real prior experience in working with attorneys, had to

13

come to grips with a large number of ongoing

14

investigations that covered such broad and varied subjects

15

as credit practices, funeral industry practices, mobile

16

home warranty performance, over-the-counter drug

17

advertising, vocational school promotion, hearing aid

18

practices, and many more.

19

difficult this task must have been, by 1974, very early in

20

the process, the draft staff report for the credit

21

practices investigation was already 650 pages long.

To give you some idea of how

22

The next year, in 1975, the FTC received new

23

rulemaking powers, and BCP turned many of the industry

24

wide investigations into rulemakings.

25

1985 speech by Commissioner Azcuenaga which noted that in

I recently saw a
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the three years following receipt of those rulemaking

2

powers, the agency commenced at least 22 major

3

rulemakings.

4

commitment of resources.

5

That total represented a substantial

To enable the Bureau of Economics to keep pace

6

with this substantial growth in consumer protection

7

activities, Dennis moved into the Division of Industry

8

Analysis, and responsibility for consumer protection

9

support moved to that division as a whole.

When even that

10

reorganization proved inadequate to keep pace, in 1978, BE

11

created a new Division of Consumer Protection.

12

head of the new division was John Prather Brown, a

13

recently hired economics professor from Cornell, who had

14

done post-doctoral work in law and economics at the

15

University of Chicago Law School.

The first

16

BE's day-to-day involvement in the consumer

17

protection mission therefore evolved over a five-year

18

period during the 1970s.

19

perspectives to the Commission’s consumer protection

20

mission.

21

economic literature discussing the role of information in

22

the marketplace.

23

goods, experience goods, credence goods, lemons markets,

24

signaling and bonding were all working their way into the

25

literature.

26

lot of theory, the core consisted of a couple of simple
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points:

that information is costly, not free, and that

2

advertising can provide useful information.

3

point may not seem very novel now, but through the 1960s,

4

industrial organization economists often looked at

5

advertising simply as a barrier to entry.

6

advertising as a source of useful information therefore

7

was a novel approach in the field.

8
9

This latter

Considering

The second concept that economists brought to
the Consumer Protection mission I consider the most

10

important.

11

costs and benefits, and therefore, to evaluate the merits

12

of activities, one must weigh the costs against the

13

benefits.

14

whether an action would make consumers better off rather

15

than on whether someone might have broken a law.

16

The idea is that activities generate both

This idea put the focus of case selection on

The third perspective that economists brought to

17

consumer protection from their industrial organization

18

backgrounds was a preference for market solutions over

19

regulatory ones.

20

I believe it is not possible to isolate BE’s

21

contribution over the 25 to 30 years since BE became

22

involved in consumer protection.

23

Protection mission looks vastly different today than it

24

did back in the mid 1970s.

25

the trenches, it may sometimes seem as if BE has made no

However, the Consumer

For an economist fighting in
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progress at all.

2

the long haul, the differences are very significant.

3

But considering what has happened over

Economists spent their earliest years in

4

consumer protection focusing on two dozen Magnuson-Moss

5

rulemakings.

6

limited available data to assess the costs and benefits of

7

the proposed rules.

8

rulemakings were either terminated or drastically cut

9

back.

The economists tried to wrestle with the

Virtually all of the early

Subsequent rulemakings have been very infrequent,

10

typically mandated by Congress, and carefully

11

circumscribed.

12

The switch from rulemaking to cases represents a

13

major change in the agency's emphasis in the Consumer

14

Protection mission.

15

more and more involved in the cases, especially in

16

focusing on ad substantiation, unfair practices, and

17

deceptive practices.

18

information tool kit and their cost benefit analysis tool

19

kit, and they looked for data, often from copy tests, to

20

see how consumers interpreted advertisers’ claims.

21

also sought to use data to predict the costs and benefits

22

of proposed remedies.

23

As time passed, economists became

They brought their economics of

They

Over all, I believe that the economists’ input

24

has led to more careful case selection.

My casual

25

observation is that the agency probably undertakes large
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national advertising cases less frequently than it once

2

did.

3

The biggest difference I see, though, is that

4

the Consumer Protection mission today devotes far more

5

resources to policing and attacking blatantly false claims

6

and fraudulent activities.

7

necessarily recommend that change in resource allocation,

8

but it is consistent with the way economists analyze

9

cases.

10

The economists did not

Most of the national advertising cases involved

11

a lot of subtleties.

12

analysis shows some ways that legal intervention could

13

generate benefits and some ways that legal intervention

14

could generate costs.

15

activities are blatantly false or fraudulent, the

16

potential cost of intervention disappears.

17

social benefit to falsity or fraud.

18

economic questions are the extent of any consumer injury

19

and whether the enforcement resources could be used to

20

greater effect elsewhere.

21

Almost invariably, a careful

However, when the claims or

There is no

The only real

So, despite the fact that it may seem when

22

you're in the trenches that progress is not being made, I

23

think in fact that the Commission’s Consumer Protection

24

mission has made substantial progress.

I wouldn't say
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that the progress is strictly due to the economists.

2

think it is instead due to the economic way of thinking.

3

I

Over the years, more and more Chairmen, more and

4

more Commissioners, and more and more managers and

5

attorneys in the Bureau of Consumer Protection have begun

6

to share the approach that economists use.

7

acceptance of the economists’ basic framework accounts for

8

the changes over time in the Commission’s Consumer

9

Protection case allocation.

10

MR. PAUTLER:

The broad

Thank you very much, Ron.

I found

11

out from talking to a couple of our ex-directors that

12

there was more activity on the consumer protection front

13

by economists prior to the 1970s than I had previously

14

realized.

15

Fritz Mueller and Mack Folsom will be able to

16

tell us a little bit about that, and I turn it over to

17

them for a little while.

18

MR. MUELLER:

Given the time constraints, I

19

shall address only what I view as trailblazing actions of

20

the Commission.

21

does deserve a profile in courage was when it took up the

22

Surgeon General's request that the appropriate government

23

agencies deal with the health hazards of cigarette

24

smoking.

25

is in Commissioner Elman's reminiscences, Rand Dixon said,

One area in which I think the Commission

At the Commission meeting, and the exact quote

For The Record, Inc.
Waldorf, Maryland(301)870-8025

144
1

“You know who the Surgeon General means.

2

The entire Commission acting unanimously came out with

3

proposed rules after considerable effort, writing what

4

attorneys considered to be the definitive legal basis for

5

the Commission's authority in this area.

6

direction of Commissioner Phil Elman, and his able

7

assistant, Posner, and with feedback from the entire

8

Commission.

9

was unanimous.

10

He means us.”

It was under the

But throughout the process, the Commission

Taking on any big industry in this country in

11

the interest of consumers is hazardous, and it was in that

12

case as well.

13

Chairman when he testified in defense of the Commission's

14

rules.

15

critical.

16

Tennessee, which they thought was certainly unforgivable

17

for an enemy of the tobacco industry.

18

I remember the day I accompanied the

The opposition from tobacco states especially was
The Chairman happened himself to be from

What I remember most is after that hearing, I

19

never felt more proud to be at the Commission.

In the

20

audience were the Presidents of the American Lung Society

21

and the AMA.

22

that the Surgeon General identified the problem, but they

23

had feared that no one would do anything.

24

no agency would act, even though the Chairman had told

25

Congress that the Commission would take action.

They congratulated Chairman Dixon and said

They were sure
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1

The end of the story was that Congress

2

eventually stripped the Commission of its authority over

3

cigarette advertising.

4

legal basis for affirmative disclosure in advertising.

5

my view and in the view of some of the Commissioners, one

6

of whom is present, the reprimand by Congress caused the

7

Commission to become timid in using its new power to

8

require affirmative disclosure.

9

But the Commission had laid the
In

When I was the head of the Cabinet Committee on

10

Price Stability for President Johnson, accompanied by

11

Russell Parker and several other great deputies, we wrote

12

a report on micro aspects of improving efficient price

13

decisionmaking.

14

published, criticized the FTC for not using its authority.

15

Well, January 19th I left the Committee and returned to

16

the Commission.

17

Commission after coming back, the full Commission welcomed

18

me.

19

This report, which the New York Times

February 10th, my first meeting with the

Commissioner Mary Jones, who is here today,

20

said, Willard, I understand the President’s Cabinet

21

Committee criticized the Federal Trade Commission for not

22

using its affirmative disclosure authority.

23

in a staff report.

24

turned to the other Commissioners and said something to

25

the effect, does anyone disagree?

I said, yes,

Well, she said, I agree with you.

They said no.
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Then Commissioner Jones said, do you guys have

2

anything in mind?

3

octane ratings of gasoline, disclosure of the life

4

expectancy of light bulbs, and labeling the food

5

ingredients of all canned goods.

6

I said, yes.

We suggested requiring

That day the Commission essentially said, let's

7

go ahead with these recommendations.

The Commission

8

directed BE to check with the legal bureau about what

9

could be done.

But there was no doubt about wanting to go

10

ahead, whereas before, there had been no movement on that

11

front.

12

As it turned out, we didn't have any authority

13

in the food labeling area.

14

areas.

15

We did proceed in the other

One reason BE chose the octane rating of

16

gasoline is that we knew that the automobile companies

17

favored the idea of octane rating.

18

something could be done in that area, they would put it in

19

their manuals.

20

They said that if

So we had the auto industry on our side.

But

21

the petroleum industry was quite awesome.

To make a long

22

story short, the Commission litigated and eventually won

23

the right to require octane ratings, and consumer

24

advocates view octane rating as one of the Commission’s

25

most important consumer protection victories.
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1

Unfortunately, there is no public advertising to

2

help consumers of gasoline believe their automobile

3

manuals when they say that most cars should be using

4

regular rather than high octane.

5

MR. PAUTLER:

Mack, would you like to continue?

6

MR. FOLSOM:

I wrote one of the reports that Ron

7

is probably referring to, the use of games of chance in

8

supermarket retailing.

9

didn't conceive of it as consumer protection.

As I was doing that project, I
I was

10

concerned that in competition among grocery stores, the

11

winner might be the one who had the most false game, the

12

most attractive game in getting people in.

13

I got all this literature from the promotion

14

companies, and it stated that the object of the game was

15

not if you will win, but when you will win.

16

going to the store, you will win the big prize.

17

If you keep

Then I discovered how the big prizes were

18

awarded.

19

and that was the store where they put the big prize piece.

20

Afterwards, you didn't stand a chance of a snowball in the

21

hot place of winning the big prize.

22

things operated.

23

They decided which store needed a sales boost,

But that was the way

As I said, I was looking at it not so much as

24

consumer protection, but informing consumers and in terms

25

of competition.
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1

Subsequently, I worked on the octane rule, and

2

was a little bit amused, since all the agreements among

3

petroleum companies had been in terms of 90 octane and 100

4

octane gasoline.

5

the well advertised measurement method suddenly was a

6

deceptive way to identify gasoline.

7

motor method plus the research method divided by two to

8

give you an average, a number that nobody had ever heard

9

of.

10

As soon as the octane rule was proposed,

You had to have the

What they didn't count on was the automobile

11

companies starting to designate the type of gasoline each

12

automobile engine required.

13

octane, which used to be 90 or 94 octane, which used to be

14

the 100 octane that everybody was familiar with.

15

combination with the new disclosures by the manufacturers,

16

the octane rule may have had a big impact.

17

Each engine now called for 87

In

My final involvement in consumer protection was

18

being visited by a young attorney from the Bureau of

19

Consumer Protection.

20

someone who testified in a number of cases.

21

sixties, I think economists testified in six matters, and

22

I did something like five of them.

23

I had developed a reputation as
In the late

So she came to my office and said, Mack, I want

24

somebody to help me in my analgesic investigation.

25

said all of the companies advertise that their product is
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1

the best for headaches or for relieving minor pains.

2

I want you to testify that they're all lying.

3

that actually, one of them could be right.

4

(Laughter.)

5

MR. FOLSOM:

Now,

I replied

Beyond that, for a particular

6

individual, one drug may work better than another, and I

7

can't help you in this regard.

8

on to become Director of the Bureau of Consumer Protection

9

when she came back in a later life.

10

(Laughter.)

11

MR. FOLSOM:

This attorney later went

But that was the end of my

12

involvement in consumer protection until the seventies

13

when we started with Dennis Murphy and John Brown.

14

MR. MUELLER:

Just a footnote to the study about

15

games of chance in supermarkets, which Mack Folsom

16

mentioned.

17

He said, Willard, what have you guys done to Safeway?

18

said, I don't know, what do you have in mind?

19

that Mr. McGowan, Chairman of Safeway, was coming to see

20

him, and that he wanted to know what my answer was going

21

to be.

22

I got a call from Rand Dixon, the Chairman.

He said

I said, one of the things we asked for in

23

connection with that study was the distribution of the

24

winners of their games of chance.
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MR. FOLSOM:

Yes.

2

MR. MUELLER:

They gave $1,000 awards as part of

3

the games of chance.

4

business in the District, and 60 percent outside.

5

something like 36 of these awards.

6

were in the suburbs, and one was in Northwest Washington

7

near Bethesda.

8

much trouble Safeway was in.

9

Safeway has about 40 percent of its
It gave

Thirty-five of them

So McGowan was coming to town to see how

MR. FOLSOM:

You can see why I said I perceived

10

of it as a competitive problem.

11

Columbia, Safeway had very little competition.

12

the District of Columbia, it had lots of competition.

13

Safeway gave the big prizes away where it had lots of

14

competition, but it advertised the contest all over the

15

place.

16

MR. PAUTLER:

Within the District of
Outside

I'd like to move on from the

17

sixties to let Wendy Gramm tell us what it was like to

18

work in consumer protection while she was running the

19

Division of Consumer Protection.

20

MS. GRAMM:

That was my first job in government.

21

I didn't really want to come to government, except I knew

22

Jim Miller and Bob Tollison and some other folks, and

23

they, along with Carol Crawford, managed to convince me to

24

come, and then put me in the Division of Consumer

25

Protection.
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Ron did a great job with his presentation.

I

2

don't remember understanding at the time that the Division

3

was brand new.

4

was also culture shock for an academic from Texas to come

5

to government.

6

Staff.

7

the processes went right.

It was just fascinating.

It

Carol Crawford was Jim Miller’s Chief of

Everybody was afraid of Carol, and she made sure

8
9

I loved it.

We put in an excellent new evaluation process
that helped bring the economists into the analysis of the

10

cases and proposed regulations very early on.

11

was BCP Director, and Howard Beales was a special

12

assistant to him.

13

Tim Muris

Fred McChesney, who was an economist and a

14

lawyer, headed up evaluation, which was the process by

15

which we screened proposed cases at an earlier stage.

16

Attorneys proposing a draft rule or potential case

17

provided recommendations to the Evaluation Committee.

18

Economists would also have a memo raising the

19

issues that they needed to address if the case were to go

20

forward.

21

McChesney, and the lawyers who ran it were Janet Grady,

22

Bob Zwirb, and Roy Lavik, people who had a very good

23

background in law and economics.

24
25

The evaluation process was headed by Fred

Tim had a law and economics background as well.
Either my staff or I would go to those evaluation
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1

meetings, which were very important.

At the time I was

2

new to government.

3

home to read every night.

4

chair.

5

something, and I would say, “I can't believe what these

6

lawyers are saying.

7

“Don't tell me that.

8

this every day at work.

I'd take a stack of BCP and BE memos
I'd sit there in my rocking

Phil would be watching a football game or

9

Listen to this.”

And he'd say,

Don't read me that stuff.

I get

Forget about it.”

I didn't have any outlet at home.

So I'd walk

10

into people's offices.

11

Pauline's office or Jack Calfee's or Dennis's office.

12

would say, “Can you believe what these guys are saying?”

13

And of course they'd roll their eyes because they'd been

14

reading this stuff for ages.

15

phase.

16

there yet.

17

And I can't remember if it was
I

I was still in the denial

They had moved on to acceptance, and I wasn't

The point is, with Tim and with Jim Miller and

18

the economists, what we were trying to do was to bring

19

economic analysis to the Consumer Protection Bureau.

20

was trying to do that from his side as well, and we were

21

trying to provide support with DCP, the Division of

22

Consumer Protection.

23

very early stages.

24
25

Tim

And that meant getting involved at

Especially after listening this morning to the
antitrust side, let me tell you, folks, what you guys were
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talking about were small battles.

I know they were big to

2

you guys, right?

3

ain't nothing compared to what the consumer protection

4

folks were involved with.

They seemed like giant issues.

But it

5

Even though Ron said there was a burgeoning

6

literature about the economics of information, it was

7

light years away from what antitrust was about, especially

8

in terms of economic analysis or economists looking at it.

9

Moreover, the literature was mostly theoretical.

10

Ron talked some about the economics of information from

11

Stigler, Craswell, Salop, and all those folks, and that

12

was theoretical.

John Brown did some work on it, and that

13

was theoretical.

But that was a heck of a lot more

14

practical than Hurwicz and Arrow and the other folks who

15

were doing stuff on information.

16

Yet I was familiar with the theory.

I remember

17

calling up my friends back in academics saying, listen you

18

guys, Tim Muris is going to bring a case on this in two

19

weeks.

20

whether this is a problem.

21

I can't wait for two years for you to figure out

The academic literature was nowhere near where

22

it was on the competition side.

The result of the lack of

23

practical applications was that it was more difficult to

24

convince attorneys to accept economists' views.
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1

not only was Jim an economist, but Tim also likes to think

2

of himself as an economist.

3

So the Bureau of Economics would have courses.

4

We set up a course, Economics for Lawyers.

5

around screaming, Type I, Type II errors.

6

would literally be afraid that he was going to quiz them -

7

- what's the difference between a Type I and Type II

8

error?

9

Tim would run
And lawyers

(Laughter.)

10

MS. GRAMM:

But the point is that it raised some

11

very important issues.

12

that government interference can deter useful business

13

behavior.

14

to be risk averse and thereby create consumer harm for

15

example by stifling innovation. These basic economic ideas

16

were radical for the time, especially given where the

17

literature was, where the lawyers were, and in terms of

18

what the accepted body of knowledge was in the case law at

19

the time.

20

We forced the lawyers to realize

You can bring a case that will cause businesses

Two important things happened during this

21

period.

One is that we embedded economic analysis into

22

the daily workings of the Bureau of Consumer Protection,

23

with regard to cases and with regard to rule reviews.

24

other thing that happened was that new research, often as

25

an outgrowth of the kind of issues we were dealing with,
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really expanded knowledge in academia.

2

that we did within the Federal Trade Commission had and

3

continue to have a long-term impact.

4

there was a lot of controversy about the National Nanny

5

and overly broad rulemakings that were in the pipeline.

6

Research Studies

When we started,

We tried to refocus the agency.

We had to deal

7

with the backlog of rulemakings.

With Jim Miller, we had

8

to get economists staffing all those cases.

9

effective, you really had to be involved throughout,

To be

10

especially at the beginning.

You had to read all the

11

cases.

12

We spent more time on the most important cases, but we

13

couldn't just blow off a whole bunch of cases.

You at least had to make some kind of judgment.

14

We were also trying to move from cases where

15

there was not so much consumer harm to fraud.

16

indicated, this change in focus was not popular.

17

As Ron

Howard wrote a memo under Tim's name when we

18

considered one of the first rulemakings that came to the

19

Commission.

20

we would use to review all regulations.

21

In that memo, he laid out the protocol that

We were going to ask whether the problem was

22

widespread and systemic, or whether it could be handled on

23

a case-by-case basis.

24

whether there was a market failure.

25

systemic?

Issue number one essentially asked
Is the problem

Does it cause significant harm?
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proposed rule effective in dealing with the problem, and

2

do the benefits of the regulation exceed the costs?

3

This methodology set a template for the lawyers

4

to use to analyze all of their proposed rules, and they

5

changed them, revised them and sometimes closed them based

6

on this protocol.

7

The economists also tried to help with impact

8

evaluations, and sometimes were successful, sometimes less

9

so.

10

But that was an opportunity to try and get some

decent data where we could about rules and their impact.

11

With regard to cases, as I said before, we were

12

involved at very early stages -- we had advertising,

13

defects, and credit cases.

14

practices cases.

15

think, [Robert] Steiner, you were involved in those.

16

Truth in Lending Act.

17

There were millions of credit

Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, I

Standard setting.

And again, we asked the simple questions.

18

Instead of just asserting that businesses were out to skin

19

consumers alive, whenever they came into contact with

20

them, we asked whether there was an alternative

21

explanation for their behavior.

22

consumers?

23

a lot of fun and interesting.

24
25

Is there a harm to

We focused on simple, basic questions.

It was

Some issues we dealt with in a big way,
especially at the very beginning.

There was a big debate
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over penalties.

2

penalties?

3

its recommendations, we fought it all out.

4

using injury as a basis for determining an optimal civil

5

penalty.

6

What was the optimal size of the

When the Sentencing Commission came up with
We advocated

We concluded that consumer injury was often very

7

difficult to measure, so for a proxy we used amount of

8

illegal gain multiplied by one over the probability of

9

getting caught.

Our economists found ourselves,

10

especially in fraud cases, saying, yeah, it looks like a

11

fraud case.

Now let's get on to the civil penalty

12

discussion.

So we had some input no matter what the case.

13

I want to make a few final comments.

I

14

mentioned earlier that our studies could be important.

15

had staff at one time saying that no firm should be able

16

to make any kind of health claim about its product unless

17

it could get a consensus of the medical profession to

18

agree.

19

consent order, because we had sued the company for

20

advertising a connection from salt to high blood pressure

21

and heart disease.

22

medical profession doesn't agree.

23

We

At this time, we had Morton Lite Salt under a

We said you can't do that because the

At the same time we had the antacid rulemaking

24

that said antacids were too salty, could cause high blood

25

pressure and heart problems, and therefore, we need a
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rule.

2

Furthermore, as an academic, I understood how hard it

3

would be to get the medical profession to agree on

4

anything.

5

I said there's a little inconsistency here.

The point is, the food industry can make some

6

truthful health claims.

What's wrong with that?

Pauline

7

Ippolito and Alan Mathios wrote a series of papers.

8

remember when Kellogg stated on the box of cereal that

9

higher fiber, or lots of bran, was good for your health.

I

10

The FDA took out after Kellogg complaining about it.

11

Carol Crawford gave a very important speech saying, hey,

12

this is exactly what you want.

13

this kind of helpful information.

14

You want consumers to get

Kellogg had cooperated with the National Cancer

15

Institute and quoted the NCI study in its ads.

16

Crawford’s speech advocated making positive use of public

17

health research.

18

impact of advertising of fiber claims on the amount of

19

fiber consumption, and additional research of Pauline, Jan

20

Pappalardo, and Dennis Murphy on the effects of

21

advertising of nutritional claims have helped change the

22

regulatory environment.

23
24

Carol

The study Alan and Pauline did on the

We are finally seeing the results of the work
that was started decades ago.

The new FDA Commissioner
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has a rulemaking proposal to consider permitting a wider

2

range of truthful health claims on food labels.

3

The point about FTC research on health claims is

4

that knowledge has been really important and is having an

5

impact today.

6

with a solid empirical basis.

7

The FTC studies are still the only research

MR. PAUTLER:

I think we have enough time for a

8

few extra thoughts from Jon Baker about a couple of

9

Consumer Protection issues from the 1990s, and then we'll

10

take a few questions from the audience.

11

MR. BAKER:

Thank you.

I wanted to take off

12

from Wendy's mention of the penalties issue, something

13

that I first thought about when I was working for one of

14

the Commissioners.

15

Bureau Director.

16

I think it was just after she left as

When I was Bureau Director, the consumer

17

protection case I remember most strongly involved a

18

dispute between the Bureaus about the right penalty where

19

my concern was that the lawyers were risking

20

underdeterrence.

Our internal dispute was about the goal

21

of the penalties.

I think it was a business opportunity

22

fraud case, and the victims were defrauded out of tens of

23

millions of dollars.

24

deterrence, the important fact was that the case involved

25

fraud.

So if you're thinking about

There was no social value to any of the business
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activity, so the socially optimal penalty should be quite

2

large.

3

Now almost always when you have these kinds of

4

cases, the defendants don't have any money, so the

5

monetary penalty is academic.

6

whether fencing in relief over deters to the extent that

7

it might keep the perpetrators out of legitimate business

8

activities.

9

Then you're worrying about

But that wasn't the case here.

These people had

10

millions of dollars.

11

amount of the fraud, but they had a lot of money.

12

I recall, the lawyers had a consent agreement.

13

settled for something like a million dollars in redress to

14

consumers.

15

They didn't have anything like the
And as

They

My concern was that while the penalty sounded

16

like a lot, it was really only cents on the dollar for the

17

victims of the fraud.

18

send a message that people who commit fraud could live

19

pretty well, because the proposed settlement left the

20

perpetrators with several million dollars in assets.

21

A small percentage penalty would

The lawyers' response on deterrence was that the

22

Commission could get a lot of valuable advertising by

23

announcing a million dollar penalty.

24

was that if we sued and lost, we might not get anything

25

for the victims at all.

Their main concern

My view was that if the goal was
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deterrence, I did not care.

2

message by suing than by settling, because the message

3

would be that the Commission would not let anyone commit

4

fraud and get away with illegal profit.

5

We would send a better

Ultimately we had a dispute over goals between

6

the two perspectives.

7

the incentives and deterrence, and the lawyers were more

8

concerned about redress than about deterrence.

9

We economists were concerned about

Another twist on deterrence and penalties

10

involved whether to challenge agents or principals when

11

both contribute to the consumer protection problem.

This

12

issue arose in the context of deceptive advertising.

Do

13

you bring the complaint against the ad agency or do you

14

bring it against the advertiser?

15

intuition, following Coase, is that it shouldn't matter.

16

Put the penalty on one party and it will monitor the other

17

one and keep it within the line so the party with the

18

obligation doesn't have to write the check to end up

19

paying the penalty.

20

Our initial economic

We soon realized we could do better if the

21

parties differed in their costs of monitoring each other.

22

If one party in the vertical chain can more cheaply detect

23

and prevent deception than the other one, we can deter

24

deception at the lower social cost by putting liability on

25

the party with the lower cost of monitoring.
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To return to deceptive advertising, when do we

2

want to add the advertiser to the complaint?

3

advertiser provided the ad agency with unsubstantiated

4

information, this analysis suggests focusing on just the

5

advertiser.

6

had correct information but developed deceptive ads

7

together, then it may be appropriate to name both in a

8

complaint and order.

9

thinking about deterrence and penalties that Wendy started

10

If the

But if the ad agency and the advertiser both

This analysis grew out of the same

in the 1980s.

11

MR. PAUTLER:

Thank you, Jon.

We have a few

12

minutes.

13

economist who runs the Bureau of Consumer Protection has a

14

few words he wanted to say, go ahead.

15

If anybody has any questions, or if the

MR. MUELLER:

The Bureau was involved in cost

16

benefit analysis and consumer protection in the 1960s.

17

One of the things that happened in the mid-sixties is that

18

the consumer movement came up, growing at full steam.

19

of the first things it advocated was licensing everything.

20

You know, shoe repair shops, a whole line of services.

21

One

We had taken the position that licensing is a

22

barrier to entry.

In fact, some time in that period, we

23

had an economist in San Francisco do a study of one

24

product area, I believe shoe repair.

The study showed
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that in markets where there were licensing requirements,

2

prices were higher than where there was no licensing.

3

Another example was my first project when I came

4

to the Federal Trade Commission.

5

the Flammable Fabrics Act enforcement.

6

Bureau of the Budget came to the Commission and said that

7

he did not understand how the Commission allocated

8

resources.

9

I was asked to look at
Someone from the

I was asked to come up with some sort of

10

rationale, so we did a multiple regression model.

11

up with a model that would predict how much bang for the

12

buck we would obtain by putting an additional inspector in

13

one location versus another.

14

satisfy the Bureau of the Budget.

15

We came

And this model seemed to

MS. MARY GARDINER JONES:

That reminds me of the

16

Metropolitan fraud program.

17

saying that you don't get any bang for the buck out of it,

18

because you put a lot of resources in, get a cease and

19

desist order, and the same people will pop up in some

20

other jurisdiction.

21

The Bureau of Economics was

My reaction was that the victims were citizens.

22

They pay taxes, and if the poor in those days were about

23

10 percent of the population, they ought to have 10

24

percent of our resources.

25

I didn't give a damn about the bang for the buck.

That's just a matter of equity.
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1

thought that was a kind of political issue, and we owed

2

them something.

3

As a matter of fact, I think we had a lot of

4

cases that have stuck.

5

unconscionable pricing.

6

precedent.

7

Whitman was a big fraud case,
We got a lot of cases out of that

I remember very clearly the Bureau of Economics

8

problems with not getting any bang out of the buck.

9

think there are other ways of looking at this thing.

But

10

that's an old classic liberal approach, I understand.

I

11

wish it were still there.

12

MS. GRAMM:

I

We pushed fraud in the Reagan years,

13

too.

The economists didn't much like it either, but I

14

think we're seeing the value of it.

15

MR. FROEB:

I'd like to ask all the panel

16

members where they think the current low-hanging policy

17

fruit is.

18

MS. GRAMM:

What do you mean by "low-hanging"?

19

MR. FROEB: In terms of just cost-benefit

20

analysis, we have such a wide policy discretion over

21

expected gain versus the resource cost, I guess that would

22

be the criterion I'd use.
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MR. BOND:

In terms of popularity, BCP’s Do Not

2

Call list has generated more publicity than anything else

3

I have seen.

4

You want to know what's next?

5

(Laughter.)

6

MR. BOND:

7

MS. GRAMM:

Spam.
Spam is a good one.

Being rational

8

about privacy issues is good.

9

stuff, and ideas are all over the place on privacy.

10

There's so much weird
The

FTC has done a good job in that area.

11

MR. FOLSOM:

I'm not certain you'll be able to

12

solve the spam problem before most of us will have

13

purchased the software that cuts off the spam.

14

this week went out and bought it for my computer, because

15

it reached the stage where I was getting 10 to 15 of these

16

things a day.

17
18

QUESTION:

You must have read Tim's speech,

right?

19

MR. FOLSOM:

No, I didn't read Tim's speech.

20

But it's out there.

21

$29.95, they give you the spam program.

22

cost was zero.

23
24

I just

Actually, if you buy the McAfee for

ALAN FISHER:

So the marginal
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MS. GRAMM:

2

(Laughter.)

3

MR. FISHER:

I know I shouldn't have done that.

It's an easy one.

I've spent my

4

entire career in antitrust.

5

is doing now, and I agree with Ron Bond's assessment of

6

the quality.

7

of things that you were reading in proposed cases that had

8

you climbing the walls.

9

I have some idea of what BCP

What I'd like is some examples of the kinds

MS. GRAMM:

I don't know that I'll remember the

10

cases, but basically there was an assumption that whatever

11

the practice was, the businessman was just out to fleece

12

the consumer.

13

practice might be a rational business behavior was never

14

considered.

15

The alternative hypothesis of how a

I'll give you an example.

This is not an

16

example from the FTC, but it's an example I used before

17

the SEC not too many years ago.

18

Costco than they are at my 7-11, is that because the guy

19

at the 7-11 is trying to rip me off?

20

of thing.

21

anticompetition issue.

22

thinking.

If peas are cheaper at

You know, that kind

And so, again, that might sound like an
But it's basically a way of

I have repressed all the examples.

23

(Laughter.)

24

MS. GRAMM: We did a sweep looking at APRs

25

concerning the Truth in Lending Act. The lawyers
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discovered that lenders overstated the APRs as often as

2

they understated them.

3

other words, lenders made mistakes on how they did the

4

APR.

5

APR in their ads.

I mean, it was pretty close.

We shouldn't bring cases if they're overstating the

6

I remember being concerned about instances where

7

firms solicited us to bring actions against their

8

competitors.

9

brought a case.

10

In

I remember one instance when a competitor
Toyota had posters on the walls in their

showrooms saying that they had the best repair record.

11

They were basing this claim on the Rogers

12

report, which was a pretty comprehensive report.

13

lawyers were saying that the survey did not include every

14

make and model of all the cars, even though the Rogers

15

report showed that these claims were true.

16

to argue that case, because the lawyers had already gone

17

in and made Toyota rip down the posters.

18

shaking his head.

19

The

We didn't have

Dennis is

Dennis remembers them all.

There were cases basically like that.

It was

20

the assumption and a lack of a view of what alternatives

21

might explain benign behavior, or even consumer-enhancing

22

behavior.

23

MR. PAUTLER:

24

MR. SCHEFFMAN: One of the most important

25

David?

contributions of DCP is that it actually has some of the
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1

best lawyers in the Commission: Keith Anderson, Dennis

2

Murphy, Joe Mulholland, and Lou Silverson.

3

And the Bureau contributes a lot looking at

4

remedies.

5

because they're conduct oriented.

6

realize that having someone like Keith or Dennis look over

7

the remedies is really important.

8

In BCP, the remedies are often regulatory
Even the lawyers

Economists really got involved in the seventies,

9

as I recall when I was there, because of the rulemaking.

10

Some industries clearly had a lot of bad practices, like

11

the funeral industry, and one might be inclined to think

12

that there was something the Commission needed to fix.

13

When we thought about what the rule was going to

14

be, we had the famous purple casket thing.

15

Commission did such and such, what if the low cost casket

16

the funeral home showed was a purple casket?

17

get around that?

18

If the

How would we

From this experience, Dennis and some of the

19

other economists became really excellent regulatory and

20

contract economists.

21

and management rely on the economists' ability to

22

anticipate unintended consequences.

23

MS. GRAMM:

In my experience, the BCP attorneys

DCP had a huge impact on another

24

area, defects.

If it weren't for the economic analysis

25

and legal thinking in terms of liability, you could have
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1

brought any kind of defects case.

2

were arguing that a defect was where the product did not

3

meet a purchaser’s expectation.

4

quality product, then over time, customers’ expectations

5

rise.

So you would always have a defect at some point in

6

time.

Good analysis regarding defects made a huge

7

difference over the long haul.

8
9

MR. PAUTLER:
question.

10

The lawyers at the time

If you have a good

Thank you, Wendy.

Okay.

One more

Jerry?
MR. BUTTERS:

I was interested in the discussion

11

that started on disclosures in tobacco.

12

situation where there's still a lot of information on

13

tobacco that people don't have that would be good for them

14

to have.

15

Today we're in a

I think consumers generally do not know that the

16

tars in tobacco products are what cause cancer, whereas

17

the nicotine is what addicts, and that it would be

18

possible to have nicotine products that give you what you

19

want from that drug but don't kill you.

20

I wonder if any of you have any ideas about

21

whether the FTC should be doing something about this.

22

MS. GRAMM:

Jerry has always been real smart.

23

One of the reasons the cigarette industry wants FDA

24

regulation is exactly that point.

Under FDA regulation,
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1

they should be able to advertise products that may be

2

better for consumers than cigarettes.

3

That’s the kind of information that consumers

4

don't have.

5

the government to regulate them, they ought to get the FTC

6

to do so, because I figured you guys would do a better job

7

than the FDA.

8

kind of information that they can't get to consumers now.

9

That's one of the reasons why they want to get regulated -

10

I've told industry people that if they want

The tar versus nicotine tradeoff is the

- so they can get some truthful information out there.

11

MR. LYNCH:

Let me ask a follow-up question on a

12

more general point.

13

the FTC from doing a study of, for example, the effect of

14

additional disclosures like that?

15

its expertise to put out a study that then might put

16

pressure on the FDA and so on.

17

MS. GRAMM:

18
19
20

Is there anything that would prevent

I don't see any reason why you

couldn't.
MR. PAUTLER:

We'll have to take that under

advisement.

21

(Laughter.)

22

MR. PAUTLER:

23

was on the panel for the session.

24

You know, just using

I'd like to thank everybody who

(Applause.)
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1

MR. PAUTLER:

2

(A brief recess was taken.)

3

MR. PAUTLER:

4

with our session on BE research.

5

together the two sessions that might be listed on your

6

agenda.

7

together now.

8
9

We'll take a five-minute break.

Okay.

We'd like to get started
We're going to roll

I have an old agenda with me, so it may be put

We shall start with Mike Lynch talking a bit
about the choice of research topics, and then we'll move

10

on to what someone might call a list of greatest research

11

hits.

12

that the various ex-directors thought might be

13

interesting, or different studies that I planted with them

14

at one point or another while I was talking to them on the

15

phone or conversing in e-mails.

16

It's not really greatest hits.

It's just things

So if your particular study isn't listed, don't

17

be too offended.

18

at all, you're always going to make more enemies than

19

friends as long as you leave anyone out.

20

in advance.

21

But, of course, any time you do any list

So, I apologize

To start, I want to talk about the research

22

function in BE.

One of the earliest functions of the

23

Commission was writing general investigative reports.

24

They aren't reports as a current day Ph.D. economist would

25

think of them.

In the early days of the Commission, the
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Bureau of Economics, or what then was called the Economic

2

Division, investigated numerous firms or industries and

3

wrote very long, detailed descriptive accounts of how they

4

seemed to operate.

5

These studies had a very heavy accounting

6

component.

7

inducing Congress to pass various laws.

8

reports of the Commission have evolved and become more

9

analytical, more like what current day economists would

10

Some of them were quite influential in
Over time, the

think of as research reports.

11

Now why was BE research done over time?

In a

12

lot of cases, BE research supported rulemakings.

That

13

would have been true of the optometry study and funeral

14

studies.

15

particular industries operated.

16

studies would have been a little more like the older

17

Economic Division reports.

18

of industries, such as food manufacturing, steel, and

19

various drug industries.

Other research was done to examine how
And those industry

Those were done in any number

20

Other research was aimed at finding or

21

summarizing the effects of different regulatory regimes or

22

laws.

23

international trade aimed at better understanding the

24

effects of trade restraints.

For instance, the Commission’s work on

Some of the studies we did
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1

on airport slot regulation or on airline regulation would

2

also fall in that category.

3

In this session, we'd like to discuss the choice

4

of the research topics, the kind of work that economists

5

have done in research.

6

introduce Mike Lynch, who will lead us through the thicket

7

of BE research.

8

MR. LYNCH:

9

To get started, I'd like to

Thank you, Paul.

The early history

of the Bureau of Corporations of the FTC indicates that by

10

and large, the initiative for economic reports was

11

requests from the President, especially Theodore Roosevelt

12

and Woodrow Wilson, and/or from Congress.

13

The topics of these investigations and reports

14

reflected the major concerns of the time, the alleged

15

abuse of monopoly power by the beef packers, the Standard

16

Oil “Trust,” major railroads, the tobacco manufacturers,

17

the lumber industry, etc.

18

In looking through the early reports, the

19

subjects are very familiar.

20

almost throughout the history of the FTC, particularly

21

oil, transportation, and many food industries, such as

22

meat packing.

23

all of the Bureau of Corporation reports, derived from

24

requests from the President or Congress.
25

They seem to be with us

In any case, a high percentage, and perhaps

As far as I can

tell, virtually all of them used compulsory process.
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studies used Section 6.

The first Bureau of Corporation’s

2

report (on the “beef trust”) contained very detailed

3

information on prices paid by and to the packers,

4

quantities and profits.

5

packers decided voluntarily to open their books and

6

records to the Bureau, after first obtaining assurances

7

that the government would not use the information against

8

them in an antitrust prosecution.

9

concerning oil transportation and particularly the alleged

In this instance, the beef

The second report,

10

favorable treatment of Standard Oil, did not use the oil

11

companies’ own books and records.

12

information on “secret rebates” and discriminatory rates

13

granted to Standard Oil came from the railroads’ books and

14

records.

15

access to its records, and apparently the Commission did

16

not challenge the railroad.

17

clearly a part of President Theodore Roosevelt’s campaign

18

against “bad trusts,” and the Bureau of Corporations

19

produced both reports specifically in response to a

20

request from Congress.

21

Rather, the report’s

The New York Central, however, refused to allow

Both early studies were

In any case, the Federal Trade Commission,

22

between 1914 and 1939, produced 80 percent of its reports

23

in response to requests from the President or from

24

Congress, and most of them involved the use of Section 6

25

to gather very detailed and highly confidential

26

information.
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1

The Commission’s reports during the decade of

2

the 1940s focused overwhelmingly on work for the War Board

3

and for the Temporary National Economic Committee (TNEC).

4

There were hearings.

5

effects of the Depression.

6

monographs.

7

Federal Trade Commission staff did, but I think it was a

8

reasonable number.

9

the reports was a request from Congress or some outside

10
11

Of course, the focus reflects the
In any case, TNEC produced 43

At this point, I'm uncertain how many the

Here again, the initiative for most of

agency.
We've heard earlier about how things changed in

12

the fifties, and really with a few blips, the changes

13

continue to the present time.

14

Commission has received fewer requests for reports.

15

fact, I don't know of any that the President requested.

16

relatively small number responded to requests from a

17

concurrent resolution of the Congress or a vote of either

18

house of Congress.

19

Since around 1950, the
In

There can be all kinds of reasons for the drop

A

20

off in requested reports.

We've heard about some of the

21

backlash from controversial reports at various times.

22

Political ebbs and flows could lead to changes in the

23

demand for FTC investigations.

24

hypothesis for dramatic drop in the FTC's market share of

25

economic investigations in Washington.

26

that the FTC has faced lots of competition from other
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1

groups with economists in the past 50 some years.

I was

2

struck going through some of the earlier reports.

Many of

3

them arose as a consequence of some big increase in

4

prices.

5

increase and wanted an explanation.

6

coffee report and some old gasoline reports are clear

7

examples, but there are very many such instances.

The public became very upset about some price

8
9

I think the 1954

We have just seen a very rapid increase in the
price of gasoline, something like 12 cents a gallon, just

10

last week.

11

Department of Energy, I believe through the EIA, will

12

study the causes of the recent gasoline price increases

13

and issue a report.

14

its reports.

15

probably do such a report in 24 hours, and it would be

16

good.

17

in requests for reports from Congress and the President is

18

competition.

19

competition is better.

20

more competition for microeconomic analysis, and you might

21

want to think about the implications of this competition.

22

Secretary Abraham announced that the

I am very familiar with EIA staff and

There are several people there who could

I think one of the reasons for the dramatic decline

Of course, we all believe that more
In any case, the FTC clearly faces

Among the new agencies or organizations,

23

Congress was our main customer for a long time.

The

24

Congressional Budget Office now meets part of that demand.

25

CBO has a staff of very able, well trained economists,

26

among other experts.
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I've already mentioned EIA.

The GAO has a group

2

of economists.

3

the FCC, and the Office of Telecommunications at the

4

Department of Defense all have a fair number of

5

economists.

6

The Economic Research Service of the USDA,

In any case, the FTC, with direct competition

7

from the Department of Justice, is more or less preeminent

8

in studying competition in various industries.

9

lot of competition from a lot of new players, and this

There's a

10

competition may account for the falloff in the requests

11

from Congress and the President.

12

One problem with the decline in

requests

for

13

studies is a loss of protection from political attacks.

14

For a study that Congress requests, a response to any

15

political attack is to respond that we were only doing

16

what Congress told us to do.

17

I believe that the reduction in requests from

18

Congress is a disturbing development, because it opens the

19

Commission to more political risk.

20

do with it, but the FTC has expertise in advertising.

21

Perhaps we need to do more advertising and marketing of

22

our own reports.

23

MR. MUELLER:

I'm not sure what to

An alternative hypothesis is the

24

rise of the power of business interests that want to gag

25

the Commission.

Walker ran into it as soon as he came to
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the FTC.

2

President Roosevelt, and he had incredible power.

3

At the Bureau of Corporations, he reported to

But the first effort he made when he became

4

Director of the Bureau of Economics was to attempt a

5

survey of something like 100,000 corporations, which

6

didn't get very far before it was pretty well squelched

7

and diminished.

8
9

Walker had great rapport with Congress.

As anti-FTC sentiment developed in the business
community, the first big change, in the 1930s, was to

10

require that both houses of Congress approve a resolution

11

and fund any study before Congress could request one from

12

the FTC.

13

for a study without appropriating any additional

14

appropriations.

15

to go through the appropriations process as well as

16

through both houses of Congress, the process is far more

17

formidable than it had been.

18

Previously, either house of Congress could call

Because any request for a study now has

Even with the expanded process, it has been

19

possible to get support from some segments of Congress or

20

from the White House.

21

studies.

22

Committee, and Mr. Celler joined in it.

23

was sent to the Congress, it was sent to Hart.

24
25

We had several requests for

The merger report was at the request of the Hart
When the report

During the sixties at one point, there was a
concern about a rapid increase in bread prices.
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President’s consumer adviser wanted the Commission to do

2

something.

3

getting a request from the White House, but it was

4

considered too sensitive to involve the President.

5

Sherman Adams case, during the Eisenhower Administration,

6

had demonstrated the political consequences of interfering

7

with the independent agencies.

8

Secretary of Agriculture to make the request.

9

few other requests that came via that route.

10

There were exchanges back and forth about

The

But it was okay for the
We had a

At the President’s request, a National

11

Commission on Food Marketing was created.

12

Commission, which had investigative authority, consisted

13

of three congressmen, three senators and three public

14

members.

15

Economics to do two of its major studies.

16

its deliberations, the Commission asked for assistance in

17

making its final recommendations, and the Chairman of the

18

Federal Trade Commission authorized me to work with the

19

Commission’s legal aides in preparing the final report.

20

Russell Parker worked closely with us.

21

the report reflected the goals of the Commission, as well

22

as the Bureau of Economics, on matters such as line of

23

business reporting, food labeling, and pre-merger

24

notification.

25
26

This

The Commission contracted with the Bureau of
At the end of

Not surprisingly,

MR. LYNCH: A lot of studies have been put out,
despite any business opposition. But they haven't been
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1

put out by the FTC.

2

government agencies.

3

studies, Paul?

4

They've been put out by other
Do you want to move on to the

MR. PAUTLER:

Yes, back to the part that's

5

greatest hits.

6

Directors to talk about some of their favorite reports,

7

and I wanted to go through in approximate chronological

8

order.

9

I've asked a few of the ex-Bureau

First we'll start with an early report on the

10

oil industry that has sort of an interesting history. Mack

11

Folsom knows a little bit about it and will give us a

12

little bit of a description and background.

13

MR. FOLSOM:

When I first came to the

14

Commission, Roy Prewitt, the Deputy Director of the Bureau

15

of Economics, discovered that I had an interest in the oil

16

industry.

17

sundry other things.

18

I had read de Chezeau and Kahn and various and

He began to talk to me about the international

19

oil cartel study, which he indicated he was the author of,

20

and all of the problems that he'd gone through because of

21

it.

22

reduction.

23

He was hit by a RIF with a substantial grade

He also had kept a copy of the original version

24

of the study in his home.

After his death, his wife

25

called me and said she was going to donate it to a
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library, and I suggested that she not do it since there

2

had been a letter from Harry Truman to Chairman Howrey

3

directing them not to publish the report until changes

4

requested by the State Department had been made.

5

I know about that letter because there was a

6

safe in the library that was marked Top Secret.

7

only employee in the Commission who had a top secret

8

clearance.

9

darn thing, and I was there and pulled it out, and there

So they had to call in a safesmith to open the

10

was this now 25-year-old letter.

11

years, nothing could be top secret anymore.

12

I was the

I thought that after 25

I took it to the Secretary's office, where it

13

survived for two days before somebody added it to his

14

private collection.

15

from Harry Truman to Chairman Howrey directing him not to

16

publish.

17

But it was just a very short note

Subsequent to Roy's death, John Blair published

18

a book while he was teaching at the University of South

19

Florida near Tampa.

20

the author of the original FTC oil industry report.

21

as you heard this morning, Roy had a copy of the original.

22

Also, when Jesse arrived at the Commission, Roy was very

23

concerned about trying to put out fires caused by the

24

report, and John Blair was not indicating any concern.

In the book, he claimed that he was
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These facts lead me to believe that Roy was the author of

2

the original report.

3

Fred Kahn, who had been co-author of the de

4

Chezeau and Kahn study, was a frequent visitor to the

5

Commission at that time.

6

expert in the petroleum industry.

7

I was asked to comment on.

8

MR. FOLSOM:

Fred considered Roy a real
That is the report that

Another report, from my time as the

9

Bureau Director, was interesting to me in two regards.

10

First, it reached the standard conclusion that I would

11

expect economists to reach.

12

imports.

13

It was a study of steel

Economists believe in free trade.

The report

14

concluded that the best estimate was that there would be

15

substantial costs to consumers if we restricted steel

16

imports.

17

report.

18

to send the people up to his subcommittee for a hearing.

19

Joe Mulholland was very concerned that I would not fairly

20

represent the report.

21

statement, he decided it was okay.

22

Congressman Vannit was not happy with the
He called the Commission and indicated they were

But after I had written a little

Well, we went up, and I felt very uncomfortable,

23

because one of the Congressmen on the committee

24

immediately said, “Do you know they're even importing

25

men's suits from Poland today?”
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(Laughter.)

2

MR. FOLSOM: I was sitting there wearing one of

3

the darn things.

4

experience to be chastised by the Congressman because we

5

were advocating free trade.

6

At any rate, it was an interesting

MR. PAUTLER:

Friz Mueller wanted to say a few

7

words about a study that was done by the Bureau of

8

Economics in 1958.

9

MR. MUELLER:

During the 1950s, the Bureau of

10

Economics was working on an economic report of the

11

antibiotics industry while the legal bureau was working on

12

a legal case against firms in the industry.

13

Whitney, who preceded me at the Commission, was Bureau

14

Director during the late 1950s when BE was about to

15

release the Antibiotics Report.

16

Whitney to rewrite the report to make it more helpful to

17

them in their legal case.

18

would not change the report.

19

that staff economist Roy Prewitt helped him handle the

20

delicate situation by writing a brief conclusion that

21

satisfied the attorneys without changing anything in the

22

body of the report.

23

quotations from the report shows how Whitney and Prewitt

24

attempted to satisfy the attorneys:

25

patents have been handled in ways that may represent a

Dr. Simon

Some attorneys pressured

To his credit, Dr. Whitney
However, Dr. Whitney told me

I suspect that the following

“Thus, certain
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conflict with the antitrust laws.

2

of prices and some other things, all situations having

3

possible restraint aspects, have been made the subject of

4

a legal investigation by the Commission.”

5

Instances of uniformity

Three months after the Commission released the

6

Antibiotics Report, the Commission issued a complaint

7

against the manufacturers.

8

decision recently to see if there were any references.

9

There is a reference to the report, but only to a few

I have read the lengthy

10

facts such as the number of patents.

11

Whitney as being in a situation where many Bureau

12

Directors could find themselves.

13

and he maintained the integrity of the Bureau of

14

Economics.

15

MR. LYNCH:

I often think of

He survived the crisis,

One little note of background, on

16

the earlier discussion of the international oil cartel

17

report.

18

was a lot going on in the Middle East.

19

had taken power and control of the oil in Iran, and in

20

1953, he was overthrown.

21

Congress) published many documents from that period.

22

A book that's just been published [All the

The times were tumultuous then as now, and there
Mohammed Mossadeq

The Church Committee (US

23

Shah’s Men: an American Coup and the Roots of Middle East

24

Terror - Kinzer] claims that the CIA, actually Kermit

25

Roosevelt in particular, was in charge of the operation to

26

overthrow Mohammed Mossadeq. The original form of the
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petroleum report would have caused problems at the time

2

had the Commission released it.

3

MR. PAUTLER:

I think the history of the 1952

4

oil report is that it told a little too much of the truth,

5

things most people didn't know at the time.

6

it's all old news, but in 1952, it was explosive.

7

MR. LYNCH:

Yes.

Right now

Many of the documents,

8

including the now-famous Achncarry Agreement dividing

9

world markets among the “seven sisters,” were made public

10

for the first time in the 1952 FTC report.

11

about the Roosevelt/Mossadeq operation was not public

12

until recently.

13

MR. PAUTLER:

Okay.

Information

Mike Scherer wanted to

14

mention a report that was actually written by one of the

15

other ex-bureau directors.

16

MR. SCHERER:

I second the nomination of the

17

antibiotics report as one of the great post-war Bureau of

18

Economics reports.

19

field of industrial organization working on the antitrust

20

case that followed from it.

21

Personally, I got my start in the

A report that was in process while I was Bureau

22

Director started before me and came out after me.

23

report, by Ron Bond, sitting next to me, and David Lean,

24

was on the prices and advertising of two sets of

25

pharmaceuticals.
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This was an absolute conceptual breakthrough

2

that really transformed the way we look at product

3

differentiation in all kinds of industries.

4

report itself came out, I wrote it up extensively in the

5

1980 revision of my textbook.

6

After the

I had shown a copy of the product

7

differentiation chapter to Dick Schmalensee, and it

8

induced Dick Schmalensee to write his famous June 1982

9

American Economic Review article on the advantages of

10

pioneering brands.

11

This was a very, very important study.

Another one on my hit parade, by Richard Duke,

12

et al., was on the steel industry and international trade.

13

The challenge that led to this study, which we began in

14

1975 when the steel industry was booming, was, can we do

15

useful industry studies without compulsory process?

16

We did a lot of them, but the steel effort was

17

by far the most ambitious.

It came out.

It was a very

18

substantial volume that showed, among other things, that

19

the European producers who were exporting to the United

20

States for the most part received very little subsidy from

21

their governments.

22

subsidizing the steel industry heavily, but the subsidies

23

came in countries where very little steel was being

24

exported.

25

the allegations of illegal subsidy.

The European governments were

This pattern told a completely new story about
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The report came out in November 1977.

In a

2

sense, it was too late.

3

in the midst of a crisis in the steel industry, the

4

congressional steel caucus was formed to do something

5

about the dumping of steel in the United States market.

6

This was six weeks before the Duke et al. study came out.

7

So in a sense, it was too late.

8

1977, the trigger price system to impede steel imports was

9

implemented.

10

On the 20th of September, 1977,

On the 6th of December,

Again, was it too late?

Well, I don't think

11

that was really the problem.

12

that it's hopeless to muster objective facts and analysis

13

against powerful political forces seeking the protection

14

of their industries.

15

I think the real problem is

No matter what the FTC does, I really don't

16

think it can repel those forces.

17

study, which was a very successful study in an academic

18

sense, was really a political failure.

19

come six weeks earlier, it probably would not have

20

affected the decisions that ensued.

21

So the failure of that

Even if it had

I've had lots of experiences along this line.

22

Let me just tell you one anecdote.

During the 1980s,

23

twice in round one and round two of the dispute of the

24

United States with Canada over the subsidy of soft wood

25

lumber exports, I was an economic expert for the
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Canadians.

2

of which was just found wanting by the World Trade

3

Organization.

4

There have been four rounds, the most recent

But anyway, in round two, I found it

5

particularly interesting.

6

agent, and I went and negotiated with the international

7

trade officials of the United States over these

8

allegations of subsidy.

9

They registered me as a foreign

The basic problem was one of spatial rent,

10

Ricardian rent.

11

of a long way away, and they're also difficult to reach.

12

Therefore, they can't command a substantial rent on the

13

timber that is being extracted.

14

The British Columbian forests are a hell

Adam Smith got all of this analysis right in

15

1776.

What I found most astounding was that these

16

international trade officials under the Reagan

17

administration could not understand Adam Smith's basic

18

analysis of spatial rent, even though all of them were

19

wearing Adam Smith ties.

20

(Laughter.)

21

MR. SCHERER:

22
23
24

So I think there are some areas

where it's really hopeless to do first rate analysis.
MR. PAUTLER:

Well, on that upbeat note, Bill

Comanor is going to tell us a little bit about one of his
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favorites, which is a conference volume that was put

2

together in 1981.

3

Bill?

MR. COMANOR:

My piece of the hit parade is a

4

joint Bureau of Economics/Bureau of Competition report

5

that Steve Salop edited and which appeared in September

6

1981.

7

Commission in June of 1980, which was still on my watch,

8

so I can still claim a little bit of credit.

It reports on a conference that was held at the

9

I always thought that the Commission, and Bureau

10

of Economics in particular, should do more to organize

11

conferences on issues that they saw as important, to play

12

a role in disseminating new academic findings into the

13

policy arena, and to bring new ideas to the Commission's

14

attention.

15

That is precisely what this report accomplished.

16

At the end of the 1970s, strategic analysis within

17

industries was a new concept.

18

those who emphasized structural factors and those who

19

suggested that efficiencies could completely explain

20

market relationships.

21

efficiencies, and those were the only two alternatives.

22

The debate was between

It was structural analysis versus

Steve Salop came to the Bureau at the time,

23

suggested a new and different set of considerations,

24

arranged this conference, did the political work of

25

getting lawyers involved, and created a first rate
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conference volume.

2

useful compendium.

3

Even 20 years later, it is still a

Let me quote one sentence from the end of

4

Steve's introduction: "Neither blind structuralism nor

5

tautological efficiencies analysis is sufficient for

6

designing economically rational antitrust policy."

7

seeking a middle ground.

8
9

He was

My query to you all, and certainly to my
colleagues on the panel, is whether Steve's purpose has

10

been achieved in the more than 20 years since that

11

conference took place.

12

MR. PAUTLER:

Okay.

I'd like to move on to the

13

next great hit, unless someone actually wants to answer

14

that rhetorical question.

15

(Laughter.)

16

MR. BAKER:

Yes.

Essentially what you're saying

17

is that this was one of the ways in which the mathematical

18

reconstruction of microeconomics around game theory

19

entered industrial organization economics and helped us

20

analyze firm conduct on the antitrust side.

21

This approach has largely captured the field in

22

academia today and is very influential in how the agency

23

thinks about lots of practices.
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MR. COMANOR:

It represented a real departure

2

and a way of avoiding the rather sterile debate that we

3

were locked into at that time.

4

claim to fame.

5
6
7
8
9

MR. PAUTLER:

That I think was its real

Now Ron Bond will mention a couple

of studies.
MR. BOND: Thank you.

I wanted to highlight a

couple of studies related to consumer protection.
The first of those studies, a major

10

investigation of the life insurance industry, got BE and

11

the FTC in trouble.

12

Mansfield from BE and with Dave Fix, Peter Pitch and Jack

13

Kahn from BCP.

14

state regulators and academia, assembled an incredible

15

array of data, and went through an enormously complex set

16

of calculations.

Mike Lynch worked on it with Ed

It drew on expertise from industry and

17

It showed that ordinary or whole life insurance

18

could be thought of as being comprised of two components:

19

life insurance and savings.

20

detail that for the savings component, the rate of return

21

after subtracting the life insurance component is

22

extraordinarily low compared with market alternatives.

23

also showed that there was a great deal of variation

24

across policies in the rate of return for the savings

It showed in extraordinary
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component.

2

very difficult time shopping for insurance.

3

This variation suggested that consumers had a

The authors’ proposed remedy was a disclosure

4

that the states could then implement.

5

disclosure was a rate of return table to show prospective

6

customers what the rate of return would be after five

7

years, 10 years, and 20 years.

8

looking at an annual percentage rate for interest costs.

9

The proposed

It would be a lot like

The proposals made a great deal of sense.

This

10

study hit the target, but once again, the target stood up

11

and hit back.

12

(Laughter.)

13

MR. BOND:

The life insurance agencies and

14

members of Congress apparently didn't like what this

15

report had to say, and within a year or two, Congress told

16

the FTC that it could not study insurance unless Congress

17

specifically asked it to do so.

18

The second body of research I wanted to

19

highlight, and Wendy has already referred to it, is the

20

work on health claims.

21

started by looking at the relationship between fiber

22

consumption and the incidence of cancer.

23

Pauline Ippolito and Alan Mathios

In the 1970s and early '80s, a great deal of

24

research demonstrated that increased consumption of fiber

25

could lead to a reduction in the incidence of cancer.
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press reported that research, and the Surgeon General

2

recommended in a 1979 report that consumers increase their

3

consumption of fiber.

4

Until 1984, however, none of this information

5

was disclosed in advertising or on food labels.

6

the Kellogg Company, in cooperation with the National

7

Cancer Institute, worked out an advertising and labeling

8

campaign to publicize the health benefits of fiber.

9

In 1984,

Pauline and Alan demonstrated that fiber

10

consumption did not increase during the period prior to

11

1984, despite all of the press and Surgeon General

12

coverage.

13

labeling campaign, there was a 7 percent increase in fiber

14

consumption between 1984 and 1987.

15

suggested that advertising was a very effective way of

16

communicating health claims.

17

followed this report with a study of fat and cholesterol

18

consumption that showed similar results.

19

Pauline and Jan Pappalardo published a study last year

20

showing in great detail that the amount of advertising

21

devoted to health claims fluctuates quite dramatically as

22

public policy is more and less permissive toward that

23

advertising.

24
25

However, once Kellogg began its advertising and

These results

Ippolito and Mathios

More recently,

Thanks to this research, we have empirical data
to suggest that advertising can provide socially useful
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information and that public policy can affect the quantity

2

of that advertising.

3

MR. PAUTLER:

That whole line of research is

4

keeping Pauline busy right now as she occasionally talks

5

to people at FDA about these kinds of issues and tries to

6

help their efforts.

7

MR. LYNCH:

8

than it used to be?

9

listen.

10

But isn’t the FDA a lot more open
I remember them.

MR. PAUTLER:

They wouldn't

Also regarding the insurance

11

study, Mike, even though Congress kicked the FTC out of

12

insurance studies, there's been a pretty big shift since

13

then to term insurance and away from whole life.

14

study helped with the educational process that caused the

15

industry to offer different products.

16

MR. LYNCH:

I think that's right.

Your

In fact, it

17

was agents selling term insurance, particularly those

18

creating new and more flexible products, that were really

19

effective in getting that message out.

20

MR. PAUTLER:

21

MR. LYNCH:

They advertised.
They advertised.

The restriction

22

was that we could not investigate insurance unless either

23

the House or the Senate Commerce Committee requested that

24

we do so.

25

requests, I guess in 1985 or '84.
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MR. PAUTLER:

Yes.

It certainly hasn't been a

2

complete ban.

3

few of his favorite research projects.

4

Now we return to Mike Lynch to mention a

MR. LYNCH:

Ron Bond is doing very well in the

5

greatest hits category.

One that I wanted to discuss is

6

the staff report on effects of restrictions on advertising

7

and commercial practice in the professions, the case of

8

optometry by Ron Bond, John Kwoka, Jack Phelon and Ira

9

Whitten.

The report was significant not only because it

10

led to fewer state and professional association-imposed

11

advertising restrictions in optometry, but also because it

12

provided a model of how to conduct objective research to

13

gather evidence on the important issue of quality.

14

A lack of quality analysis had been the major

15

stumbling block of almost every previous study of

16

restrictions on advertising.

17

other up to that time, dealt with the quality issue in a

18

convincing way.

19

conclusion that said, and I quote:

20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30

This study, more than any

That was really the foundation for the

Prescriptions in eyeglasses are no less adequate
when purchased from an advertising optometrist
or chain firm optometrist, than when purchased
from a nonadvertising, noncommercial optometrist
in either a restrictive or a nonrestrictive
city.
The thoroughness of the examination does vary,
but regardless of the thoroughness of the
examination, prices tended to be lower in
nonrestrictive cities.
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The study demonstrated that advertising led to

2

lower prices for eyeglasses but had essentially no effect

3

on the distribution of quality.

4

model, and other similar studies followed it.

5

original purpose of the study was to support the

6

Eyeglasses 2 Rule, but the Commission ultimately did not

7

adopt the proposed rule.

8

proposed eyeglass rule, the report and the follow-on

9

reports had major, very positive effects.

This study served as a
The

Despite the demise of the

The discount

10

eyeglass organizations, such as Pearle and For Eyes, that

11

restrictions on advertising had hampered, grew rapidly as

12

states and professional associations eased their

13

restrictions.

14

The report was also very important, because now

15

anyone arguing before the professional associations or

16

state legislatures has this very impressive report to say

17

that it is in the public interest to ease advertising

18

restrictions.

19

Ron told me that Lenscrafters is now the number

20

one seller of eyeglasses.

Lawyers and dentists now

21

routinely advertise in the yellow pages.

22

study, mainstream optometrists, lawyers, and dentists

23

rarely advertised.

24

groups to advertise is due in large measure to the

25

pioneering efforts and excellence of this early report.

Before this

The ability of these professional
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I want to make some other points, using the

2

optometry study as an illustration.

Studies can be very

3

effective and produce a lot of benefit, even if the

4

Commission loses the legal battle.

5

need to be a rule to affect consumers positively.

6

study from the FTC attracts a great deal of attention and

7

helps those opposing a government enforced restriction on

8

competition, even when the Commission cannot compel or use

9

its powers of coercion to make changes.

The result does not

A good study

10

gives advocates a weapon that they wouldn't have

11

otherwise.

12

A good

I would like to mention one other, much earlier

13

study.

On the one hundredth anniversary of the Bureau of

14

Corporations, it is only fitting to remember one of its

15

earliest and most influential reports, The Report of the

16

Commissioner of Corporations on the Transportation of

17

Petroleum, May 2, 1906.

18

Roosevelt had urged Congress to extend the ICC’s power

19

over transportation rates.

20

give the ICC the authority to determine whether a

21

challenged rate was “reasonable,” to decide on a

22

reasonable rate if it found the rate to be unreasonable,

23

and to have that rate go into effect immediately, subject

24

to judicial review.

25

with these provisions in 1904.

26

the House, 346 to 7.

In 1904, President Theodore

Specifically, he sought to

Congressman Hepburn introduced a bill
The bill passed easily in

A year later, Congressman William

For The Record, Inc.
Waldorf, Maryland(301)870-8025

198
1

Randolph Hearst introduced a bill that declared pipelines

2

to be common carriers subject to ICC jurisdiction.

3

Although these bills had much support in the

4

House, many Republicans in the Senate opposed the

5

President on this matter.

6

passed either bill.

7

important in changing this situation.

8

the height of the Senate debate on the Hepburn bill

9

(amended to include Hearst’s provisions declaring

By 1905, Congress had not

The Transportation Report proved
On May 4, 1906, at

10

pipelines common carriers), President Roosevelt submitted

11

a synopsis of the Report to the Senate.

12

historian Arthur Menzies Johnson wrote,

As economic

13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27

The report, summed up in Commissioner James R.
Garfield’s letter of submittal, proved to be a
sensation. Its main theme was that Standard Oil
had been profiting by secret rates granted by
the railroads, but it also called attention to
Standard Oil’s pipeline power in this and other
connections. Garfield declared that pipelines
enabled the oil combination to do its refining
in advantageous locations which high road rates
and pipeline charges barred to competitors.
“The development of the pipeline system by the
Standard Oil Company was the result of special
agreements with railroad companies,” he said.
[p.221, footnotes omitted]

28

The report received a great deal of publicity,

29

most of it favorable.

The vote in the Senate now became

30

“perfunctory.”

31

for good or ill (and I happen to think that setting rates

32

for railroads was a huge mistake), the Transportation

The Hepburn Bill passed 75 to 0.
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1

Report had a major effect on the future of railroads and

2

oil pipelines.

3

government’s antitrust case against Standard Oil.

4

type of regulation the ICC introduced and evolved heavily

5

influenced later regulatory agencies such as the FPC

6

(later FERC) and the CAB.

7

to be one of the most influential, if not beneficial, in

8

BC/FTC history.

9
10

It also served as a basis for the

MR. PAUTLER:

The

The Transportation Report has

Thanks very much.

Jon Baker has a

few of his favorite studies to mention.

11

MR. BAKER:

Even though mergers kept us very

12

busy, we still managed to do some studies in the Bureau of

13

Economics when I was here.

14

although some of them might have come out when Jeremy was

15

Director.

16

hospitals, which was a litigation problem area for the

17

Commission.

18

one in Pauline's research program.

19

others examined comparative food advertising claims to

20

evaluate whether consumers gain truthful information from

21

those kinds of claims.

22

was that researchers must use copy testing to determine

23

whether advertising claims are deceptive.

24
25

Several were underway,

Some studies involved competition issues in

A couple involved food advertising, including
Dennis Murphy and some

For me, the most importance lesson

Roy Levy wrote a report on competition in
pharmaceuticals.

The rent to own industry study probably
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came out under Jeremy.

2

industry by John Howell, Roy Levy and Harold Saltzman was

3

also released after I left the Commission.

4

A lengthy study of the soft drink

The study that interested me the most, and I

5

think may be the most influential, was a report to

6

Congress on the first proposed tobacco industry

7

settlement.

8

the litigation between the tobacco companies and the

9

states.

That proposal was the first attempt to settle

The proposed settlement would have required

10

federal legislation to implement it.

11

reduce tobacco use and reduce smoking by restricting

12

marketing and advertising, raising the price of

13

cigarettes, and imposing some financial penalties on the

14

industry if youth smoking goals were not met.

15

increases would have been realized by requiring the

16

industry to make annual payments, and those payments would

17

have funded federal and state programs to try to reduce

18

tobacco usage.

19

The idea was to

Price

The firms’ desire for a broad antitrust

20

exemption immediately got our attention.

But thorough

21

analysis demonstrated that tobacco firms would likely make

22

a big profit on the deal, even without the antitrust

23

exemption.

24

tobacco companies and retailers pass through 100 percent

25

of cost increases to smokers.

Economic studies had consistently found that

Moreover, under this
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proposal, the industry would save on marketing

2

expenditures and litigation costs.

3

The annual industry payments that the proposal

4

envisioned would have been transfers from smokers to the

5

government.

6

shareholders.

7

collecting a tax for the government and for the states.

8

With the addition of an antitrust exemption, the most

9

likely result would have been to make effective

The settlement would not have affected
It was as though the tobacco companies were

10

coordination more likely.

11

elastic, prices and profits would probably have increased

12

substantially, even though consumption was falling.

13

proposed settlement therefore would have been a terrific

14

windfall for the tobacco companies, we said.

15

have reduced some youth smoking as well.

16

all the different implications.

17

addressing the need for the antitrust exemption, but as a

18

practical matter, we were raising important questions

19

about the settlement itself.

20

With demand not particularly

The

It might

We pointed out

Formally, we were only

After we published our report, the tobacco

21

companies came back with a different proposal, the one

22

that has now gone into effect with the states.

23

settlement required neither federal legislation nor

24

antitrust exemption, and it only involved the state cases.
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Independent of our study, and before he

2

succeeded me as Bureau Director, Jeremy Bulow wrote a

3

Brookings article describing the later settlement in much

4

the same way as I described the original federal

5

settlement, but the Commission did not comment on the

6

state settlement.

7

MR. PAUTLER:

Thank you, Jon.

I guess that

8

covers the greatest hits for the moment.

I want to switch

9

to a different area of FTC endeavor, the data collection

10

period, which except for a few early collections, covered

11

1939 to about 1982.

12

premerger notification between 1969 and 1979, the decade

13

before official HSR filings started.

14

I also want to discuss the period of

Few current FTC staff are aware of the premerger

15

notification program of 1969-1979.

16

useful to have some background on the origins of that

17

system.

18

expert in the Commission’s data collection.

19

It would therefore be

Fortunately, ex-Director Mike Scherer is an

MR. SCHERER:

Okay.

Let's throw the cats and

20

dogs to the wolves or whatever [referring to a comment in

21

Mr. Miller’s luncheon speech].

22

has a long tradition at the Commission, including

23

accounting work done for the war efforts in both world

24

wars and price and profits studied in various industries

25

over the years.

Systematic data collection
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I'm going to confine my remarks, however, to

2

three particularly controversial programs:

3

patterns, and that most beloved one, the line of business

4

program.

5

QFR, corporate

QFR, which started as a joint program with the

6

SEC before the FTC took it over entirely, provided

7

important inputs into the national income statistics.

8

is the way the Bureau of Economic Analysis at the

9

Department of Commerce estimates quarterly Gross National

10

QFR

Product and Gross Domestic Product figures.

11

Contrary to statements made by Bureau of

12

Economics management on occasion, QFR was the basis for

13

various studies that we have done within the Bureau of

14

Economics.

15

you, Russ?

I think Russ Parker did one of them, didn't

16

MR. PARKER:

17

MR. SCHERER:

18

have to want to use it to use it.

19

We used it in several studies.
Yeah, okay.

It was used.

But you

That's a prerequisite.

It was a pain in the ass, because we had to

20

sample many small businesses.

That was part of the point.

21

Small businesses would receive these requests, and they'd

22

call me up as Bureau Director or send me a really nasty

23

letter with a carbon copy to their Congressmen.

24

get a copy from Capitol Hill, and we had to do a lot of
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negotiating with people to calm them down and get them to

2

comply.

3

The program went over to Census Bureau since

4

then, and they're doing fine.

5

believe that they're either doing it better or worse than

6

the FTC did.

7

complainants.

8

and I finally decided to send him a pacifier.

9
10
11

There's no reason to

I have one amusing story about one of the
I was having a long conversation with him,

(Laughter.)
MR. SCHERER:

I sent him my only President Ford

WIN button.

12

(Laughter.)

13

MR. SCHERER:

And that gesture was a serious

14

mistake, because the button would have been incredibly

15

valuable now.

16

But in any event, that was QFR.

Corporate patterns sought data at the five-digit

17

SIC level for the thousand largest manufacturing firms in

18

the United States.

19

was in 1950 and was quite uncontroversial.

20

results were published.

21

wrote an econometrics paper at Harvard using the

22

and I later used it in a paper that appeared in the

23

American Economic Review in December '65.

It had two iterations.

The first one
Initial

Not long thereafter I actually
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The almost identical survey proposal in 1972 was

2

enormously controversial.

3

quash.

4

happened is that industry learned that the FTC was no

5

longer a paper tiger; that it was bringing structural

6

cases; that the more it knew about structure, the greater

7

the chance was that the Commission might bring a

8

structural case.

9

to stop the survey.

10
11

There were 300 motions to

What happened between 1950 and 1972?

anything from it.

What

The business community therefore wanted
I'm not sure if we ever did publish
I don't think so.

Let me go on to line of business.

Fritz Mueller

12

set the wheels in motion.

13

was beginning to take definition.

14

sought from 471 large corporations quite detailed

15

breakdowns of their balance sheets and income statements

16

by individual, narrowly defined line of business.

17

were approximately 270 categories into which companies

18

were required to break down their operations.

19

By the early 1970s, the program
As it evolved, it

There

As I recall, the most diversified corporations

20

reported on about 40 lines of business.

21

something on the order of seven or eight manufacturing

22

plus one-and-a-half nonmanufacturing lines of business.

23

The average was

Again, there was absolutely furious resistance.

24

The resistance arose from several different fronts, but if

25

there were a single identifiable leader, it was the
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Business Roundtable and its principal attorney, Ira

2

Millstein.

3

that I made a sour face.

4

program so effectively, represented the Federal Trade

5

Commission in presenting a major award to former Chairman

6

Bob Pitofsky last year.

7

friends.

8

was Moriarity.

When Tim Muris mentioned Ira earlier, Tim saw
That Millstein, who opposed this

Actually, Ira and I are very good

9

We did a Holmes and Moriarity act for years.

He

I forget how many companies filed motions to

10

quash, 140 or 170 or something like that, claiming various

11

problems.

12

the data, we will have to incur prohibitive cost.

13

One problem:

We don't have the data, or to get

Chairman Lew Engman was a genius on this.

We

14

got all these motions to quash with very unsubstantiated

15

claims.

16

invite them to submit supplemental motions detailing and

17

swearing what the problem is for them and what it's going

18

to cost them to solve these problems.

19

Lew said, well, let's go back to these guys and

When they had to swear, the cost estimates went

20

down, down, down, number one.

21

pretty good insight into where we might have to change a

22

few things to reduce the cost of compliance.

23

But number two, we got a

Now the uproar was just getting going when I

24

arrived as the Director of the Bureau of Economics.

25

had just solicited these first motions to quash when one
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of my best friends and colleagues from Harvard Business

2

School came to Washington and said let's have lunch.

3

so I went to lunch with him.

4

And

This friend was a vice president of the W.R.

5

Grace Company, which was leading one of the groups of

6

opposition to the line of business program, and which had

7

filed a motion to quash telling that it was going to be

8

really expensive for them to comply and they didn't have

9

the data, blah, blah, blah.

My friend had come up through

10

the accounting staff of Grace to become vice president in

11

charge of one of its many divisions.

12

I told him about Grace's motion to quash.

13

said, hey, it's no problem.

14

We've got all those data readily available on our

15

computers.

16

we've got them.

17

weeks, and the report can easily be compiled.

18

He

We went through the form.

A couple of items are pretty sensitive, but
We'll put one MBA on it for a couple of

So, number one, I began to wonder, hey, are

19

these guys really telling the truth in their motions to

20

quash?

21

I'm head of a division at Grace, and my division is quite

22

different qualitatively from many of the differentiated

23

product divisions of Grace.

24

Grace once a month, and he chews me out royally for not

The second thing my friend said is this.

Look,

I have to go in to Peter
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making profit margins as high as those of leaders of other

2

Grace divisions.

3

The fact is, I'm in a commodity business and the

4

margins are lower.

5

this line of business program you're proposing by which I

6

could be evaluated objectively relative to my peers in the

7

same line of business.

8

very valuable.

9

luncheon speech], what gets measured, gets better.

10

Dammit, I wish we had a benchmark like

He thought these data would be

To quote the Honorable James Miller [the

So there were a lot of things that weren't as

11

they seemed in this program.

12

resistance, among other things, from the various public

13

accounting firms located in Washington.

14

at one point, and most of the representatives of the Big

15

Five accounting firms testified and told us what an awful

16

program this was.

17

We encountered furious

We held a hearing

Well, what was not known was that one of those

18

witnesses was meeting regularly with me every couple of

19

weeks in secret and telling me, first of all, what

20

problems I could anticipate; second, what genuine problems

21

there were in the proposed line of business forms; third,

22

how to solve them; and fourth, helping me recruit

23

personnel for the program.

24

supportive of the program in private, in the secrecy of

And he was very much
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our meeting room.

2

prelude to the end.

3

But in public, my God, this is the

So again, things were not exactly as they

4

seemed.

A second problem alleged was that the data would

5

be useless in any event.

6

W.R. Grace certainly didn't think that was the case.

7

did get a series of comments trashing the program from

8

consultants hired for a six-digit honorarium by the law

9

firms fighting the line of business program.

My divisional chief friend from
We

10

I was really miffed that an article critical of

11

the line of business program had appeared in the American

12

Economic Review without disclosing that the author had

13

received a six-figure honorarium for writing the article

14

from the law firms fighting line of business.

15

had refereed the paper for the American Economic Review.

16

And I said, if you want to publish this thing, okay.

17

you damn well better have the author reveal that he was

18

paid by three different law firms for writing the article.

19

No such explanation appeared, and I protested to

Indeed, I

But

20

the American Economic Association.

I proposed a

21

resolution to be debated on the floor of the annual AEA

22

meeting.

23

about that.

24

They adopted a rule, a bylaw right on the spot, that any

25

article published in the official publications of the

The Executive Committee was not terribly happy
They said let's settle this out of court.
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American Economic Association from henceforth on shall

2

reveal any sources of financial support underlying the

3

article.

4

I checked the other day in a recent AER and

5

found that it's true.

People are doing it.

6

following the bylaw that flowed out of this.

They're

7

We subsequently rebutted the arguments against

8

line of business reporting in an article in the American

9

Economic Review, I believe in March of 1987.

The article

10

had the most co-authors of any paper ever printed in the

11

American Economic Review.

12

There was a serious problem with the line of

13

business program.

For the data to be really useful, they

14

had to be timely.

We did publish four complete reports,

15

but on average, they were six plus years after the

16

December concluding the average reporting year, and that's

17

simply too late.

18

delay.

19

we tried to take a step, we got litigated against.

20

remember we had a hearing in Judge Weinfeld's courtroom in

21

New York.

22

corporate lawyers on one side of the hearing room and two

23

FTC lawyers on the other side.

24

were litigated.

25

litigation.

There were a lot of reasons for the

The main reason for the delay was that every time
I

We had a hearing, and I think there were 170

Every step we took, we

We did in the end succeed in the

The appellate court said that this program
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was fine, consistent, and so forth and so on.

2

appealed to the Supreme Court, which denied Cert.

3

thought the program could go.

4

Opponents
So we

Litigation continued and delays continued.

Once

5

we had solved all the litigation problems, we could have

6

issued reports on a timely basis, but then of course we

7

didn't.

8

published in May 1982.

9

The program ended with the 1977 report, which was

Line of business reports could have been a data

10

series of very great value.

11

better.

12

the performance of American industries will provide

13

incentives to improve that performance.

14

alone.

15

What gets measured gets

I still firmly believe that good information on

But I stand

Almost alone.
MR. PAUTLER:

Thank you very much, Mike.

I also

16

wanted some discussion from you and Fritz Mueller on the

17

1969 Merger Prenotification Program, how it came to be,

18

and how effective it was.

19

that the thing ever existed.

20

was earlier.

21

MR. MUELLER:

Most FTC staff don't even know
Fritz can start because he

First, following very briefly on

22

Mike.

The greatest tragedy regarding the line of business

23

program was that it covered only 1973-76.

24

turned out to be among the worst that one could find to

25

test the concentration-profit relationship.

These years
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The first year had a 20 percent inflation rate,

2

and every year thereafter also had exceptionally high

3

inflation rates.

4

the quality of empirical studies in the profession, Mike

5

Scherer and Leonard Weiss.

6

Scherer and Ross, has a cautionary footnote on this point

7

explaining that studies based on line of business data may

8

be flawed because of the unique years involved.

9

I have always relied on two arbiters of

The classic I.O. textbook,

My colleague, now deceased, Leonard Weiss, did

10

some of these line of business studies.

11

skeptical from the outset, because a doctoral dissertation

12

of one of his Ph.D. students demonstrated that in years of

13

high inflation, the concentration-profit relation

14

disappeared.

15

He was very

Professor David Ravenscraft took line of

16

business data just for the food industries, which

17

inflation does not affect as much as many other

18

manufacturing industries.

19

significant positive relationship between concentration

20

and firm profits (Review of Economics and Statistics

21

1983.)

22

He found a statistically

Yet the conventional wisdom has become that

23

studies based on line of business data have proven that

24

there is no significant relationship between market

25

concentration and profit.

I think this inference is
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nonsense.

2

Industrial Organization (1993) futher demonstrating this

3

point.

4

I co-authored an article in the Review of

The Commission-mandated Merger Prenotification

5

Program of 1969 began when the Commission decided to issue

6

merger guidelines in the cement industry and in food

7

retailing.

8

Commission to use its power under Section 6 of the FTC Act

9

to require premerger notification, but I could never get

Beginning in 1964, I began urging the

10

more than two votes.

11

Phil Elman was the other.

12

Food Distribution Guidelines, BE inserted a premerger

13

notification requirement.

14

of three, and the Commission’s first premerger

15

notification requirement started January 3, 1967.

16

Mary Gardiner Jones was one, and
When we prepared the Cement and

At that time we got a majority

Then in 1969, I suggested to Richard McClaren,

17

soon to be the new Assistant Attorney General for

18

Antitrust, that we work on a premerger notification

19

program.

20

premerger notification program through Congress.

21

him that with his support, I thought that the Commission

22

would go for such a program.

23

request.

24

memorandum and gave it to Phil Elman.

25

reproduced and circulated for distribution to go to the

26

Commission the next morning, March 20, 1969.
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Commission unanimously accepted all of the recommendations

2

of the Bureau of Economics.

3

of $250 million making acquisitions of at least $10

4

million would have to report data prior to completing an

5

acquisition.

All corporations with assets

6

Among other data, the Commission required 7-

7

digit product information, and this requirement caused

8

quite a stir.

9

Commission accomplished in three months what Congress had

A Business Week story said that the

10

been unable to do for 18 years after passage of the

11

Celler-Kefauver Act.

12

I happened to be in the right place at the right

13

time.

14

10, 1969), McClaren had invited me to be on his staff.

15

declined but said I would work as closely with him as I

16

could.

17

conglomerates during this period in which he discussed our

18

close working relationship.

19

Just before I left the White House staff (January
I

A New York Times journalist has written a book on

MR. SCHERER:

Could I just add a very brief

20

anecdotal footnote on premerger notification?

It was I

21

think Wednesday, December 24th, 1975.

22

Economics had just had its annual Christmas party.

About

23

2:30 in the afternoon I said to everyone, go home.

Have a

24

nice holiday weekend.

The Bureau of
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I was sitting all alone in the bureau offices

2

and the telephone rang.

I picked it up, and it was a

3

lawyer in Boston who had a premerger notification report

4

due the next day, Christmas day.

5

(Laughter.)

6

MR. SCHERER: He said “Seven digits.
I told him where.

Where the

7

hell do I get that?”

And I told him

8

how to finish the form.

9

finish this up and I'm going to get on the plane and I'm

He said, “Okay, I'm going to

10

going to come to Washington and deliver this report to

11

you.

Will someone be there to receive it?”

12

(Laughter.)

13

MR. SCHERER:

I said, sir, it's Christmas eve.

14

The staff has gone home to their families.

15

to go home to my family.

16

weekend to use the report.

17

put it in Fed Ex and had it arrive on Monday, that'll be

18

just fine with us.

19

I would like

No one will be here this long
It would be fine if you just

He said, “Okay, I'll do that.”

I said, you stay

20

home and have a nice Christmas with your family.

21

you very much.

22

saying the FTC didn't give a damn about its premerger

23

notification form.

24

Thank

This guy wrote a letter to Peter Rodino

(Laughter.)
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MR. SCHERER:

The result was that Rodino

2

scheduled hearings, the end result of which was the Hart-

3

Scott-Rodino Act of 1976.

4

(Laughter.)

5

MR. PAUTLER:

Thank you very much to everybody

6

on the panel.

7

of Bob Tollison, who was going to cover the advocacy

8

section or as we sometimes call it, the regulatory

9

intervention program, I'm going to go through it quickly.

10
11

We have one more session.

MR. LONG:

In the absence

Do you have time for a question or a

comment?

12

MR. PAUTLER:

13

MR. LONG:

Go ahead, Bill.

Ask a question.

As either the cat or the dog or

14

occasionally, who knows, the wolf, with respect to the

15

line of business program, I thought I would make a couple

16

of observations.

17

I want to back up to the QFR program.

We got

18

rid of it.

19

data collection at the Federal Trade Commission.

20

program has been at the Census Bureau since about 1983,

21

for twenty years.

22
23

What we didn't get rid of is the quality of
The QFR

It's still running strong, and it is one of the
best data collection programs at the Census Bureau.
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know because I've used data from several of them through

2

the Center for Economic Studies at Census.

3

It is still one of the best data collection

4

programs, and it was the model that we had in mind for

5

timeliness of collection and publication of line of

6

business data.

7

before the end of the following quarter.

8

model eventually.

Census collects the data and reports it
That was our

We never got to do that.

9

QUESTION:

Why is timeliness so important?

10

MR. LONG:

When doing any kind of benchmarking,

11

for any company or industry trying to make a dollar,

12

timeliness matters.

13

good enough to have data two or three years later.

14

In the commercial sector, it’s not

MR. MUELLER:

Having worked at both the QFR

15

program and as a census agent, I have no question that

16

Census is more lax than the FTC in accepting or just not

17

pursuing non-reporting firms.

18

At one point someone requested how many times

19

Census had brought legal actions against corporations for

20

not reporting etc., and it was just minuscule.

21
22
23
24

MR. MUELLER:

Russ Parker has experience with

this.
QUESTION:

It's not as important if you're just

using the data for research.

But if you're using them for
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benchmarking, it's very important.

2

says that.

3

Everybody in industry

MR. MUELLER: There is a very interesting story

4

about the Commission's reputation in QFR.

5

Federal Statistics Committee and requested that the SEC

6

segment be transferred to the Federal Trade Commission.

7

When I went to the meeting, the Federal Reserve Board, the

8

Department of Commerce and several other agencies were

9

very much against the transfer.

10

I was on the

I said that we have one advantage, and that's

11

Section 6(b).

12

Reluctantly, they agreed to the transfer.

13

the Federal Reserve Board was very upset about a big

14

problem with the SEC segment.

15

error, and it raised problems with GNP predictions and

16

with regulating financial markets.

17

The SEC has no mandatory authority.
At the time,

There was a $7 billion

Anyway, after the first report under the FTC, I

18

remember going to the committee, and they said, well, just

19

how many of these companies reported to you?

20

one reported.

21

how many companies reported to the FTC.

22

every one reported.

23

or three minutes and said how did that happen?

24

that they're afraid of Section 6(b).

And they said, no, no, no.

I said every

We want to know
I repeated that

People sat around in silence for two
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MR. LONG:

So QFR was a great success for the

2

Federal Trade Commission, and it still is both intact and

3

successful.

4

On the line of business program, there is always

5

hope for good work not to be totally discarded.

6

hasn't referred to a paper that he presented last year.

7

It was an alternative approach to an early paper using the

8

line of business data for a technology flows matrix, where

9

you start with R&D effort and find out where it ended up,

10

who were the eventual users.

11

breaking example of data analysis.

12

Mike

This paper was a path

He redid the original paper with alternative

13

data and reported the results last year at a conference.

14

To quote Scherer:

15
16
17
18

“Basing a technology flow matrix on such
contaminated R&D data would impart considerable
inaccuracy.”

19

The contaminated R&D data are the data that the Census

20

Bureau collects for the National Science Foundation and

21

that the NSF publishes.

22

Once again:

23
24
25
26
27
28
29

“Basing a technology flows matrix on such
contaminated R&D data would impart considerable
inaccuracy. The simplest solution to this
problem would be to restore line of business
reporting in the National Science Foundation
Census Bureau surveys, disaggregating the
reporting lines more finely than they have been
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2
3
4
5

disaggregated in the past, and exerting
strenuous efforts to convince industry
participants that the data shed important light
on the dynamics of the American economy.”

6

Unquote.

In July and August I participated in

7

two workshops at the National Academy of Science, both

8

supported by NSF.

9

Technology and Economic Policy Board, and the second one

The first one was hosted by the Science

10

was hosted by the Center for National Statistics.

11

conferences focused on line of business reporting for the

12

National Science Foundation Census Bureau data collection

13

effort.

14

Both

If I were a betting man, I would bet that it's

15

going to happen.

So we may be seeing the daughter or son

16

of line of business show up at the Census Bureau with NSF

17

funding probably by the next census year, which is 2007.

18

To conclude, the detailed data on research and

19

development that were collected by the Federal Trade

20

Commission for those four years, '74 through '77, have

21

been used as the basis for more published economic papers

22

in refereed journals than all of the papers that used data

23

reported at the SEC on R&D or data reported to the Census

24

Bureau in the program that the NSF funds.

25

MR. PAUTLER:

If anybody is interested in seeing

26

a list of many of the papers based on the line of business

27

data, you can see them in our miscellaneous papers lists
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of BE publications.

2

people did as follow-ons to the line of business.

3
4
5

A lot of them came from research that

We've got to move on to the advocacy section if
we're going to get any of it in at all.
First, I'd like to acknowledge the work that

6

Denis Breen and our administrative people did in putting

7

this program together.

8

(Applause.)

9

MR. PAUTLER:

They did an outstanding job.

I wouldn't say that trying to get

10

13 ex-directors together and figure out what they might

11

say is like herding cats, but you're not ever sure what

12

everybody's going to do.

13

behind schedule.

14

That's one reason we're a little

The final area we will cover today is the

15

advocacy program, because BE historically played a

16

significant role in that activity.

17

Tollison wasn't here to talk about it.

18

I'm sorry that Bob
Please see Mr. Pautler's slides at
http://www.ftc.gov/be/workshops/
directorsconference/docs/pautlerslides.pdf

As slide 2 indicates, one can characterize the

19

advocacy program in a couple of different ways.

20

look at the first characterization, it sounds great.

21

Consumers aren't always well represented before regulatory

22

bodies, and an advocacy program that shares our experience

23

and our expertise with other governmental bodies helps

24

them do a better job of incorporating consumer interests.
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The bottom portion of slide 2 characterizes our

2

advocacy program another way.

3

to do their jobs and insist that they impose some market-

4

based approach.

5

We tell other agencies how

The reason the characterization of the program

6

is important is that the description carries some

7

judgment.

8

what we did was great.

9

regulatory intervention, how can anybody say it's bad?

10

Using the language on the top, everybody thinks
Whether you call it advocacy or

However, if what we're really doing is walking

11

into other people’s homes and telling them how they should

12

behave or what they should do, then people can get bent

13

out of joint.

14

joint, particularly state regulators who didn't appreciate

15

having the FTC tell them how to do their jobs better, even

16

though in virtually every case, we got a request to come

17

in and give our opinion.

18

participate, regulators frequently liked neither our

19

advice nor our market-based approaches.

20

In fact, a lot of people got bent out of

Despite the invitations to

If Bob Tollison were here to make this

21

presentation today, you would probably soon learn that he

22

is not a real fan of government activity (see slide 3).

23

(Laughter.)

24

MR. PAUTLER:

25

Those of you who do know him know

that that's an understatement. However, Bob actually said
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1

that he thought that allocating resources toward the

2

advocacy program, or what he would have called the

3

“intervention” program, was wise, for at least the

4

attorneys and economists were pointing their guns at real

5

monopoly power.

6

That's the power of the government.

Now, of course, he didn't ever say the attorneys

7

and economists would actually hit their targets, but at

8

least he said we might be pointing in the right direction.

9

When did the advocacy program start (see slides

10

4-5)?

11

started at the beginning of the Commission.

12

it started in 1974, as Bill Kovacic has stated in writing.

13

One can claim that it started in the 1970s as a result of

14

costs imposed by clumsy government policies, as Mike

15

Scherer wrote in article in 1990.

16

that the intervention program was the brainchild of

17

Chairman James C. Miller, as Bob Tollison said.

18

these opinions could be correct.

19

the more direct, in-your-face anti-regulation approach,

20

which probably was first a leading FTC initiative under

21

the Miller administration.

22

the Commission had active advocacy programs in

23

international trade and in the health care area.

24
25

We heard some discussion earlier.

One can claim it
One can claim

Finally, one can claim

Any of

Bob was talking about

However, during the seventies,

Slide 6 is the only graph.

It tells the story

of the life, near death, and possible return to life of
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the advocacy program.

2

of FTC filings at various state and federal agencies.

3

course, the counts aren't weighted.

4

The graph shows the actual number
Of

The count of filings in 1987 is not

5

representative, because about two dozen of them were

6

virtually identical.

7

ethics code that was cranking around all the states, and

8

we filed the same comment in 24 states.

9

could probably subtract 24 filings to obtain a filing

There was a proposed Bar Association

So in 1987, one

10

number that is comparable to total filings for other

11

years.

12

In any event, advocacy peaked in 1987, hit a low

13

point in 1997, and made a little bit of a comeback in

14

1998.

15

years.

16

on energy and electricity.

17

Policy Planning have expanded the horizons for the

18

program, and we're active in an increasing number of areas

19

beyond electricity.

20
21
22

There has been a further revival the past few
During 1995 to 2000, we focused almost exclusively
Now the folks in the Office of

Over the 20 year period shown in slide 6, we did
714 filings.

102 was the peak; 5 was the low.

How much did the advocacy program cost us?

It's

23

always nice to figure out how much you're paying for what

24

you're getting.

25

than 4 percent of its resources on advocacy.

See slide 7.

The FTC never used more
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1

frankly, I'm being conservative there.

2

never more than 3 percent of the FTC resources even at its

3

peak.

4

I bet advocacy was

During the latter part of the eighties, we had

5

pretty intensive scrutiny from various congressmen and

6

senators who were interested in how much we were spending

7

and whether we actually had an invitation to comment on

8

each issue.

9

collecting data on how much we spent on the program, and

During these years, we spent a lot of time

10

it was certainly less than 4 percent.

11

Commission is spending less than 1 percent of agency

12

resources on advocacy.

13

Currently, the

Slides 8-10 list numerous topics that have been

14

the subjects of advocacy filings over the years.

I am

15

going through them very quickly.

16

comments on international trade, starting in the 1970s.

17

Advocacy concerning horizontal restraints in an incredible

18

number of industries has a long history at the Commission.

19

We filed comments on many regulatory issues in

20

transportation, particularly during the 1980s.

21

Love Field, Texas, an airport regulatory issue, is John

22

Peterman's favorite.

23

rail regulation.

24

transportation industry was fair game for the Commission

25

to file comments reflecting the interests of consumers.

We filed numerous

One called

Other filings involved trucking and

Essentially, any regulated
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The issue of use-or-lose airport landing slots was one of

2

the most interesting of those issues.

3

We filed many comments before the Federal

4

Communication Commission.

In fact, current FCC Chairman

5

Powell is in trouble for an issue over which we filed many

6

comments during the 1980s -- trying to change the

7

ownership limits on television, radio, and newspaper

8

properties.

9

couple of studies on that topic.

We filed several advocacy comments and did a
Keith Anderson and John

10

Woodbury were the primary authors of those studies.

11

We did not participate in the more recent

12

debates on ownership limits at the FTC.

Given the

13

acrimony in the debates, perhaps it is fortunate that we

14

were not involved.

15

some additional support for whatever the right solution

16

is.

17

haven't done a study to look at it.

However, maybe we could have provided

I have my own prior about the right solution, but we

18

A number of studies involved topic areas that

19

only lasted a few years because the issues went away.

See

20

slide 11.

21

while.

22

Association of Attorneys General was interested in it.

23

Certificate of Need regulation was an important area for a

24

few years, and we did a number of studies that supported

25

our advocacy work in that area.

State anti-takeover legislation was hot for a

Car rental legislation was hot when the National
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Did we have any real successes?

The next

2

several slides list seven studies that "prove" we actually

3

had a significant effect.

4

don't think I'll go through all of them.

5

some of the areas I just mentioned.

6

Due to the lack of time, I
Most were in

The one that I think may have had the biggest

7

effect is number four here (slide 13).

Alan Mathios and

8

Bob Rogers did a lot of work on the relative merits of

9

price cap regulation versus the more traditional rate of

10

return regulation.

11

required a couple of years to complete.

12

only basis the FCC had for its attempt to move toward

13

price cap regulation.

14

any work that it may have done on the subject.

15

Chairman of the FCC cited our research as the only

16

empirical basis for using a less restrictive form of price

17

regulation.

18

Their study began in 1985 or 1986 and
It provided the

The FCC itself has not made public
But the

As I said, there were several other provable

19

successes.

Slides 17-21 show six of my favorites.

20

the time is late, I'm going to skip most of them.

21

we did 714 advocacies, the only thing I can do is make the

22

other 708 authors mad at me by listing my six favorites.

23

(Laughter.)

24

MR. PAUTLER:

25

quickly.

Since
Because

I’ll slip through these slides

Maybe you can pick them up as they flash past
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your faces.

My last point is that there is a substantial

2

synergy between Bureau of Economics reports and the

3

advocacy program.

4

release dates.

5

advocacy arguments that we made at various agencies.

6

Without empirical research and solid arguments that have

7

been well thought out, any advocacy filing would only

8

convince those who agreed with your position up front.

9

For this reason, I believe that FTC research in the area

Slides 22-24 link BE studies to their

All these BE reports were used to support

10

of regulation mattered a lot for the advocacy program and

11

allowed us to have the “greatest hits” that I talked about

12

before.

13

comments would have been a lot less compelling.

14

Without the research studies, most of our

We continue to do research in the regulation

15

area, although there's a lot less of it than we did in the

16

1980s, and much less comes out now as official BE reports.

17

A lot of it now tends to skip the BE release stage and go

18

directly to professional publication.

That process

19

actually has benefits for the author.

It doesn't have as

20

many direct benefits for the organization, but that's the

21

way it's working out now.

22

going to change in the future.

23
24

I don't know whether that's

Anyway, that's a quick run through the advocacy
program or “regulatory intervention” program.
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has questions may ask anyone in the front row who is still

2

here.

Thank you very much.

3

(Applause.)

4

MR. PAUTLER:

5

MR. LONG:

Bill?

You put up on the screen what you

6

did, either a report or an intervention.

7

looked at the results across 700 observations, not just at

8

the winners?

9

We knew you'd talk about the winners.

MR. PAUTLER:

Actually, I think you probably saw

10

the word "non-random" up there.

11

random selection.

12

Has anybody

That was clearly a non-

A few non-FTC observers have made general

13

evaluations of the advocacy program.

14

thought that the program was great.

15

actually wrote the statement on the slide, but the

16

Kirkpatrick Commission (slides 26-28) said that the

17

program was one of the most important things the

18

Commission was doing.

19

The ABA in 1989
Who knows who

The closest thing we have to an independent

20

evaluation of the advocacy program was Arnie Celnicker’s

21

1989 study, based on a survey of 1987 recipients of FTC

22

advocacy comments.

23

survey 1989 recipients of FTC advocacy comments.

The FTC staff used this methodology to
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1

surveys were a complete sample of advocacy comment

2

recipients during those years.

3

The recipients responded that the filings and

4

reports were useful.

5

they'd come back and ask us again for input if the

6

opportunity arose.

7

survey in the St. Louis Law Review in 1989.

8
9

I think 65 percent of them said

Arnie published results from the first

That's the closest thing I've got to an
evaluation of the advocacy program.

It may not be

10

perfect, but this survey is probably more than we do to

11

evaluate most of our programs.

12

QUESTION:

How many industries have we been

13

kicked out of?

14

effectiveness of the program.

15

That's an even better measure of the

MR. PAUTLER:

Well, we got some individual

16

responses from people who didn't really like what we said.

17

So we did hit a nerve in a number of instances.

18

you've got to remember about the advocacy program is that

19

there's always somebody on the other side.

20

bothering to comment, somebody invariably has a vested

21

interest on the other side and will be miffed by the FTC

22

showing up to make its argument.

23

the number of people that told us they were angry about

24

it, but I know there were more than two.

25

One thing

If we're

I never kept a count of

(Laughter.)
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MR. PAUTLER: We weren't kicked out of anything,

2

as best I can recall, as a result of an advocacy filing.

3

So we didn't have as much of an effect as, say, Mike

4

Lynch's insurance study.

5

Any other questions?

6

MR. HILKE:

You mentioned synergies between the

7

reports and the advocacy.

There are also some synergies

8

between the advocacy program and the litigation side,

9

because at least in the electricity side, our credibility

10

from competition advocacy has helped in litigation, and

11

vice versa.

12

doing one activity spill over into the others.

13
14

We could also examine how the effects of

MR. PAUTLER:

I'd like to thank everybody for

coming today.

15

(Applause.)

16

(Whereupon, at 5:15 p.m., the conference

17

concluded.)

18
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Policies Towards Vertical Restraints
in the 1970s

William S. Comanor
University of California
Los Angeles and Santa Barbara

Director, Bureau of Economics, FTC
1978-1980

1
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1970s: A Decade of Change in Policies
towards Vertical Restraints (1)
Legal Arena
•

1975, Repeal of Miller-Tydings and McGuire
Acts which authorized the state "fair trade"
laws.

•

1977, Sylvania decision retreats from standard
of per se illegality towards non-price restraints.

•

These two actions set the "high water" mark
for a policy against vertical constraints.

2
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1970s: A Decade of Change in Policies
towards Vertical Restraints (2)
Economic and Policy Arena
•

Publication of books by Richard Posner and
Robert Bork that rapidly created a new
"conventional wisdom" towards vertical
restraints.
Richard A. Posner, Antitrust Law: An
Economics Perspective, 1976.
Robert Bork, The Antitrust Paradox, 1978.

•

Proposed a total confluence of interests
between manufacturers and consumers in
regard to vertical relationships.

•

Questioned circumstances where vertical
restraints can have anti-competitive effects.

•

Called into question per se illegality standard
against vertical price restraints. [Noted by
Justice White in his concurring opinion in
Sylvania.]
3
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A Policy in Flux
•

Considerable uncertainty on how to proceed.
Some embraced the new conventional wisdom
and proposed a complete policy shift (led by
some B.E. economists).
Some emphasized that legal standards had
not changed, and also questioned the new
wisdom (led by B.C. lawyers).

•

Chairman Pertschuk, under considerable
political pressure for his initiative on Children's
Television Programming, took a conservative
position.

•

Few policy initiatives taken in late 1970s
towards vertical economic relationships.

4
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Data on FTC Vertical Restraints Cases
Initiated between 1975 and 1981 (1)
1975:

15 cases: all settled by consent
7 concerning RPM
5 concerning Tying

1976:

11 cases: 10 settled by consent, 1
complaint dismissed
6 concerning RPM
3 concerning shopping center lease
restrictions
1 concerning Tying

1977:

6 cases: all settled by consent
3 concerning RPM
2 concerning Tying
1 concerning shopping center lease
restrictions

1978:

3 cases: all settled by consent
2 concerning RPM

5
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Data on FTC Vertical Restraints Cases
Initiated between 1975 and 1981 (2)
1979:

9 cases: all settled by consent
7 concerning RPM
1 concerning shopping center lease
restrictions

1980:

6 cases: 5 settled by consent, 1 case where
FTC found liability but 8th Circuit reversed
6 concerning RPM
5 concerning Tying

1981:

2 cases: all settled by consent
1 concerning RPM

Of the 52 Vertical Restraints cases for which
Complaints issued:
32 (or 62%) concerned RPM
50 (or 96%) were settled by consent
32 Complaints issued between 1975 and 1977.
18 Complaints issued between 1978 and 1980.
Number of complaints declined by nearly half.

6
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On the Edge of a Revolution
•

Antitrust policy standards shifted sharply in
1981.

•

Few vertical restraints cases were brought by
the federal enforcement agencies in the
1980s.

•

With advantages of hindsight, we can see the
precursors of the new standards adopted in
the 1980s.

•

Economists played a leading role, but not well
understood at the time.

•

Culminated in Vertical Restraints Guidelines,
which have since with withdrawn.

7
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New Standards Supported in
FTC BE Staff Reports
FTC Report Overstreet, 1983:
"The general conclusion drawn here is that the
current rigidly applied standard of per se
illegality appears to be unnecessarily costly
when evaluated in terms of economic
efficiency." (p. 1)

FTC Report by Lafferty, Lande and Kirkwood, 1984:
"Evaluations of RPM cases...[suggest] the
following policy conclusions: (1) an approach
that allows RPM by a new entrant is very likely
to be socially beneficial, and (2) a provision...
that allows dealer selection on the basis of
quality is also likely to be beneficial." (p. 5)

8
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A Conflicting Standard
Scherer and Ross, 1990: "The weight of the
evidence...supports a conclusion that prices
are on average elevated [by RPM], perhaps
appreciably. ...[Studies] suggest average
price differentials of 10 to 23 percent." (pp.
555-6)
•

Is this a relevant factor?

•

Is consumer welfare likely to be enhanced
when final prices are higher?

9
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Has the Enforcement Pendulum
Shifted Again?
•

FTC v. Toys "R" Us
Opinion by Chairman Pitofsky, 1998
Affirmed by Court of Appeals (7th Cir.), 2000

•

U.S. v. Microsoft
Opinion by Judge Jackson, 2000
Affirmed liability by Court of Appeals (D.C.
Cir.), 2001

•

LePage's, Inc. v. 3M
Opinion of Judge Sloviter, Court of Appeals
(3rd Cir.), 2003

•

These cases have important vertical
components.

•

Do these cases signal a more active
enforcement policy towards vertical restraints?

•

Has the post-Chicago economic literature
played a role?

10

244

245

246

247

248

249

250

251

252

253

The Role of Economists in
Competition and Consumer
Advocacy

September 4, 2003

1
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What is the Advocacy Program?
The interests of consumers are not always well
represented in some legislative and regulatory forums.
The goal of the Commission’s advocacy program is to
share our experience and expertise with governmental and
self-regulatory bodies about the potential effects on
consumers of proposed legislation, rules, industry codes,
etc.
VERSUS
We tell other people how to do their job through marketbased approaches to regulation and public policy.

2
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What is the Advocacy Program?

(Continue)

Tollison (1983, p. 217) says the purpose of the early 1980s
intervention program was to attack government-maintained
monopolies through comments to other regulatory
agencies.
I think that such a resource allocation [toward advocacy]
by the agency is wise,
for at least its attorneys and economists are pointing their
guns at real monopoly power.

3
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When Did the Advocacy Program Start?
1. In the earliest days of the Commission, when the FTC
submitted comments to the Fuel Administration (on coal
pricing) and the War Industries Board (on steel).
2. Competition advocacy was made part of the
competition mission in 1974, under Chairman Louis
Engman. (Kovacic 1982, p. 649).

4
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W hen Did the Advocacy Program
Start? (Continue)
3. As a result of several 1970s BE
economic reports documenting the
costs imposed by clumsy government
policies (e.g., petroleum pricing,
optician regulation, occupational
licensing). (Scherer 1990, p. 471).
4. Brainchild of Chairman James C.
Miller III (Tollison 1983, p. 217).
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Advocacy Filings 1982-2002
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How Active Has the Advocacy Program Been and
What Has It Cost?
Number of filings = 714 from 1982-2002
Peak 1987 = 102
Through 1997 = 5
Current 2002 = 21
Resource use at peak 1987: <4% FTC (<35 workyears);
6-8% BE (7-10 workyears).
Current <1% FTC (5 workyears); 2% BE (1-2 workyears).
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Advocacy Topics: Hardy Perennials
Restraints on international trade (1975-1990) in steel,
Canadian softwood lumber, DRAMS computer chips, tuna
non-rubber footwear, etc. Fifty-three filings between 19821989.
Restraints on health care advertising and commercial
practices and contracting (1978-1994).
Horizontal restraints and entry barrier legislation (e.g.,
occupational regulation) lobbied for by various professions
and business groups, including attorney ethics codes
(1980-2000).
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Advocacy Topics: Hardy Perennials (Continue)
Regulation issues in airlines (Love field, Logan airport,
“use or lose” landing slot, etc.), rail, and truck
transportation (1980-1993).
Postal regulation issues (a dozen filings from 1981 to
1989).
Regulatory reform in telecommunications: broadcasting,
and cable TV regulation, must carry, fin-syn, PTAR,
electromagnetic spectrum allocation, telephony (19831995), (3 dozen FCC filings over the years).
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Advocacy Topics: Hardy Perennials (Continue)
Auto dealer entry restrictions and off-site auto sales (19821995).
Taxicab regulations (Twenty filings from 1983-1989).
State regulation of gasoline sales and marketing (dozens
from 1984 to 1992, 2002 - 2003).
Regulation of health and nutrition claims for foods in
advertising and labeling (1987-1993, 2000, 2002).
Restructuring of the electricity generation, transmission,
and distribution industry (1995-2002) FTC advocates
competitive structure rather than using behavioral rules

10
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Topics Lasting a Few Years
State Anti-takeover legislation 1984-1990
Health Care Certificate of Need laws 1983-1989
Rental Car legislation 1988-1990
Selective contracting and "any willing provider" laws 1993.
Pharmacy groups and others lobby state legislatures for
protection against the anticipated effects of HMOs and
health care reforms
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Effects of the Comments - Some Nonrandom
Examples
(1) Corporate Average Fuel Economy Standards 1986,
1988. Decisions not to raise the automobile fuel efficiency
standards were based on an empirical analyses provided
by BE staff.
(2) Certificate of Need regulation in North Carolina in
1989. BE comment played a key role in the Policy Board
recommendation against continuing the entry restraints.
Last in a series.
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Effects of the Comments - Some Nonrandom
Examples (Continue)
(3) Use or Lose rules for landing slots at four major U.S.
airports. In August 1992, the FAA increased the "use-orlose" usage rate from 65% to 80% on a weekly basis citing
prominently to the FTC comment, which reported that slot
usage by the major slot-holders already approaches or
exceeds 90%, and that larger firms used their slots more
intensively than did smaller owners.
(4) Comments to the FCC regarding the relative merits of
price cap regulation versus rate of return regulation in
1987 provided the factual basis for the FCC action.
Chairman of the FCC, cited FTC empirical results as the
basis of the FCC policy choice in a letter to Congressman

13
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Effects of the Comments - Some Nonrandom
Examples (Continue)

Dingell in1988. The research suggests that interstate
long-distance prices could fall by 7 percent if AT&T could
price its service more flexibly. In addition, entry
restrictions tend to raise rates by 10 percent.
(5) BE’s empirical work showed that rules proposed by
FDA in 1992 would disallow health claims for large classes
of healthy food, such as fish and lean meats. FDA altered
the rules so that better versions of bad foods would be
able to tout their superior characteristics.

14
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Effects of the Comments - Some Nonrandom
Examples (Continue)
(6) FTC staff filing to FDA on direct-to-consumer
prescription drug advertising in early 1996 “turned the tide”
toward allowing information to flow to consumers regarding
drug therapy options according to unsolicited comments by
an attorney for an advertisers trade association.

15
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Effects of the Comments - Some Nonrandom
Examples (Continue)

(7) FTC efforts to highlight the competition issues in
electricity industry restructuring had an impact as one
leading researcher in the area (Bill Hogan) used BE’s
arguments to make the point that open access to
transmission grids would only work if sellers truly trusted
the independence of the grid operator. In addition, one
FERC Commissioner used FTC staff advocacy comments
as a principal basis for his speech material. (Massey on
ISOs).

16
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Advocacy Favorites: Pick Six
(1) Massport's (Boston’s airport authority) Program for
Airport Capacity Efficiency, February 29, 1988.
The staff of the FTC commented on Massport's
proposal to change its landing slot prices to reflect costs,
including congestion costs. These comments were the
focus of much media attention, and the Executive Director
of Massport in a March 1988 letter thanked the FTC staff
for helping shape Massport's policy. BE did additional
work on possible follow-up briefs after DOT tried to kill the
Massport proposal.
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Advocacy Favorites: Pick Six

(Continue)

(2) The Federal Communications Commission's AM/FM
Radio and Television Ownership Rules, July 15, 1987.
In July 1987 the BE staff commented on the FCC
proposals for alterations in the form of regulation of radio
ownership. FCC rules restricted the extent of ownership of
radio and TV stations in the same market. BE staff
presented theory and empirical evidence to support the
idea that such cross-ownership could be efficient and
lower production costs without leading to adverse
competitive consequences due to increased concentration.
In December 1988 the FCC liberalized their rules
regarding cross-ownership and cited to the FTC staff
comments on efficiency aspects of cross-ownership
generally.
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Advocacy Favorites: Pick Six

(Continue)

(3) The FCC’s Financial Interest and Syndication Rule
which restricted ownership of the rights to re-run TV
shows, 3 filings in 1990-1991.
The FTC staff argued for repeal of these outdated
rules. New empirical analysis relating to the proper market
definition was provided in an appendix and the FTC staff
comment was the only unbiased comment to directly
address the issues raised by the economic analysis of the
movie coalition's experts. DOJ Assistant Attorney General
Rill found the economic analysis "superb".
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Advocacy Favorites: Pick Six

(Continue)

(4) The FCC’s Must-Carry Rule for Cable TV, November
26, 1991.
The "must-carry" rules, compelled local cable systems
to retransmit on its basic service tier all of the locally
broadcast stations. This comment contained a careful
empirical analysis of the effects of must-carry
requirements showing that the must carry rules did not
solve a significant problem, since almost all cable stations
carried all the local stations whether they were required to
or not. The cable systems apparently wanted to carry
stations people wanted to watch. There was also no
evidence that the cable companies were trying to
monopolize any advertising market as the must-carry
proponents alleged.
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Advocacy Favorites: Pick Six

(Continue)

(5) Housing and Urban Development proposals to ban
referral fees paid by home mortgage lenders, July 15,
1988; Follow-on RESPA Reform, 2002.
Made the point that regulating one small component
of the price of a bundle of services was likely to mislead
mortgage shoppers and lead to higher, not lower,
mortgage rates for borrowers.
(6) Federal Energy Regulatory Commission’s open
access rules for electricity distribution, August 7, 1995.
BE’s opening salvo in 8 years of comments on various
aspects of electricity system regulatory reform.

21
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Selected BE Reports Used in the Advocacy Program
International trade restraints 1977, 1980, 1984, 1987,
1989, 1994
State board optometry rules 1980
Airport landing slot allocation 1983, 1988
Taxi entry and price regulation 1984
Dental hygienists 1986
Retail market area laws for auto dealers 1986
Certificate of need and health care services 1986, 1987,
1988
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Selected BE Reports Used in the Advocacy Program
(Continue)
State anti-takeover laws 1987
Regulation of long distance telephony 1988
Ocean Shipping 1989, 1996
Trucking deregulation 1988, 1995
Health claims for foods before and after the NLEA 1989,
1996, 2002
Occupational regulation 1990
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Selected BE Reports Used in the Advocacy Program
(Continue)
Other BE-funded studies:
Hospital Merger Report 1991-1994 (various journals)
Natural Gas Pipelines 1993
Regional Effects of Import Restraints 1996
Cable TV Must Carry 1997
Fats and Oils Advertising before the NLEA 2000
Gasoline Divorcement 2000
Selective Contracting and Any Willing Provider Laws 2001
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Advocacy Program Evaluations
Some effort was made to assess the Advocacy Program’s
impact.
Celnicker, 1989 Law Review article reviewing 1985 1987 comments concluded that
the FTC provided input that decisionmakers found
useful.... Sixty-five percent of the survey recipients
indicated that they either had requested, or plan to
request, FTC input on other issues.
A follow-up survey done internally over the next 2 years
produced the same conclusion.
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Advocacy Program Evaluations (Continue)
The 1989 ABA Antitrust section’s “Kirkpatrick Report”
stated:
The FTC's Competition and Consumer Advocacy
Program is one of the most important of the
FTC's various projects.... It has generally
provided quality advice about issues of
consequence.
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Advocacy Program Evaluations (Continue)
The FTC's competition advocacy program
permits it to accomplish for consumers what
prohibitive costs prevent them from tackling
individually. It is the potential for the FTC to undo
governmentally imposed restraints that lessen
consumer welfare, and to prevent their
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Advocacy Program Evaluations (Continue)
imposition, that warrants the program's
continuance and expansion. ...potential
benefits from an advocacy program
exceed the Commission’s entire budget.
These positive evaluations, however, were followed by the
decline and then near-death of the program over the 1990
to 1997 period.
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Advocacy Program as a Bureaucratic Vagabond
Since 1980 each Bureau played a role in Advocacy, with
BE being the key substantive player. The process
required a lot of coordination (not to mention patience).
1980-1982 The Bureau of Competition (BC) provided
most of the coordination. (Healthcare competition and
international trade restraints focus).
1983-1984 The program is formalized and centered in the
Bureau of Consumer Protection's Evaluation division. The
intervention effort was lead by Andrew Strenio.
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Advocacy Program as a Bureaucratic Vagabond
(Continue)
1985-1986 New head of the program, Walter Vandaele.
BC's policy group under Sid Moore also played a
substantial role as did Keith Anderson, head of Regulatory
Analysis in BE.
1986-1988 Executive Director’s Office. The coordination
function was handled by Jim Giffin.
1988-1994 Office of Competition and Consumer
Advocacy (OCCA) was formed and Richard Fielding and
Bruce Levine took over control, replaced by Michael Wise
in 1992?
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Advocacy Program as a Bureaucratic Vagabond
(Continue)
1994-1997 BE becomes home of the program. Mike Wise
remained with the Program, becoming Associate Director
for Advocacy and Legal Counsel in the Bureau of
Economics.
1998-2001 Advocacy moves to Policy Planning. Bill
Cohen handled the coordination tasks for four months and
Michael Wroblewski took over in April 1998.
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Advocacy Program as a Bureaucratic Vagabond
(Continue)
2001-2003 GC/Policy Planning split the function. The
management of the advocacy function moved briefly to GC
with Mike Wroblewski in June 2001, then it moved to OPP
in 2001/2002 with Jerry Ellig, except for electricity and
pharmaceutical patent matters which Wroblewski retained.
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